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Eight years ago I had a discussion with a friend. During an internship in Poland we decided it could
be very profitable to open a hotel/restaurant at the border between Germany and Poland, in order to
accommodate the many truck drivers that had to wait endlessly before being allowed to enter Poland.
Based on the fact that we did not like the idea of spending much time in our own hotel, in a remote
area only surrounded by truck drivers without our family (because we assumed they would not enjoy
our hotel either) and the realization that there were probably some bureaucratic obstacles we had not
yet considered, we decided not to pursue our plan. Instead, I started writing a dissertation.
About a month ago, on one of my regular commutes to Maastricht, I heart a story on the radio about
a project a Dutch businessman started in Latvia. A few years ago he was on holiday, traveling around
the Baltic States with a friend, and visited a small island with only one mansion. They spent a nice day
on the island, dreaming about the tourist possibilities such a mansion offered. Last year his friend had
called him with the news that the mansion was for sale. After a short ten minute phone conversation
they decided to buy the mansion and convert it into a hotel. They made this decision without a
thorough economic analysis or calculation, based solely on the memories of the nice day they spent
there. It turned out to be a good decision; the hotel is now one of the most exclusive tourist
accommodations in Latvia.
This story interested me a lot. Although it did not surprise me, it did give me a good feeling. The
fact that a Dutch businessman had a similar experience to the one I had eight years ago. and many
years later decided to take action based on little less more than a good feeling, confirmed that the
topic of this dissertation is still very current seven years after I started it.
When starting as a PhD student I was unsure whether I would be interested in and capable of doing
research. The transition countries interested me a lot indeed. Such a large and culturally diverse
region at such short distance from the Netherlands, that only recently started reforming, was an ideal
object for my study. The major political and economic changes that occurred in the region, the
winners and losers of the market economy, individuals but also regions and even countries, all made
the choice of a research topic easy. However, the idea of sitting behind my computer for many years
in a small, dark office scared me considerably. Only the assurance of Chris de Neubourg that I would
be able to do research and combine those research activities with projects and consultancy activities
made me decide to try it. It turned out to be a good decision. Most of the time I enjoyed my work,
specifically the different aspects of research, teaching and consulting. That is not to say that I enjoyed
it all the time. I also suffered from the "great PhD depression", wondering if I would be able to write a
book good enough to be defended. During those times, the good times but specifically the less nice
periods, I was lucky to be supported by Remco and my family and friends, who encouraged me to
continue writing. But it wasn't until the birth of Gijs that I knew I would finish the work. He made me
aware of the true value of life and decreased the importance of this book considerably. Exactly that
realization, that this book was only important to a certain extent, made it easier to finish. So I did.
Now the birth of this book, my second birth, is a fact. Even though I am extremely satisfied that I
finished and am pleased with the content of this dissertation, the result does not compare to the
beauty of my first birth.'V"-, ,•':•• '>"Acknowledgements ••••"-,•• ••<-•• ^••-sr-:;-. SV
Writing a dissertation is a lonely job. Not many people understand the content of the job
"researcher", let alone understand what my research is about. Generally people know I am working at
Maastricht University, my work has something to do with Central and Eastern Europe and I
sometimes worked in Moldova. But what exactly I study and why it is important to me remains the
question. I hope that the content of this book, specifically the Dutch summary in the back, and my
"fifteen minutes of fame" during the introduction of the defense will change that a little and that I will
be able to transmit some of the enthusiasm I obtained for research over the last years.
Even though being a PhD researcher is a lonely job, it does not mean I did the job alone. Many
people assisted me, some of which I want to thank explicitly. First and foremost I want to thank Chris
de Neubourg, for convincing me to write a dissertation and supporting me the whole period. I enjoyed
working with you, in an open, friendly and honest environment. I appreciate our discussions and
always left our meetings with new energy, numerous new ideas and a smile. Thank you for creating
the possibility to combine research with more practical jobs, which enabled me to develop my skills
also in other areas than research.
Second, I want to thank Jaap Bos, Ben Kriechel and Allard Bruinshoofd. Having you as roommates
and fellow PhD students made my research-life more interesting and a lot more pleasant. I believe the
atmosphere in our room was always positive, discussions on every subject were possible and you
were always willing to listen, read my work, advice me and assist me when needed. Not only work
related. Jaap en Ben, I am convinced your support as paranimf will be equally appreciated. I am glad
to have you as friends.
I received a lot of assistance in my research. My work benefited greatly from the advice of Gerard
Pfann and the members of the research team at the Business Investment Research Center. I
specifically want to express my appreciation to Wilko Letterie for the joint work included in chapter two
of this dissertation and Boris Blumberg for his assistance in the development and methodology
description of the survey. I also want to express my gratitude to Jaap Bos and his colleagues at De
Nederlandsche Bank for their cooperation and comments on the gravity analysis in chapter five. Last,
I believe chapter six improved a lot due to the advice of Christiane Schwieren, Piet Keizer and Klaus
Meyer. The Q-seminars and later Maastricht Interdepartmental Lecture seminars provided me with
the opportunity to present my unfinished work and receive constructive comments, for which I thank
the participants.
With all those researchers around, it is important to find a balance between research and daily life.
Mieke Drossaert, Celine Duijsens and Susan Roggen excellently took care of the personal aspects at
work. They created a nice atmosphere in their office, showing interest in things other than research. I
enjoyed the regular short conversations in your room a lot. I also highly appreciate your willingness to
assist me, even with less pleasant activities. Susan, thanks for correcting my Dutch summary and
bibliography. Sylvia Beenen, thank you for the administrative support.! ••- '• .!.• >": P-. ••:" ij •.*"*«."
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Chapter 1 Introduction ^»i^^f;s-si|e^«'ä^^i;: ^•:>^
The compe///ng necess/ry of fhe princ/pfe of freedom of c/70/ce /s a/so c/ear to ws. Tfte fa/7ore to
recogn/ze fh/s /'...y ;s fratyg/7^ w/fh fery d/re consequences, consequences for wor/d peace.
Deny/ng fhaf rig/hf to /he peop/es, no matter whaf fhe pretext, no maffer tvhaf words are used to
concea/ rf, means /nfr/ng/ng upon even fhe unsfaWe ta/ance fhar /s /\. ./. Freedom of cho/ce /s a
un/Versa/ pr/nc/p/e to ivh/cn fnere shou/d be no excepf/ons."
(MW73//Gorbachev, 7 December J98S, speech to (he C/V genera/ assemb/y) ' ' ,
In his speech to the United Nations general assembly in December 1988, from which this quote was
taken, Nobel prize winner Mikhail Gorbachev basically surprised the whole world, by not only
stressing the importance of the principle of freedom of choice, but by accompanying those words with
the announcement that the Soviet Union would reduce its military presence in Central and Eastern
Europe, as well as in the Central Asian border region. This move eventually led to the separation of
the Central and Eastern European states in 1989 and 1990 and to the end of the Soviet Union. The
most visible starting point of the turnaround, the fall of the Berlin wall on November 9'* 1989, was one
of the most unexpected, impressive and important events of the last century. The countries from
Central and Eastern Europe broke with the Soviet Union, stepped away from the socialist ideology
and started reforming themselves towards becoming democratic societies. Soon after, the Soviet
Union broke up into 15 independent countries, initiated by a separation of the Baltic States and
Ukraine who declared full independence in 1991.
The changes for the countries were huge. Major reforms needed to be undertaken. In the short run
prices of goods were liberalized and countries opened their borders to free trade and investments.
Private ownership of companies became allowed and countries started privatizing state-owned
enterprises. Macroeconomic stabilization, including exchange rates and monetary policy, was of high
priority. In the longer run institutions needed to be established to deal with the market economy. More
importantly, the society needed to adjust to the changing norms and values in the now democratic
market economic countries, which were highly different from the previous socialistic planned
economies. Individual reward systems, such as wages based on performance, became accepted and
private initiatives and entrepreneurship were encouraged. Companies (private and state-owned)
needed to become demand driven and profit oriented instead of supply driven, production plan
oriented. Countries engaged in these reforms at different paces and using different methods, but in
general the focus was put on privatization, liberalization and stabilization.' After more than a decade
the reforms in those areas were more or less completed in most of the Central and Eastern European
countries.*
' The Washington Consensus (Williamson 1994). rebuilding entire societies quickly according to a blueprint, was applied to
transition countries (Ellman, 1997)
* The actual reforms are meant, not necessarily the implementation of the reforms For example, the share of private ownership
versus state ownership is comparable to other market economies. The question whether the privatised firms are already
restructured and function according to market oriented mechanisms as well as firms in Western Europe is not discussed here.
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The establishment of institutions and the social changes were often considered less of a priority,
both by the countries themselves and by the bilateral and multilateral donor organizations assisting in
the developments. As a result, the transition to a market economy has been less complete in those
areas. Nowadays the negligence of those two areas is considered a strategic mistake, given that
changes in those areas are crucial for the general functioning of the economies (EBRD Transition
Report, 2000)
1.1 FDI to and trade with Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia '
While clearly the changes were enormous for the CEECs (Central and Eastern European countries)
and Central Asia, also for the Netherlands the collapse of communism was influential. Not only the
hostility between the East and West decreased as the cold war ended, but at the same time a huge
market opened up for trade and investments. Foreign trade and investments were always kept as low
as possible in the 20'* century, for different reasons (see box 1.1).
Given that the focus in the socialist countries was on industrialization, there was a shortage of
consumer goods and the quality of the goods that were available was generally low. The transition
countries formed a large new market for foreign (including Dutch) enterprises that could fill this niche.
Allowing for FDI and the impact this FDI has on the local economies are two interesting economic
phenomena happening in the course of transition. In general FDI is considered a source of growth for
thp host country for various reasons.Chapter 1 Introduction









After the Russian revolution, a blockade imposed by Western powers virtually put an end to all
foreign trade and FDI. At the same time. Lenin advocated a policy of self-sufficiency, meaning
socialist countries should try to fulfill their basic needs using the production factors and facilities in
their own countries. Trade between socialist countries was allowed.' In order to temporarily
substitute the import of foreign goods and capital from the West, mass labor was used. A state
monopoly for foreign trade was installed and state-owned foreign trade organizations were
established.
Foreign trade with the West was gradually allowed through the foreign trade organizations and
trade was mostly used as political and economic medium to solve internal issues. Trade occurred
on bilateral level', solely to fulfill immediate needs for certain goods. The imported goods were paid
for through economic or political concessions, for example restitution of foreign heritage. After 1925
joint-stock companies were allowed to directly import and export, though always under the
supervision of the state-owned foreign trade organization. Foreign investments were not allowed
(with a few exceptions) since they were contradicting the politically motivated isolationism
Stalin strongly advocated economic independence and tried to eliminate foreign trade as much as
possible. Industrialization should lead to the necessary growth and occurred at the expense of
agriculture. Some imports were needed to achieve industrialization and fulfill the production targets
set by the central plan. Those imports needed to be balanced by agricultural exports. Demand for
the Soviet Union export goods on the world market was low since the world suffered from the Great
Depression and the quality of those export goods was not high In order to earn the necessary
income, the Soviet Union sold their exports at extremely low prices, eventually resulting in
accusation and punishment for dumping.
At the start of World War II the Soviet Union allowed only for minimal trade with political reasons.
Trading with nazi-Germany allowed the Soviet Union to prepare their military forces two more years
for war. Trade with other countries was still minimal.
During the period the Soviet Union was involved in the Second World War, foreign trade with
western capitalist countries occurred on a lend-lease basis. The capitalist countries needed the
Soviet Union as ally in the war and were willing to export to the Soviet Union without being directly
paid. The settlements of those lend-lease arrangements eventually led to large problems.
During (he Co/d IVar era, the desirability and possibility for trade with the West diminished. Foreign
trade occurred mainly between the socialist countries, joining the CMEA (Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance*). Coordination was done by the Soviet Union, where prices or exchange
rules were created by bureaucratic organizations Since the currencies were not convertible, trade
was often done on bilateral basis using barter. FDI was still hardly present, not even between the
CMEA countries
In the 1970s the situation changed, mainly because of the discovery of oil and natural gas in the
Soviet Union. Given that those resources could easily be traded for hard currency on the world
market and the price for oil was high, this discovery led to a large export. This allowed the Soviet
Union to buy technology without becoming indebted. In addition, the West changed its attitude
positively, increasing the willingness to trade and grant credits to the socialist countries. Still. CMEA
trade based on barter remained the most dominant form of trade in the socialist countries. In
addition, industrial cooperation became more intensive. Yugoslavia (1967). Romania (1971) and
Hungary (1972) were the first countries that introduced joint venture laws, allowing foreign
participation. Hungary extended its laws frequently in the years after to accommodate foreigners.
But. because of the unstable political situation and weak economic development of those countries,
the inflow of FDI remained very limited. In addition, private production was also limited, and only
allowed at small scale in Poland (agriculture) and Hungary (small businesses).* In 1980. Bulgaria
introduced a law allowingjoint ventures with up to 99 percent foreign participation.
Czechoslovakia. Poland and the Soviet Union opened up for joint ventures with foreign participation
in 1985 and 1986. Gorbachev's reforms further liberalized the markets, but a decrease in oil prices
blocked further increase in trade Since export revenues decreased, the Soviet Union had to limit
the imports. New legislation allowed for joint ventures and a careful step towards enterprise zones.
The implementation of those plans never happened, since transition started in 1989-1990.
Sources: Ebberbach (1982). Gueullette (1991), Kornai (1992). Meyer (1998), Djarova (2004)
Ideally, a socialist universe would be created, in which socialist countries freely traded according to the socialist principles.
However, this ultimate aim of the revolution - a politically and economically unified universe - was never achieved (Trotsky.
1918. described in Gueullette, 1991)
' Germany was the first country that signed such a bilateral trade agreement. The USA remained the exception: the Soviet
Union never traded with the USA.
* CMEA is often referred to as Comecon. It was set up in 1949 and dissolved in 1991 Members were the Soviet Union.
Bulgaria. Czechoslovakia, East Germany. Hungary. Poland. Romania, Cuba, Mongolia and Vietnam. Yugoslavia and Albania
were initially members, but left the CMEA before 1991
* The initial reforms allowing private ownership and foreign involvement on a small scale in Hungary and Poland were part of
the reasons why those two countries performed relatively well in the early years of transition.Chapter 1 Introduction - •- --••<•• • -r-v.-O
FDI contributes directly to country development by providing capital and creating employment
possibilities. In addition, foreign human capital enters the country as well as firms with a higher level
of technology than the local firms. Local people and firms benefit from these skills; they contribute to
increased local human capital in the form of labor and management skills and increased technology
adoption. The presence of foreign firms helps develop institutional structure, creating distribution
channels and changing the business culture. Foreign firms can also give a boost to the local
economy, given that they may buy inputs from the local firms and the fact that employees of the firm
spend (part of) their salaries in the local retail stores. Last, the inflow of FDI decreases the chance for
policy reversals, which was especially important in the early years of transition. Once foreign firms
had entered the market, it was harder for politicians to revert to the closed economy of the socialist
past.
It is very interesting to study which countries in transition have been successful in attracting FDI
and what the host country determinants of the FDI flows are. If the inflows of FDI indeed lead to
positive economic development, it is useful to know more about the motivations of firms that have
invested in the region in order to be better capable of attracting FDI in the future.
In this study the focus is on Dutch direct investments to Central and Eastern Europe and Central
Asia. Engaging in an FDI in a transition country during the 1990s could offer attractive prospects for
Dutch enterprises. Allowing foreign enterprises to become active in transition countries meant
opening up a land of opportunities in the form of a large region with abundant natural resources
relatively close by. In addition, the region was characterized by a lack of production and
entrepreneurial skills to develop the market in the short run. Given the fact that local and foreign
investments were low, possibilities were present in almost every field to set up a company without
facing much competition. In other words, if a company delivered a product or service that was absent
or of better quality than the supply in a transition country, or if a company was better able to manage
its company efficiently, there were ample opportunities to become profitable. An increase of Dutch FDI
in the region in the 1990s was therefore expected and those investments were also expected to be
successful. '
It remains unclear whether the expectations were met, since studies on Dutch FDI in transition
countries are limited. There exists a large body of theoretical literature on FDI, but empirically not
many studies have focused on outward Dutch FDI.' No study focuses on all aspects of Dutch direct
investments, including macrolevel and microlevel analyses. This study intends to fill this above-
mentioned gap. First, it studies firm-level characteristics in order to find out whether some firms are
more likely to invest than other firms. Second, a microlevel analysis is included, with specific
information on the investment decision at the firm level. Third, it includes a macrolevel analysis of
Dutch FDI flows to the transition countries.
' Hogenbirk (2002) gives an interesting overview of inward FDI Drogendijk (1998) focuses on the transition countries, but
studies more cultural aspects Belderbos (1992) studies the interdependence of the investments of Dutch multinational
enterprises in the Netherlands and foreign locations. Carmeaux and Huisman (1986) focus on Dutch FDI to developing
countries Less academic, more business oriented research exists of several guidebooks or leaflets, often published on a yearly
basis, describing how to engage in FDI and what aspects to take into account (eg. Fenedex. KPMG. Price Waterhouse
Coopers). There are also country studies describing the most recent developments in the CEE region and Central Asia
published on a regular basis, often including a chapter on FDI (EBRD country studies). Lastly, some publications were written
on the success and failure of Dutch FDI in the CEE region (VNO-NCW (1997). Hastenberg en van Rietbergen (1993)).Chapter 1 Introduction — •<•-'•; ' :••'•>/•->
1.2 Dutch FDI to the transition countries: definition and summary statistics
Foreign direct investment is defined as net inflows (or stock) of investment to acquire a lasting
management interest (ten percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy
other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term
capital and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments (International Monetary Fund,
Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook).'
The main motivation to focus on FDI, instead of exports or portfolio investments in this study is the
long-term perspective firms mostly have when engaging in an FDI. Investment sums are often large
and involve sunk costs, making the investment irreversible. That makes an FDI less suitable for the
pursuit of short run profit. There are generally speaking four kinds of FDI (Dunning, 2000):
• Market seeking FDI, in order to satisfy the foreign market. " ' •
• Resource seeking FDI, to gain access to natural resources. ••>''" ^ * ' *'
• Efficiency seeking FDI, in order to achieve a more efficient division of labor or more efficient
use of another asset.
• Strategic asset seeking FDI, designed to protect advantages a firm possesses at the moment
of the investment, or reduce possibilities for the competitors. . ....
In 1989 the total stock of Dutch direct investments in the world was 73443 million euro, equaling 32
percent of the Dutch GDP. 48 percent of this amount was invested in Europe, 45 percent in North and
South America and eight percent in the rest of the world. Dutch FDI to Europe flows mainly to the
countries from the European Union. In 1989 less than one percent of the stock was invested in the
CEECs or Soviet Union. None of the countries in the CEE region or the former Soviet Union record a
stock of Dutch FDI above one million euro. The FDI stock is especially low when considered per
capita. EU countries receive an FDI per capita of 88,4 euro, the FDI per capita in the CEECs and FSU
equals two eurocent in 1989. Based on these data a catch up effect of the CEECs and FSU could be
expected, leading to high FDI inflows in the 1990s.
Dutch FDI to the CEECs and FSU indeed has increased enormously since 1989 (see figure 1.1). In
2002, the total FDI stock in the region was 13.600 million euro, resulting in an FDI stock per capita of
37.5 euro. This amount is almost 1900 times as high as the FDI per capita in 1989. However, the
division of FDI over the countries shows large inequalities. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and
Russia jointly received about 90 percent of the total FDI, leaving the other 21 countries with only ten
percent. This large inequality is clearly shown by the trend lines in figure 1.1; the EU accession
countries received more FDI than the rest of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
' -.:fr< :-' '..-•"•-V •• ':•'• -:!•• •-•: ' • • - ' : •<=.<! :-V/Vi:>-
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Outward FDI stocks are positive in this analysis. FDI flows can be negative on firm level but also on country level. This
situation occurs if firms quit with the FDI, disinvest or repay loans in the home country more than they invest in the host country.Chapter 1 Introduction
Graph 1.1: Yearly FDI inflows and stock (million euro)
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1.3 Research questions , .; »i , .^
The purpose of this dissertation is to obtain a better idea of the complete investment decision process
of Dutch firms investing abroad. The research questions are i) Which firm characteristics increase the
chance a firm invests, ii) What does the investment decision process of firms look like and is it
different for investors and noninvestors?, iii) Which country determinants attract Dutch investments to
transition countries? and iv) How does personal influence relate to direct investment decisions?
The microlevel analysis in this dissertation focuses on the home-country firms (supply side).
Studying the firm's characteristics and reasons gives insight in the question why some Dutch
enterprises invest in a transition country, whereas others firms decide not to invest. This could be
simply a matter of firm characteristics, meaning there is an attractiveness of the region for a certain
type of firms. Firms from the oil sector for example are in general interested in the countries with
natural resources and the banking sector was in principle interested in the transition countries since
this sector was not well developed in 1989. Summarizing, having certain firm characteristics can be a
reason to invest in a transition country.
But the decision to invest is more complicated and does not solely depend on firm characteristics.
The internal investment decision processes of firms are very different and are likely to affect the final
investment decision. The information provision with respect to an investment is important, as are the
analysis and interpretation of this information. Some firms will be certain to invest based on only
limited information, whereas others will need a lot more information before they decide to invest or
not. Studies on the investment processes of firms are limited and therefore additional knowledge can
increase the effectiveness of investment-supporting institutions in home and host country in helping
firms decide. This not only means information is needed on the investment decision processes of
firms that decided to set up an FDI, but also information on the processes of those firms that - afterChapter 1 Introduction
serious considerations - decided not to invest.
Instead of looking at the supply side (home country firms), the host country perspective can be
placed central. Why do some countries receive high FDI inflows, whereas others countries from the
same region hardly benefit from the Dutch entrepreneurial activities. In other words, what are the
determinants of Dutch investments to transition countries? The macrolevel analysis is based on a
dataset containing yearly Dutch FDI flows and country specific macroeconomic indicators. Looking at
the yearly aggregate FDI flows gives a clear picture which countries are receiving most Dutch FDI and
show a large discrepancies of inflows over the countries.
A last microlevel problem discussed in this study relates to the unexplained decisions factors. One
of the interesting findings of studying the investment procedures at firm level was the importance of
personal influences in decision making. Some firms base their investment decision not necessarily on
economic motivations, such as profit expectations, but rely more on personal aspects. Examples of
personal influences are the nationality of the firm's owner. Such kind of personal motivations have so
far been excluded from direct investment decision theories, but can play an important role. Therefore
it is important to include those factors in both theoretical models and empirical research to investment
decisions of firms.
In order to answer the microlevel research questions raised here, specific firm-level data are
needed. Given that the available databases did not contain sufficient information, including both
company characteristic and FDI information, a survey was developed. The main advantage of
constructing a new database is that the information in the database is tailor-made to answer the
research questions posed. Disadvantage of using survey data is that a questionnaire can only contain
a limited number of questions, thus limiting the amount of information available and the information
provided can be subjective. Following the informed observer approach, relying not only on the
knowledge and intuition of the researcher but also basing the main research questions on the
knowledge of the /nfo/imed observers (the Dutch entrepreneurs active in transition countries)
benefited the practical relevance of this survey.^ In addition, all of the firms to whom the survey was
sent were interested in the transition economies, but some decided to invest and others did not. The
inclusion of both investors and non-investors makes a comparison of the investment process possible,
providing information on possible differences in preparatory processes. Such a database has not
been studied before, neither in the Netherlands nor in other countries and it can add to the general
understanding related to investment decisions.
1.4 Outline of the study
The first part of the dissertation contains a microlevel analysis. Chapter fwo provides a theoretical
overview of the direct investment decision literature used in this study, the real option theory. In
section 2.2 a description is given of the basic option model. I argue that this model is theoretically well
suited to model FDI decision making, since it incorporates the irreversibility as well as the uncertainty
of the investment. In section 2.3 the option model is extended so as to include the possibility to
choose from several investment projects and section 2.4 allows for different degrees of uncertainty in
the projects from which to choose. The theoretical overview and extension of the option model give an
indication of the main research questions of this dissertation. Chapters three and four include
* The informed observer approach is a central concept within the NWO Pionier project to which this research was linked.
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empirical studies testing the expectations based on the option model using Dutch microlevel data. In
chapter tfiree a short overview of Dutch FDI flows to transition countries is given. In addition the
survey data are used to find out which Dutch firms are most likely to invest in the CEE region. Chapter
four studies the internal investment decision processes of firms in order to detect if there is a deviation
in investment processes for investors and noninvestors. The influence of experience is also tested,
checking how the investment decision process with respect to the first FDI in the CEE region relates
to the process followed for the firms' latest FDI in the region. Finally an investment framework relates
the availability of information to the investment decision. I argue that firms will continue to collect
information in a decision process up to the point the firm is confident to decide whether or not to
invest, as long as the benefits of having additional information exceed the costs of obtaining the
information. One of the important finding when studying the firms' investment processes was that
personal motivations are important in the decision making.
Part two of this dissertation includes a macrolevel analysis of Dutch FDI flows. In chapter five
macro data are used to estimate a gravity model for Dutch FDI worldwide. This model is used to see
whether transition countries have been able to improve their weak start-of-transition positions as host
countries of Dutch investments and if they are now receiving a share of FDI inflows that could be
expected based on their macroeconomic characteristics and performance.
Part three of this study, c/japter s/x, builds on the conclusion made in chapter four that personal
motivations play an important role in decision making. The information from the survey shows that
many firms incorporate personal motivations in their investment decision. In this chapter I argue that
these kind of personal motivations can be linked to individual concepts, such as personal intuition and
emotions. I argue that this intuition and emotion of the decision-maker are of importance in a firm's
investment decision, even though they are rarely included in economic theory. In section 6.5 I use a
utility model including the utility of the firm as well as the utility of the decision-maker to incorporate
emotions and intuition in an investment decision model. • •• • ,' • .r?H --"•# "r • rf;Kv?., ^
Chapter seven summarizes the research and provides policy advice based on the results of the
dissertation.
Since existing databases did not have sufficient data to answer the main problem statements, I
developed a survey. Annex A describes the methodology of the survey. Annex B consists of the
translated questionnaires sent to the investors and noninvestors.
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Chapter 2 The real option model applied to foreign direct
investment decision-making .; ^ ,.».;, -.WVM-U* «SSO.^ITOB-»^!.^.-«.. **.•<;«»«
"A good chess p/ayer rtaf tosf a game /s senous/y conwnced h/s toss was fhe resu/f oA a m/sfafce
he made. He searches for maf m/sfa/ce /n fhe open/ng of fhe game öuf forgefs //?af /n each sfage
of fhe mafch he made s/m//ar m/sfa/ces and none of h/s moves was perfecf. He on/y nof/ces one
spec/f/c m/sfa/ce, to wh/ch he devotes h/s attention, because h/s opponent made use of ;Y.
How much more comp//cated /s (be game of war, fbaf /s p/aced vwf/un a certa/n f/me span and ;n
wh/ch (here /s no/ one w/// d/ctaf/ng to move obsfac/es, buf /n wh/ch everyth/ng /s (be resu/f of
end/ess co///s/ons of fhe w/Y/power of mosf d/vergenf/nd/v/dua/s" « " "-»;•;*. ,^a <•, ».••.•w--*»'-! af
(leo/V. ro/stoyf7868;, War and Peace). . ; .•;?;•: !^^......•!-• •,.,.< »«i. ;*>•«»>
• -.• • '--M '., •'••' >f:x'"' •>• -,."•- >. '.'•'vt 'A- •-. ,•<;•'.• -ifä»
2.1 Introduction «w* v •..-:•' *- •:•»•• «
Several theoretical models have been developed in order to explain outward foreign direct investment
flows and stocks. Macroeconom/c mode/s are used to describe the size and direction of the FDI flows
to specific host countries, taking into account country-specific conditions, such as the general
economic development of the countries, labor market situations or sector specific influences. At the
firm level, case sfud/es or management sfud/es use elaborate frameworks to describe or model the
preconditions, reasons and motivations for firms to engage in an FDI. M/croeconom/c mode/s look at
firm decision-making, where different investment strategies result in different cost and benefit factors
being taken into account. ^ • ' • •••?•-• v-< :;-: "<;y; ?-'?>»
These theoretical studies have been accompanied by a string of empirical studies that have been
published the last decades. Still, a direct link between macro and micro FDI models and business
investment frameworks has not yet been formulated. Many FDI models co-exist, but the links between
the different fields of expertise often remain unclear. This absence is at least surprising given that it is
likely that firms, when making an investment decision, will take some aspects of each of the fields into
account. First, FDI is subject to a required set of preconditions and motivations, as described in the
business literature. Second, firms may want to consider macroeconomic conditions in order to select
the host country that appears most interesting to them. Third, firms will need to evaluate internally
whether an investment is interesting from a cost and benefit point of view.
This chapter focuses mainly on the third point mentioned. The combination with point one and two
is relatively straightforward. I assume that firms interested in an FDI will i) have the necessary
preconditions and motivations, otherwise they would not consider an FDI and ii) will select one or
more potential host countries before making cost and benefit analyses (see chapter five for a
macroeconomic study on host country determinants). With respect to cost-benefit FDI decisions,
there are two main references I would like to mention before engaging in this chapter's addition to the
theory. First, the cost/benefit analyses of FDI that is most referred to is a model on the direct
investment decision of a firm by Buckley and Casson (1981). In their Net Present Value analysis
(NPV), the timing of an investment and mode of market servicing is determined on the basis of
several variables.' They assume non-recoverable set-up costs of an FDI, recurrent fixed costs
' Production costs, transportation costs, costs of tariffs, costs of doing business abroad, market size, growth of the host country
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(independent from output) and recurrent variable costs (dependent on output). Only one mode of
market servicing can be used at the time and depends crucially on the stage of development of the
host country. In an application of their model, they explain how a firm may choose between exporting
to a foreign country, licensing or FDI. Second, Meyer (1998) in his dissertation added a lot to the
understanding of the impact of many different variables influencing an investment decision. He
provided an excellent literature review, linking many different FDI theories and variables to an
investment decision.' In addition he develops a transaction costs model and tests the impact of the
variables using microeconomic survey data.
The approach chosen in this chapter build on those two references. However, the main difference
is the use of a real option model instead of a transaction cost or NPV model. The merit of the real
option model is the possibility to incorporate the impact of irreversible set-up costs and uncertainty on
the investment decision, without losing the possibility to include all the different variables influencing
the investment decision, as described by Meyer. Irreversible set-up costs and uncertainty directly
influence the timing of an FDI. Since FDIs often involve large irreversible costs and transition
countries are still relatively risky host countries, the option model is more suitable to model the timing
of an FDI-decision than the NPV-model.
In section 2.2 a basic option model, dealing with a firm's investment decision to invest in one
country or not, is described. Variables included in the business, microeconomic and macroeconomic
theories can all be included in this specific model and the timing of an investment is a crucial factor. I
will show why exactly this option model is more suitable in modeling the various aspects of decision-
making to an uncertain region like the CEE states during the last decade.' In section 2.3, the basic
option model is extended to include the possibility for a firm to choose from several countries in which
to invest. By allowing several countries from which to choose, the model becomes more realistic since
in practice firms can also choose from several locations when considering investing abroad and the
number of alternatives to choose from influences the timing of the investment. In section 2.4, different
possibilities are given on how the model can be adjusted further to describe the real life situation
better, by broadening the uncertainty assumptions of section 2.3. Where in section 2.3 uncertainties
are assumed equal for all countries considered, in section 2.4 different degrees of uncertainty are
allowed between countries. Given that countries are at different stages of economic development and
their macroeconomic conditions clearly influence the uncertainty related to the investment, the
investment choice is different for each country. Section 2.5 provides a summary and conclusions are
drawn with respect to expectations to be further researched in the chapters three and four of the
dissertation. .. .,.-, ..,_
2.2 Real option models'
The real option model builds on the same principles as a Net Present Value model. The basic idea is
that companies calculate or estimate expected revenues and costs and discount those values in order
to make a decision taking future flows into account. The criticism of the NPV model is the lack of
'Meyer. 1998. chapter three and four, pp 59-112.
'CEE region = Central and Eastern Europe.
' Section two is a description of the real options model, with application to foreign direct investment decisions. Readers familiar
with the real option model are advised to go to section four. The real options model is elaborately explained in for instance
Pindyck (1991), Dixit & Pindyck (1994) and Trigeorgis (1996).
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flexibility and the fact that the model neglects the irreversible nature of some costs. The real option
model explicitly incorporated those two critiques, by modeling irreversible investment costs and
allowing for postponement of an investment due to uncertainty. Comparison of the NPV and real
option model shows that because of those two factors, outcomes of a similar investment decision can
be different. This is visualized in investment example one in box 2.1.
Assume a firm can invest in an FDI, but the investment costs are irreversible.' This irreversibility
means that once a firm has invested in period t=0, it will not be able to stop the investment free of
costs and invest in a different FDI in period t=1 if that turns out to be more beneficial. According to the
E(NPV) decision rule the firm invests in the FDI at time t=0 if the E(NPV) of the investment is positive.
However, it is possible that, if the firm postpones the investment at time t=0 and instead invests at
time t=1, the E(NPV) of the same FDI will be higher due to for instance a growing demand in the
market or an increase in the price of the product. If the firm already invested at time t=0 the presence
of the irreversible costs make it impossible to invest again at time t=1. In that case it would have been
better for the firm to wait with its investment, in order not to lose its option to invest at a later time.
This situation, indicating the negative implications of lack of flexibility, is numerically explained in
example one.
The real option theory incorporates the possibility to wait with investment today and postpone the
investment. It does so by assuming that a firm can buy an option with the right to invest in the same
host country in the next period, but with no obligation for the firm to do so. If in period t=1 it is
beneficial for the firm to invest it can exercise its option, but in case developments are negative, it will
not have to exercise its option right.' The real option theory thereby models the uncertainty in the
economy. . •- •••.;•••
In real life, firms always face uncertainty when making a foreign direct investment decision. For
example, the economy of the host country is an uncertain environment for the investor and this
uncertainty may influence the return on the investment of the firm over time. Uncertainty occurs at
many levels. The preferences of the consumers may change over time, costs of production change
over time and macroeconomic situations in the host countries are variable as well. The discount rate
only includes a risk-free rate. The uncertainty is captured by the different probabilities and expected
pay-offs of the scenarios included in the example. ' • •"
The investment decision model following the options theory is further extended using continuous
time. The most common definitions used are:
Vo ; the value of the investment at time t=0.
lo ; the irreversible investment costs of the FDI at time t=0.
Fo ; the value of the investment opportunity today, which is what a firm is willing to pay to have
an option to invest in an FDI later.
F, ; the value of the investment opportunity next period.
* Meaning a reversal of the decision, scaling down or stopping the investment will inevitably lead to a toss of the set-up costs.
This kind of option has the same characteristics as the call options in the financial sector.
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Box 2.1: Example one
A firm has the opportunity to set up an FDI in the CEE region at t=0 or in the next period t=1. The
investment is irreversible with setup costs of 1=5000, so once invested in period t=0 the firm cannot
stop with that investment free of costs and invest in period t=1 if that is more profitable. The risk is
diversifiable, so I use a risk-free discount rate of p = 10 percent
The firm sells one good per year, at price P. At time t=0, Po=1OOO. Due to uncertainty two different
scenarios are possible for period t=1. If the economy is growing, the price will increase to Pi=1500,
but if the economy enters a recession, P, decreases to 500. After period one the price remains stable.
Each scenario has a probability p=1/2 to occur and which scenario will occur depends on an event
that cannot be predicted. Summarizing:
1=5000 >-...,v ->~v. ;. . .:,.. ••.......,,.,;,v ,..,.-. ,h
Po=1OOO
P,=500 with probability of 0,5 (scenario one) or P, = 1500 with probability of 0,5 (scenario two)
r=10percent * • '" " '
The situation is depicted in figure 2.1. ,,^ •'•••'; - >:• ••>•-••.•.•; ^ .,; -• v >*?>.'
Following the standard NPV calculation, the E(NPV) if the firm would invest in period t=0 is
E(NPV)«, =-5000 + ]T 1000/(1.1 )'=-5000+11000=6000.
/ (i
The firm would thus invest in the FDI at time t=0, since the current value of the investment is positive.
In this example this decision would not be the most optimal. The option theory includes both the
presence of uncertainty, leading to the two different scenarios in period t=1, as well as the possibility
to wait with the investment. If the firms waits one year with the investment, it keeps the option to
invest if the price increases and not to invest if the price decreases. The expected NPV in period t=0
of investing in period t=1 would thus be: ...„•.
E(NPV),,o = '/4(-5000/1.1+ ^1500/(1.1)') + '/2(0) ='/*( (-5000+15000)/1.1)=9090.90 ^ .^ ": :
/-i
Clearly it is more optimal for the firm to wait to invest at time t=0 and only invest at time t=1 as the
prices increase to 1500.
The value of waiting one year equals 9090.90-6000 = 3090.90
Figure 2.1: FDI decision example including uncertainty. .-.,.> „ : v. »ft-.»!.?
Time (=0 t=1 t=2
p=%^______--> P,=500 • P2=500
Po=1000 "<C^__^^ . . .. .
p«V4 ~~* P,=1500 • P2=1500 ,-•:,;..
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For the determination of F, uncertainty plays a role. If the asset of the FDI in period one, (V,. /,/ /s
positive, the option value is F, equals that amount. However, if (V,- /,,) is negative, the firm will not use
the possibility to invest at time t=1 and F, equals 0. When the information on F, for each scenario is
known, it is possible to determine Fo, using a risk-free discount rate. As long as the value of Fo,
calculated using the risk-free portfolio, exceeds the payoff from investing today (Vo-'a), the firm should
wait to invest and keep the option to invest later.
Summarizing, the firm has to decide whether it is optimal to invest the sunk cost of the project / and
receive the value of the project V at time t=0, or to wait and keep the option to invest. The value of a
project is given by equation one, where the current value V of a project is known and the future value
of the project is uncertain (aVdz) but changes over time in V are observed (aVdt).' • ^r. . ; "s!
•• . -..-.>( * • •-.! !-.,•:•••- • -.-•• •, -t .. .-i ..-..: .••!.-.. •• ,. •.•••-> ••-,.- -.: •<:•.! i
(1) dV = aVdt+aVdz -"- ! ^ .
The value of the option to investment is given by FfV9. The investment opportunity is equal to a call
option, meaning the firm buys the right to invest in a later period, but it does not have the obligation to
invest. The firm's optimization problem is to maximize option value of the investment, which can be
done solving the Bellman equation two':
(2) p-F(K).rf/ = £(dF(K))
This equation states that over the time df, the expected return on the investment opportunity,
p • F(F,) • efr , should be equal to the expected rate of capital appreciation given by £(c/F(^)) .* In
addition the following three boundary conditions must be satisfied:
- F(0) = 0 :lf V goes to 0, it will stay at 0 and the option to invest is worthless.
- F(V*) = V*-l :V* is the value of the project at which it is optimal to invest. When investing at
V*, the firm receives a net payoff of V*-l.
- F(V*) = 1 :Smooth pasting condition: F(V) should be continuous and smooth at V*.
If Vo>V* it is optimal to invest now, otherwise the option value of waiting is more valuable than the
expected payoff of investing today. V* is therefore called the critical value of a firm to invest.
The impact of uncertainty on the model is twofold. First, the critical value of an FDI, V*. increases
as uncertainty increases, leading to a lower number of investments. Second, the option value of an
investment, F(Y), increases when uncertainty increases. With higher uncertainty it is more interesting
to keep an option since the value of the FDI may increase or decrease over time and keeping the
option creates the possibility to see which one of the trends will occur without running the risk of
losing money.
The implication of the real option approach with respect to explaining FDI decision-making models
is enormous. Many articles, theoretical and empirical, have explored the possible consequences of
this model on FDI decisions. A summary of some of those articles is included in table 2.1. The papers
' Following a Wiener process, with a Brownian motion, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994), chapter three.
* Using the Dynamic Programming method, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994), chapter five, pp. 135.
* See Dixit and Pindyck (1994). chapter 5.2, pp. 140.
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discussed in the first part of the table are mostly theoretical, focusing on the choice of an investment
mode through the real option theory. The second part of the table contains empirical articles that test
the link between real options and FDI. Summarizing this literature, a few trends become clear. The
theoretical articles uniformly conclude that applying the option price theory on FDI decisions may lead
to a postponement of these investments, possibly indefinitely (McDonalds and Siegel (1985), Capel
(1992), Rivoli and Salorio (1996)). In addition, small-scale investments like a platform investment or
participation in a joint venture do not necessarily have to be seen only as an investment project, but
can also be considered an option to invest more or divest at a later stage (Kogut and Kulatilaka
(1994), Chi and McGuire (1996), Mollgaard and Overgaard (1999)). In that sense, the initial FDI can
lead to various subsequent investment decisions the firm has to face in the future periods. These
follow-up decisions may also influence the initial investment choice. It is possible that an FDI at the
current stage may not be very profitable, but the possibility the FDI offers to expand later may be so
valuable that it will positively influence the current investment decision. Last, an FDI will most likely
have a higher option value than a joint venture or a license agreement. This higher option value is
mainly due to the fact that an FDI has higher irreversible set-up costs and often only one owner.
Higher set-up costs increase the option value of waiting and being a single owner increases the
flexibility of the firm to opt for a delay without having to discuss with partner firms. So, only if the
current value of an FDI project is sufficiently high, will the investment be undertaken (Buckley and Tse
1995, Rivoli and Salorio (1996), Pennings and Sleuwagen (1997)).
Empirically, there are several studies based on the option model. A selection is included in the
second part of table 2.1. Kogut (1991) shows that firms do not use joint ventures as options to expand
their FDI. Several case studies indicate that for large multinationals the real option theory may be
useful in making strategic management decisions (Kemna, 1993). In addition, several studies look at
the impact of uncertainty and irreversibility on FDI behavior. Most studies conclude that uncertainty
and risk negatively affect the decision to invest.
However, in some studies the results less clearly supported the option theory, resulting in
recommendations for better specifications of variables or more elaborate research (Peters (1999),
Guiso and Parigi (1999), Lehmann (1999), Vonnegut (2000), Altomonte (2000) and Calcagnini and
Saltari(2001)).
With respect to direct investments in transition countries, several conclusions can be drawn based
on theory and empirical tests. First, the real options model can explain why firms will not always
invest immediately when the prospects are profitable, but wait longer to reduce uncertainty. Second,
the real option model can give an explanation why developing countries or transition countries, due to
a higher uncertainty within the region, do not attract high FDI flows, even though in terms of natural
resources or market potential these countries can be very attractive. However, the model also
explains why so many firms are in principle interested in investing in these high-risk regions. The high
uncertainty in fact increases the option value of an investment. These markets can be very interesting
in the future, so many companies will keep their eyes open for opportunities, but postpone their
investment for the moment.
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Table 2.1: Overview of studies linking real option models with foreign direct
investment decisions











































































Study of the valuation of
investment projects, when
there is an option to
temporarily and shut down




Market servicing is a
dynamic problem and
when choosing a mode for
market servicing these





Can a platform investment
in a foreign country at the
current stage be
considered an option to
invest in that same
country at a later stage?
Besides E(NPV) the value
of options will also differ in
different modes of market
servicing. How do they
affect the entry mode
decision?





ventures as a market
entry mode?
Do real option settings
affect the assumptions
and links made in the OLI
paradigm?
Which mode of entry in a




Using the real options approach leads to three main
results, namely 1) Increases in output price uncertainty
can raise or lower the current value of a project, 2)
Futures prices permit the firm to value the project without
having to estimate future commodity prices and 3) High
profits in the far future may have a greater current value
than uncertain profits in the near future
The article of Buckley and Casson (1981). describing
market servicing choices as a transaction cost model, is
taken as a basic model. It has been described using real
options terminology and assumptions It is shown that
uncertainty fosters postponement of investments,
possibly indefinitely.
Especially for FDI. exchange rate fluctuations not only
influence operating investments but also influence the
option values of future investments. This influence
affects a firm's decision whether or not the option to
invest will be exercised.
Platform investments can be made with relatively small
investments, but keep the possibility open to invest later.
The major problem with this line of thinking is the fact
that the value of these platform investments is not
directly visible at this moment. Their payoff will only
occur later and firms will therefore need a longer-term
view in order to engage in these investments. As such,
firms that are not aiming at short-term profit
maximization will be the ones most likely to benefit from
these kinds of option investments.
Maintaining ownership in a foreign activity also means
maintaining the position to value future options
Therefore the option of an FDI is most likely higher than
an option of a license agreement Besides, being
physically present in a country will translate into better
ability on the spot and as such will result in a larger
option value Thus, firms are expected to prefer FDI
earlier under the real option model than according to the
E(NPV) model, since the option value of an FDI will be
relatively high compared to the option value of other
modes of entry.
Joint ventures can be considered as an option to buy out
or sell shares to the partner at a later time Different
valuations of the situation ex-post, with the awareness
ex-ante that this occurs, are main motivation to engage
in such a joint venture Transaction cost issues, such as
information costs and sunk costs, need to be taken into
account, even in the real options approach
In uncertain environments ownership and intemalization
advantages are negatively rather than positively
associated with FDI Ownership advantages often make
it possible to delay the FDI, while intemalization
advantages often serve to make it less reversible Both
indicate the value of waiting is high and investment may
be delayed
Export has the lowest option value of waiting, followed by
a joint venture (assuming profits are lower taxed in case
of the joint venture) Obviously cooperation is a very
important factor in choosing the mode of entry, since
with no cooperation the joint venture is no attractive
mode of entry at all Only if the value of the project is
high, setting up a direct investment becomes attractive,
since this is clearly the most nsky mode of entry for the
foreign firm.























































Kulatilaka. a joint venture
as platform investment is
considered in a two-period
game theoretical
approach.
To what extent are the
values of options to invest
or disinvest altered by the
governments policies of
entry and exit controls and
restrictions on the
repatriation of profits?
n the Real Options theory an
A test to see if a joint
venture functions as an
option to a real FDI.
Empirical test using 92
American manufacturing
firms engaged in a joint
venture. If a jv is
undertaken as a platform
investment and an option
will be exercised once the
firm will expand its foreign
activities. If the jv is closed
or disinvested the option
is not used.
How applicable is the
option theory in practice?





What are the effects of
uncertainty on investment
decision, based on results
from a sample of about
1000 Italian manufacturing
firms?
A firm will start its investments in a foreign country by
means of a joint venture, in order to find out whether the
foreign partner is a "good" or" bad" type of firm. A price at
which the firm will buy shares in the foreign partner is
determined ex-ante, as well as an amount of capital that
is invested in the joint venture by both the foreign and
home firm After the first period, the firm can either
acquire the total foreign firm if it is a good firm, keep its
option in the form of the joint-venture one more period, or
sell its shares when the foreign partner is a bad type of
firm. Several game-theoretic approaches are described,
with strategies that would be optimal for good type of firm,
bad type of firms and the home firm.
Using a two-period model, several conclusions can be
made. The risk of exit controls acts like investment
irreversibility. depressing the investment flows in period
one. Expropriation represents an extreme form of exit
control and reduces investment even further. The risk of
entry restrictions on market size acts by encouraging FDI
in period one (given that the additional investments in
period two may be restricted because of policy reversals).
This last argument is opposing previous research,
indicating that the higher the risk for policy reversal (and
imposing entry controls) the larger the amount of
investment
d foreign direct investments:
Of the 92 joint ventures initially included in the dataset 55
percent of the firms were closed after one year and
almost 70 percent of the firms were closed after two
years As such can be concluded a large percentage of
the firms did not effectively use their option to expand.
The factors found that did increase the likelihood of
exercising the option of expansion were an unexpected
increase in the value of the venture and the degree of
concentration in the industry. All other factors included in
the analysis were insignificant.
Three case studies, on a timing option, growth option and
abandonment option, are tested in practice in a
multinational. In all cases the option value was explained
to managers and the difference between the E(NPV)
model and option model made clear Managers found the
technique useful, especially in investment questions
where flexibility in strategic thinking was needed.
In a multiple linear regression, FDI flows from the EU to
the Visegrad countries are checked to find the factors
predicting timing of entry. Variables specified by OLI-
Gravity and real option models are included In general
the results do not indicate any significant influence of the
option variables included, being uncertainty and nsk
indicators, on timing of entry
This study does not deal with FDI investments, but does
show clearly the impact of uncertainty on investment
behavior. A subjective uncertainty indicator was created,
using the expectations of firms with respect to growth in
demand in the next three years. Several tests show that
expected demand has a positive effect on the decision to
invest, while uncertainty has a negative effect The
irreversibility of the investment also plays a significant
role; the impact of uncertainty is more negative if
investments are more irreversible. The impact of
uncertainty is also more negative if the firm has a larger
degree of market power.







































Develop and test a real
options model that
demonstrates the role of
country specific risks and
sunk costs in determining
a firm's choice of mode of




Do irreversibility of an
investment, the urgency of
the investment, the impact
and expectations of





Panel data including 2500
FDI in CEEC.
Do the real options
variables "opportunity
costs of waiting",





flows, when added to OLI,
Gravity and neo-classical
trade variables?
Are investments in the
private sector higher in
areas with lower demand
volatility than in countries
with higher demand
volatility?
A model is developed to specifically describe an FDI
choice with host countries with different uncertainty
perspectives. Empirical tests are consistent with the
theory prediction that higher risks discourage capital
expenditures and thus discourage FDI investments.
Investor risk sensitivity goes up in sectors with significant
plant-specific sunk costs.
A country that wants to attract FDI should focus mainly on
the institutionally dependent investments since firms with
only SR goals are not interesting for the LR development
of a country and resource based FDI does not need any
additional stimulation. In general all firms considered
irreversibility of their investment, the urgency of the
investment, the impact and expectations of structural
shocks and the uncertainty of their investment important
and the way they affected their investment decision was
in accordance with theory. The conclusion of the case
study approach was therefore that the real option theory
does explain investment decisions better than the E(NPV)
rule.
The inclusion of three real options variables "opportunity
costs of waiting", "uncertainty of the local environment"
and "irreversibility of the investment" in a panel data
analysis explaining FDI flows yielded very promising
results. Both uncertainty variables were significant, with
the expected sign. However, the variable included to
capture the irreversibility of the investments is not
significant. In his conclusion Altomonte states that even
though his results seem to support the real options
theory, still better specifications of country, sector and
firm effects are needed.
• " • *
Using data from business surveys of seven European
countries, results indicate that investment is positively
associated with higher expected growth rates of
production and lower growth rate volatility. Lower
uncertainty results in higher investments
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2.3 Extension of the model: the possibility to choose between two countries
The real options model, as described in section 2.2, already incorporates many features that make it
suitable to interpret real-life investment decisions. Firms use all kinds of cost and benefit variables
and can postpone investments. In this model uncertain environments can be modeled accordingly
and taken into account in the decision-making.'" However, in this model firms still only have the option
to choose from one project or country." In reality, firms can select two or more projects they consider
interesting for investments. In this section, I will present an extension of the previous model that
includes the possibility to select between two FDI alternatives in different countries.'* In order to do
so, some of the parameters will be defined slightly differently. An elaborate mathematical explanation
of this section is included in annex 2.1.
Assume a firm with a single FDI possibility, FDU in country A. The set-up costs of an investment
are not included anymore as parameter I, but will be included in V. V/ is the net return of the
investment in FDU in period one and equals to the value of FDIA in period one minus the investment
costs U. The net present value rule suggests investing as soon as vV>0. However, as was
mentioned in section three, the value of vV should be compared with the expected net present value
the investment yields if the firm delays its decision. Suppose that the firm also has the option to start
FDU in period two." Then if the firm invests in period two the net value of the FDU is equal to V/. If
the firm invests in the first period, it cannot recover the initial sunk cost of the investment and restart
FDU in period two. These sunk costs preclude the firm from setting up FDU at better terms in period
two and realizing the potentially higher value V/, because the initial investment is irreversible. To
capture the notion that future realizations are uncertain, V/ is a random variable, which is uniformly
distributed on the interval [u-o, u+o]. Both u and a are strictly positive. The parameter u denotes the
expected value of V/. The variance of V/ equals 1/3a*. Therefore, a higher a implies a higher
degree of uncertainty surrounding the future benefits of FDU. It is not possible to postpone the
investment decision even after period two. If the firm's management has delayed the investment
decision in period one, it will undertake FDU in period two if the realization of V/ exceeds zero. In
case the firm does not invest in period two the investment option expires. An additional assumption is
that u<o. This assumption implies that the probability that the firm does not implement FDU in the
second period is strictly positive, because in the worst case scenario v/ = u - a < 0". To decide
whether to invest in period one the firm calculates the expected value of the option to invest in the
second period:
(3) ' v J ; — i T ' J '
The symbol £ is introduced to facilitate the discussion in later parts, when two investment choices
'"See Dixit and Pindyck. 1994.
" In this section. I assume firms consider an FDI in two different countries. For simplicity I assume in each country, A and B.
only one investment can be made. The FDI in country A is therefore called FDI» and the FDI in country B is called FDIu.
" The model is taken from Laar van de, M. and W Letterie, "The delaying effect of financing constraints on investment" (2004),
Bu/tehn of Econom/c Research. 56 (3), pp 271-282. This article is also available as Meteor Research Memorandum RM
03/2001
" Without losing generality. I abstract from discounting or similarly, assume the risk-free discount rate equals 0 percent.
" The case where u<o is definitely more interesting than the alternative case with u>o. because then the expected value of
FDU in penod two is always positive and equal to u If the investment in period one is postponed, the firm will always invest in
penod two. limiting the role of uncertainty in the final decision.
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are possible. It is optimal to invest in period one if V/>F(Vy. Otherwise the firm will postpone the
investment decision until period two. In fact equation three shows that the net present value of the
investment in period one, V/. should be strictly larger than zero to be willing to invest in period one.
Furthermore it can be shown straightforwardly that the higher the uncertainty as measured by o, the
higher the value of delaying the investment: ^A > 0. This result indicates that higher uncertainty
tends to inhibit investment. Various studies provide empirical support for this claim (see for instance
Guiso and Parigi, 1999; Ghosal and Loungani, 2000). Finally, the delay of the investment becomes
more likely as the expected value of V// increases: ^J/, > 0.
So far, this section basically repeated the general investment decision model for one project. In
reality firms may have to choose among different investment projects due to the lack of financial
means. A firm can have an interest in investing in a newly set-up company or joint venture in a foreign
country. With such an investment a firm faces large set-up costs and high uncertainty. A firm that is
interested in the booming region of Central Europe, based on information available such as
macroeconomic performance and business climate indicators, selects for example Poland and the
Czech Republic as potential host economies for its FDI. If the company has sufficient resources
available to cover all costs involved it can opt for an FDI in both of these countries as long as each of
them is expected to have a positive NPV. However, due to limited financial resources a firm may have
to choose between Poland and the Czech Republic as a location for its FDI. Based on profitability
estimates, the best option today may be to invest in Poland instead of in the Czech Republic.
However, imagine the firm knows that next year the Czech Republic adopts a new set of laws that
favors foreign investors and thereby increases the prospects of an FDI there tremendously. If the firm
invests in Poland today it will not be able to invest in the Czech Republic next year. Due to this
uncertainty regarding the enactment of the new law, the firm can decide to postpone its investment in
order to keep the possibility to invest in the Czech Republic next year in case this new law is adapted.
The real options approach predicts that the incentive to postpone an investment increases with the
amount of uncertainty surrounding the future value of the project. Hence, the higher the uncertainty
the higher the probability the firm will suspend investment. Irreversibility plays an important role in the
model. If the firm has decided to invest in a certain project previously, it will not be able to recover the
initial expenses and use these to start an alternative project later. Similarly, it will not be able to restart
the same project at better terms later. Therefore binding financial constraints tend to increase the
incentive to wait with investing. The presence of multiple projects provides the firm with an incentive
to learn which is the best project.
Suppose now that in addition to FDIA the firm has an alternative investment option called FDIB- If
the firm chooses to invest in FDIB in period one this investment yields Vg'. The net present value of
FDIB in the second period is randomly distributed as well. To simplify the analysis it is assumed that
VB* is also uniformly distributed on the interval [u-o, u+a]. In addition, that V„* and VB* are
independent. These assumptions affect the generality of the results. However, the main argument
presented, that the firm has an incentive to learn which project is the most profitable one, holds in a
more general setting as well.
Irreversibility is an important assumption. Suppose that the firm is able to recover the initial
expenses of its investments. In that case the firm can for instance invest its financial resources in
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FDU in period one. If FDIB turns out to be more profitable the firm can reverse its decision to
implement FDU and start FDIB instead. Irreversibility does not allow for this possibility. Irreversibility
implies that a firm has an incentive to wait with investing in a particular project, because the future
returns of another competing project may be very promising. An implicit assumption is that the returns
of a project implemented in period one are insufficient to provide the required funds to start another
project in period two as well.
To simplify the analysis, it is also assumed the firm is not able to acquire any additional external
funds to finance investment. The financial resources of the firm may be used to start an investment
project. If financial constraints are not binding the firm may choose to invest in both FDU and FDIB. In
fact, the firm should apply the methodology described for one investment possibility to both FDIs
separately, since the value of the firm is additive in the values of the two FDIs. Thus, the firm will
invest in FDU in the first period if and only if V/ 2 F(V^ and consider its investment in the second
period otherwise. The firm will undertake FDIB in period one if and only if Vs' > F(VB) and decide on
investment in the second period otherwise. Obviously the value F(Ve) can be derived using the
methodology described before. w "-. ->>=•• . * JS;:;?,-;- •;•-:• ••• ••-•••:•.•-.•:• • : ••.-»:>•:• o~^i>
However, if the firm faces a financial constraint it has the possibility to undertake one project at
most. The financial constraint implies that by investing in FDU the firm gives up the option to invest in
FDIB. The decision whether to invest in the first period depends on the expected value of FDU and
FDIB projects A and B in the second period. Therefore, the starting point is solving the firm's decision
in the second period. . .......
invests in FDU if: VV* 2 VB* and V„* 2 0. - .:••:••••<*
(4) A firm invests in FDIB if: .. Ve* > V/and VJJ* * 0. ".- -•••''•-"-'**•'
does not invest if: V„* < 0 and Vs^ < 0. •-• ., -'^-»ar
Figure 2.2 shows in which instances the firm invests in either FDU, FDIB or abstains from investing
in period two. The horizontal axis denotes the possible realizations of V^. The vertical axis depicts
the values Vs^ can assume. In the areas I and II (where v/ 2 Ve* and V/ a: 0) the firm selects FDU.
The firm prefers FDIB in the areas denoted by III and IV (where VB^ > V„* and Vs^ ^ 0). The firm does
not invest if V/ < 0 and VB* < 0, in which case areas V and VI are relevant. The presence of FDIB in
addition to FDU affects the expected net return from investing in period two for two reasons. First,
FDIB allows the firm to obtain a higher return from investment in area III, where the firm would have
earned V^< Ve* if FDIB did not exist. Second, the possibility of selecting FDIB allows the firm to invest
in more instances (area IV). •••... • ,
In the model the firm cannot sell the investment option that it did not implement to another firm,
because the option results from firm-specific resources or capabilities that cannot be imitated or
transferred to other companies. Therefore in the first period the expected value of the two investment
projects is given by (see annex 2.1): •«••-,-..•••< -•••- - •: . . >,.....
20Chapter 2 The real option model applied to foreign direct investment decision-making •.-*.. . j.vf ' ,




2<r . . . I
l
Given the assumption that o>u it can be shown after some straightforward calculations that: i
I
.a, w..w -
where £ is defined in equation three. To recall, the quantity E represents the critical value for each
investment opportunity at which the firm is willing to undertake either FDU or FDIB in period one if the
firm does not face a financial constraint. Equation six indicates that the presence of two investment
opportunities in combination with a financial constraint raises the critical benchmark at which the firm
finds it optimal to invest in the first period by more than 33 percent. This increase is due to the fact
that by investing in either FDU or FDIB the firm gives up the opportunity to invest in the other project
later, which is undesirable because it may yield a favorable outcome in the future.
The results above suggest that the timing of an investment made by financially constrained and
unconstrained firms will differ. Suppose that a population of firms exists in which each firm considers
the same investment projects, FDU and FDIB. Firms that do not face a shortage of cash are more
likely to start project FDU or FDIB in the first period than financially constrained firms, because the
critical value £ at which these firms are willing to invest is lower than that of the constrained firms. If
FDU refers to investing in Poland and FDIB denotes the possibility to invest in the Czech Republic,
then firms that have enough financial resources and are interested in these regions are more likely to
be early investors than their constrained counterparts, since the latter are more inclined to see which
region is the best environment.
It can be shown that if the expected value of the future returns of the two projects, u, increases that:
f3 1;IW + <T
d/i 2<j U 2crJ 2cr
This result implies that the firm's incentive to delay the investment decision increases with a higher
expected future return u. The same holds if the parameter a measuring the amount of uncertainty
surrounding the projects increases:
ÖCT öcrV 3 3CT^ 3 er' ö<r^ 3^/ 3
Therefore, higher uncertainty tends to increase the incentive to postpone investment.
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These results also hold if the analysis is extended towards an unlimited amount of firms. The
theoretical analysis, in which we expand the investment model from two to N investment projects from
which the firm can choose, can be found in section four of van de Laar and Letterie (2004). The
analysis there shows that the more investment projects the firm has to choose from, the higher the
possibility is that one of those projects will have a high expected value of future returns. Thus, as N
approaches infinity, the probability that the investment is postponed approaches 100 percent. In
conclusion we find that having a larger group of possible projects has several consequences. For
financially unconstrained firms, investment decisions can be made separately per project. They will
invest in each project that is expected to become profitable. Financially constrained firms will have to
select the best alternative for them. This lack of financial means leads those firms to postpone their
investment more often. In addition, a higher expected future return of a project also delays the
investment decision, as well as a higher rate of uncertainty does.
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2.4 Real option model with two countries from a different risk category «*> re
The model described in section 2.2 is restrictive, because the firm can only choose from one country
in which to invest. In section 2.3 the model Is extended and allows for a choice between several FDIs
in different host countries. However, this model is still restrictive because of the assumption that these
countries have equal expected values and equal uncertainty parameters. In reality these assumptions
are never the case. Countries differ in many aspects, all influencing a project's expected value and
uncertainty.
In this section I argue that, when choosing between two countries with different uncertainty, the
investment decision will more likely be postponed than when looking at only one project or two
projects with equal uncertainty. I build my reasoning on the results obtained in the previous sections
and refrain from mathematical derivations.
Assume that the same conditions hold as in the previous section, being that investments are
irreversible and investment is only possible in either period one or period two." If a firm only considers
an FDI in country A, it will invest in period one as long as investing today will be profitable (('] > 0,)
and investing today will be more beneficial than waiting one more period and Invest in period two, so
Pj > F(K^ ). If the choice of a firm is extended with one more country, the conditions are extended
accordingly. A firm will now only invest in period one in FDU if that is more profitable than investing in
country B (FDIB) in period one, but also more beneficial than investing in FDU or FDIB in period two.
These assumptions are summarized in equation eleven.
(9) Invest in FDU in period one if: - J^_{ > 0
- Ki >
- - ^ >
If one of these conditions does not hold, the investment will be postponed until period two. If the
expected values u for FDU and FDIB in period two, as well as variances a* of V** and VB* are equal,
the probability of investing in FDU in period one (respective two) is the same as the probability of
investing in country B in period one (two).
Now assume due to some incident, the uncertainty of country B increases to twice the uncertainty
in country A and the expected value u remains equal for both A and B. As was mentioned in section
2.3, the impact of uncertainty on the model is twofold. As uncertainty increases, the critical value of a
firm to invest in an FDI in period one, V, increases and the option value of an investment, F(V,),
increases. With higher uncertainty it is more interesting to keep an option.
The increase of uncertainty in country B means that the critical value V* of FDIB in period one
increases, as well as the option value F(VB). A postponement of the investment in FDIB will be more
likely. In addition, as can be seen from equation eleven, a postponement of FDU will be more likely,
even though the uncertainty or expected value in country A did not increase. This increased chance
of postponement is due to the condition that investment in country A in period one will only be
undertaken if the value of the investment is also higher than the option value of investing in country B
" Discrete two period time model.
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in period two, namely Kj > F(K„). No changes have occurred on the left hand side of this equation,
whereas the right-hand side increased in value. ." <-,••...••:.•,.•< . •-,- ., ,-vi«.! c ai.._-L
In practice, this interrelated effect of uncertainty may be important when looking at alternative host
countries. An increase in the uncertainty of one host country can lead to the postponement of an
investment in another - still lower risk - alternative host country. Given the fact that considering
countries with a higher uncertainty will also lead to postponement of possibly viable investment with a
lower uncertainty risk, it seems reasonable to assume that firms will only consider countries of equal
risk as alternative host countries. A country that considers an investment in Poland may think of the
Czech Republic as a nice alternative, but may not yet consider Kazakhstan or Afghanistan, since
those host countries deviate largely in investment uncertainty with Poland. ~. -*.• ••;-w" >:••> i> i: :q
2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter I gave a description and literature overview of the rear option model and extended the
model. In order to explain FDI decisions better, the option model is an appropriate model. The option
model assumes the investment decision is uncertain and investments are irreversible.
In section 2.2 the option model is described in detail. The option model provides a decision rule
based on expected values of investments and argues firms will invest as long as the expected value
of investment is positive and the expected value of investing today is higher than the expected value
of investing later. Still, due to uncertainty and irreversibility of the investments it can be more
beneficial to wait with an investment and invest at a later time. By buying an option, a firm has the
right to invest at a later time, but it does not have the obligation to do so. Thus, if the situation
changes negatively, the firm does not have to exercise the option and will postpone the investment. In
section 2.3 and 2.4 the option model is extended as to allow for several investment projects from
which to choose. Instead of only considering one investment alternative, firms may consider two,
three or even more alternatives before deciding where to invest. The analysis shows that by allowing
for several projects from which to choose, firms are more likely to postpone their investment.
Summarizing, based on the models theoretical predictions investment decisions of direct
investments are dependent on four important aspects, being the irreversible set-up costs, uncertainty
of the investment, financial constraints and number of alternative host countries. Companies without
financial constraints are more likely to invest sooner, as well as companies with low irreversible set-up
costs. A higher uncertainty will delay an investment decision and companies that consider several
alternatives are also less likely to invest than companies that consider only one possible FDI location.Annex 2.1 Mathematical derivations related to section 2.3 • .',-, %...• -i- m>re»i i.,-«j« -..•»(_. >..«x- «• *-cV f t
Annex 2.1 Mathematical derivations related to section 2.3
V/ is the value of the project in period one. v/ is the expected value of the project in period two and
is assumed to be a random variable, which is uniformly distributed on the interval [u-a, u+o]. Both u
and a are strictly positive. The parameter u denotes the expected value of V/ and the variance of (//
equals 1/3cr*. ' . - • •'.•••;. 'E no
Proposition 1:
If the management of the firm delays the investment in period one, it will invest in period two if V/
exceeds zero. The expected value of the option to invest in period two equals E. Thus, V/ should be
strictly larger than E (and thus than zero) in order to invest in period one.
A firm invests in period two if the value of the project is positive, so the sum between 0 and u+o of the
values at which the firm will invest gives the option value.
E-<* + *> >0
4cr
A firm invests in period one if F^J > F(F^,) thus if Kj >E
Proposition 2a:
A higher uncertainty a leads to a larger possibility of delaying the investment.
4q(2(/v + q)l) - (// + or)M _ 4a^ - 4/
(4a)' (4cr)" 4a"
Given a > w , and 4 a" >0, then >0.
Since E increases if a increases, F] should be higher as well to exceed E«
Proposition 2b:
A higher expected value of the investment leads to a higher possibility of delaying the investment.
Proof
d£ _ 4a(2// + 2a) _ /y + a
' 2aAnnex 2 1 Mathematical derivations related to section 2.3 <•*-•"- •<-'*.»*isw >j< «-**»-.•-• -..-,- it-»,r!t)i=.-- • -onnA
Given // + cr > 0 and CT > 0, — >0. • .^ • * *nnA
.s4vr*as ;Kv ••vgri?•'"•*.*?.' ••••; ^ --J-' *•••
Since E increases if u increases, Kj should be higher as well to exceed E« - '.**-,'. -•».••
» ,.*,- *:>,.^. •• ,< . y_, ... ,-'f.Vfi-,.....>. >....-. ..•.•-•- ..' v.>', -"-:T' •.'*.• ?•>. '• -'•
Proposition3: • .••=•;:•:'->.:--tw
Extending the investment choice with an alternative investment, increases the chance a firm will
postpone its investment in period one.
In section 2.3 is assumed that // and «rare equal for project A and B, thus the two projects can be
considered equal in mathematical calculations.
1,1,1 ,
.) = —K.—ÜK, +-(T(u + ff) and
3 2 2
As
r- L3 ' 2 ' 2
1/ u 1,
Include E= — in equation 5 leads to
4
(6)
/' , (5 1/^4
By assumption, CT > /v, so — < 1. Thus, — >—.
cr ^3 3 07 3
4
F(VA,VB) > - f , thus F(VA.VB) > F(VA)
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Proposition 4a:
A higher expected value of the investment u leads to a higher value of delaying the investment.
Proof:
c/y ocr"
Further mathematical simplifications lead to:
<9// 2cr 12 2cr
Given (T >//, —0.5(—)>1, then
2 cr
3 1//V // + ff
2J 2 2CT
Proposition 4b:
A higher uncertainty a leads to a higher probability of delaying the investment.
Proof:
3 3<J öcr 3 3
w 5£ 5 u 4
Given cr > //, — < I, and given —( ) >— then < 1, and given () then
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Chapter 3 Determinants of Dutch investments in transition
countries
"The usurpafon, so characteristic for f/mes of chaos and confus/on, spreads. /V/ /«nds of
commanders, teaders, /nnovators and //berafors come and go. Tne besf tesr /n such coun/ries /s
to w's/r /hem a few f/mes a year. Each f/me you see new faces and hear new names. Bur wbaf
happened to fhe o/d ones? Un/cnoivn. D/d (hey h/de? D/d /hey set up a new company? D/d fhey
mention fhey wou/d be rigbf bac/c? /f ;s for a reason tiiaf such a ride /n an amusement part<, fhaf
goes up and down w/fh enormous speed, /s ca//ed Russ/an Mounfa/n'"
(Ryszard Kapusc/risto CJ993J, /mperium, Dec//ne of a Worid Power)
3.1 Introduction * ' '
The determinants of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) are frequently studied. The reason is
straightforward: if the determinants of FDI are known, policy to attract FDI can be better targeted. The
determinants of FDI can be divided in macro- and microdeterminants. The macro level determinants
are exogenous to the firm, for instance the GDP of the host country. Many macroeconomic
determinants significantly explain FDI flows. The influence of those factors for Dutch FDI flows is
discussed in chapter five. The microlevel determinants are endogenous to the firm, like the size of the
firm or the expenditures on research and development. This chapter focuses on the relation between
those micro- or firm-level determinants and Dutch FDI flows and tries to answer which Dutch firms
invest in transition countries and which factors influence those investments decisions.
Much research exists on which firms are most likely to be internationally active and what variables
determine or influence foreign investments. There are four major reasons to focus on these questions
in this dissertation again, instead of simply summarizing the results of those studies. First, the real
option model is taken as starting point for this chapter (see chapter two). Reason to do so is the fact
that the new insights from the model can lead to expectations or hypotheses on investment
determinants that deviate from the expectations of other economic models. Second, the
internationally accepted results from theory and empirics might not hold for Dutch firms. The Dutch
people have always been considered a nation of traders. For centuries they have been active in
international business and as a consequence an international orientation may be more present in the
Dutch business culture than in other countries. In addition, the Netherlands is a small country that
needs to be internationally oriented to thrive economically. Third, the internationally accepted results
also might not hold when the host countries of the foreign direct investments are located in Central
and Eastern Europe and Central Asia (transition countries). The transition countries have been
predominantly closed to international investments and trade during the last 45 to 70 years.' Even after
the regime changes in the early 1990s the business environment contains relatively few international
firms active in the market, the institutional framework is underdeveloped and the political and
economic environment is rather unstable. All these factors increase the uncertainty in this region, but
' The countries of the former Soviet Union started their planned economies early 20th century. The countries of Central and
Eastern Europe were added to this group of countries after the Second World War. Since 1967 only six countries allowed
foreign participation, mainly in the form of joint ventures For more information see chapter one box 1.1.Chapter 3 Determinants of Dutch investments in transition countries >*--•;•• - «rnBrvssv;« <tjii..j " A*«:>;•»:..•,! • •.*,!•>«*o
it remains questionable whether these factors also decrease the attractiveness of the region. Fourth,
the results might not hold when only firms that are interested in investing internationally are
considered in the analysis. In most research, the sample of firms studied includes both firms that are
interested in FDI as well as firms that are not at all interested in investing internationally. This study is
based on a unique dataset that includes a specific sample of Dutch firms. The main advantage of the
dataset is that all firms included in this study were interested in the Central and Eastern Europe and
Central Asia when participating in the survey of Dutch investments in this region. The firms had
already applied for information on this region or participated in seminars on doing business or
investing in the region. Of those firms, firms invested in the CEE region and firms decided not to
invest, but all had a serious interest in the region. Literature suggests there are differences between
firms that invest internationally and firms that do not have any interest in international business
operations. However, it is very likely that the differences are less distinctive when only firms that all
had seriously considered investing abroad are included in the sample.
The second paragraph of this chapter gives a literature overview of the theoretical and empirical
research on the different characteristics of internationally and nationally oriented firms. The different
expectations with respect to investment behavior of Dutch firms, when considering the option theory
as guideline, are clarified in this section. Section three provides information on Dutch FDI behavior
over the last decades, specifically in the transition region. In addition, summary characteristics of the
firms included in the survey are given, divided in firms that invested in one or more transition countries
(investors) and firms that did not invest in this region (noninvestors). This section is based on both
nationally aggregated and survey data. Section 3.4 includes an analysis on the first investment of
Dutch firms in a transition country after 1989, using the survey data as source of information. The
main question discussed is which factors influence whether a firm invests in this region. In section 3.5
allowing for multiple investments by one firm extends the analysis. All investments, including
investments in different countries as well as several locations in the same country, are included.
Thereby, the effect of experience of investments in other transition countries and previous
investments in the same country is taken into account when trying to determine what factors influence
investments. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Firm characteristics as FDI determinants
The choice to start an FDI is in principle based on several factors, including factors like return, risk
and control (Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992), Dunning (1988), Meyer (1998)). In investment
decisions, like FDI decisions, there is a trade off between returns and risks. The more uncertain an
investment in a foreign country is, the higher the expected return must be to make an FDI interesting
for a firm. In addition, a firm will only invest if it expects the investment to be profitable and if investing
now is expected to be more profitable than investing at a later time/Control refers to the necessity to
directly influence the functioning of the firm in the foreign market. When the need for control is high,
FDI is a suitable investment mode for a firm. If control is less important, export or license agreements
are more appropriate investment modes (Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992), Erramilli and Rao (1993),
'The possibility of postponing an investment is extensively elaborated on in the investment option literature. This Is discussed
In chapter 2.2 of this dissertation See for instance Dixit and Pindyck (1994) or Trigeorgis (1999). For a theoretical approach of
the option theory specifically applied to FDI decisions, see Capel (1992)
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Hennart and Larimo (1998)). The focus on the factors return, risk and control coincide largely with the
OLI theory of Dunning, where an ownership choice, location choice and internalization choice are
placed central (see for instance Dunning (1977, 1988, 2001). Ownership advantages should be
present for a firm from the home country to operate more efficient than firms in the host country.
Location advantages must be present in the host country compared to other countries including the
home country to make it attractive to invest there. Internalization advantages must be present in order
to make it more beneficial to integrate all activities within the firm than to subcontract the activities. In
order for the real option model to be applicable, I assume the ownership advantages are present for
the firms seriously interested in an FDI. If location advantages and internalization advantages are
sufficiently high for a certain host country, the decision to invest will be taken based on the option
model.'
The option model as described in section 2.2 and 2.3 mentions three major aspects that influence
an investment decision; financially binding constraints, uncertainty of an investment and irreversibility
of an investment. Firms need human and financial resources to absorb the increased costs and
activities related to an investment. The theory assumes that firms without financially binding
constraints can invest in all alternative projects as long as the expected value is positive and exceeds
the option value of waiting for each of those projects separately. Firms with a financial constraint have
to choose between the alternative projects and are therefore more inclined to postpone an
investment. Measuring financial constraints is difficult. Size, profitability, or growth in the firm often
serve as a proxy for the amount of skills and resources of a firm. In general larger firms are expected
to have more internal resources available for an investment or have better possibilities to finance its
investment externally." Thus, larger firms more likely do not have a financially binding constraint and
invest sooner. Most empirical research confirms a positive relationship between size and FDI (Horst
(1972), Grubaugh (1987), Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992), Li and Guisinger (1992), Pennings and
Sleuwaegen (1997), Meyer, (1998), Altomonte (1998)). Existing high profitability and growth are also
expected to increase FDI activities, but the empirics suggest these effects are less important and
many studies also find an insignificant or even negative relation (Li and Guisinger (1992), Pennings
and Sleuwaegen (1997), Horst (1972), Kimura and Lee (1998), Meyer (1998)). Age can also be
considered an indication of financial constraints. Older firms have more experience in business and
therefore may have a more creditworthy status than younger firms. They may have less difficulty in
obtaining the necessary financial means to support their investment. However, empirical studies do
not show a significant age effect in FDI decisions.
Uncertainty influences the investment decision negatively; the higher the uncertainty, the larger the
chance a firm will postpone its investment. The uncertainty of an investment is broadly said
dependent on the characteristics of the host country as well as the characteristics of the firm. In
chapter five the impact of host country characteristics is described more elaborately, but generally
speaking a the economic development of a country, a stable business climate and a stable political
environment decrease investment uncertainty and increase the chance a firm invests. With respect to
firm level characteristics, specific skills, like management skills or experience in a region, decrease
the uncertainty surrounding the investment and increase the chance for a firm to engage in an FDI.
^ To review the decision mechanism for an FDI in one or multiple host countries, see section 2.2 and 2.3 of this dissertation.
In some theories low growth and profitability may serve as a reason to look for alternative possibilities abroad and will
increase the chance to start an FDI. See for instance Kimura and Lee, 1998
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The presence of international activities and the existence of trade relations with the host country at
the time of the new investment are often used as proxies for these skills (Agarwal and Ramaswami
(1992), Li and Guisinger (1992), Kimura and Lee (1998)).'
The irreversible set-up costs of an investment negatively influence the investment decision; the
higher those irreversible set-up costs are, the larger the chance the firm will postpone its investment.
The sector the firm is active in can serve as proxy for those set-up costs. There are basically three
kinds of FDI; market seeking FDI, cost oriented FDI and strategic investments. The market seeking
FDI is set up to serve the local market with existing products." This generally does not involve the
establishment of costly production facilities and these activities often can start at small scale.
Therefore the irreversible costs are relatively low and firms invest sooner. Examples of sectors that
are market seeking are the retail sector or logistic sector. An investment in sectors where production
is reallocated is often cost oriented. Cost saving often occurs in labor intense, resource specific or
technological advanced production processes (Pennings and Sleuwaegen (1997). (Altomonte (1998),
Pennings and Sleuwaegen, (1997), Djarova (2004)). Examples of sectors with relatively many cost
oriented investments are the industrial sector, agricultural sector and construction sector'. Because of
the involvement of production facilities, irreversible set-up costs are high and investments in those
sectors are more often postponed. The last form of FDI, strategic FDI, is harder to be linked to a
specific sector. Strategic asset investments are for example undertaken in order to diversify risks
geographically or to deal with foreign or local competition (first mover advantage'). These investments
are most likely small-scale investments involving low irreversible set-up costs. In the option literature
they are considered an option to expand the activities later. Investments in joint ventures are often
taken as proxy for a platform investments, with greenfield or brownfield investments as market-
seeking or cost-oriented counterparts.' The relation between sector of activity and investments based
on the option model contradicts the general findings in the literature. Altomonte (1999) and Penning
and Sleuwaegen (1997) find that firms in sectors in which economies of scale are more likely or
sectors where production is labor intense more often engage in FDI, based on the cost-saving
arguments. On the other hand, other researchers found that sector divisions do have an insignificant
effect in FDI choices (Horst (1972), Grubaugh (1987)). Last, research and development expenditures
(R&D) are often included in analysis, since the firms engaging in more technology oriented sectors
are often more innovation minded and have a competitive advantage in product differentiation. In
addition technology oriented firms have a better negotiating position with the host economies with
respect to their terms of entrance (Grubaugh (1987), Kimura and Lee (1998), Meyer (1998),
Altomonte (1999)). A literature overview, summarizing these results, is included in table 3.1.
* On the other hand, investments in risky environments often offer possibilities for short term successes or relatively large
profits, for instance because the market is not served yet, local and foreign competition is absent or regulations are unclear and
leave room for a lot of flexibility.
* Starting an FDI in a host country can be with the purpose to increase sales in the host country (opening a sales office, no
production facility), resulting in an increase in the scale of production at home with lower per unit costs (economies of scale in
the home country). Other arguments for market seeking FDI are the replacement of exports to the host country or finding a
market for products that are no longer in demand in the home country (Djarova, 2004).
If firms from the construction sector invest in sector-specific machinery the set-up costs are high. If, however, they are purely
market onented. try to serve the local market and use the production factors from the mother firm, the irreversible set-up costs
will be lower.
* First mover investments (or other strategic investment decisions) can lead to a market position that in the short run may not
be profitable, but that will prevent local or foreign competitors to enter the market. Therefore the longer run presence in the
market, that is expected to be profitable, will be guaranteed. (Kogut. and Kulatilaka (1994)).
* Greenfield investments are newly established firms, brownfield investments are takeovers.
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Note: + (-) indicates a positive (negative) significant effect of that factor on investments. Insig stands for insignificance of the
factor. An empty box indicates the factor was not included in that study.
Based on the literature review, I expect Dutch firms with an FDI in a transition country to be larger
and older than Dutch firms without an FDI, since those firms are less often financially constrained. In
addition I expect a firm with several owners of different nationalities to have an FDI more often than
firms with full Dutch ownership, since firms that face international influence are possibly also more
internationally focused. Furthermore firms that already had trade relations with a firm(s) in a transition
country are expected to invest in the region more often than firms without these trade relations. Those
factors all decrease the uncertainty of the investment. Last, based on the size and irreversibility of the
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set-up costs I expect firms in the agricultural, industrial and construction sectors to be less likely to
invest than firms in other sectors. On the other hand investments in those sectors are likely to benefit
from lower production costs, which could be a valid argument to reverse the expectations. I do not
expect the results to be as distinctive as can be expected based on the literature. The fact that the
firms in the sample already showed serious interest in the region makes the distinction between the
investors and noninvestors less large.'"
Up to this point, only the empirical literature on the decision to invest or not is discussed. An
additional aspect of an FDI decision is the timing of investments. The timing of the investment is a
complex decision, which is highly affected by the risk indication of the host country. Investing in a
risky country may lead to more profitable opportunities than investing in a low risk country, but it is
also more risky for the company. This argument is particularly valid for when looking at the region of
Central and Eastern Europe. Investing immediately after the start of transition, in the years 1989 to
1991, was risky since legal frameworks, property rights, institutions and economic reforms were not
yet in place. On the other hand an early move could lead to high profits (early mover advantages).
The further countries proceed in the transition process, the more stable they become. I anticipate
country stability to be more influential than early mover advantages and expect the chances that firms
invest, both for the first as well as for subsequent times, to increase as time goes on.
3.3 Facts and figures on Dutch investments and investors
The flows and stock of Dutch outward direct investments increased constantly since 1987 (see figure
3.1). Europe" and North America" are the main receivers of Dutch FDI. Looking at the worldwide
percentage division of Dutch FDI stock, the share invested in Europe increased from 45 to 60 percent
of the total stock, whereas the share in North America decreased over the last years from 45 to 30
percent. The percentage stock invested in the rest of the world has remained more or less stable
between 10 and 15 percent. Within Europe the majority of Dutch investments go to the countries of
the European Union. In 1987 the stock of Dutch investments in Central and Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union was only five million euro, but it increased to almost 13600 million euro in 2002. Within
the transition countries the division of Dutch investments is highly variable, with the majority invested
in the most developed Central European countries and only marginal amounts in the less developed
Eastern European and Central Asian countries. Figure 3.2 shows that the joint Dutch investment
stock in Poland, the Czech Republic, Russia and Hungary equals 89 percent of the total Dutch
investments in the region in 2001, while in terms of population those countries only make up 50
percent of the total regions population.
This trend is confirmed by the data from the survey. Among the respondents of the survey, Poland
is the most popular host country in which to invest, followed by Hungary. Remarkably, the Czech
Republic only takes fifth place as receiver of Dutch FDI, after Russia and Romania (see figure 3.3).
'° I am aware that the analyses in sections 3 3 and 3.4 suffer from an omitted variable bias. Competitive firms are more likely to
invest abroad than their less competitive counterpart However, the survey data used show a relatively high item non-response
in the question to indicate profitability of the firm, disabling me to include profit as indicator for competitiveness (exception is
model four in table 3 4) Also liquidity indicators to proxy financial constraints would have been a valuable addition to the
dataset. that are unfortunately not included now.
" Europe includes Western Europe. Central and Eastern Europe and the countries from the former Soviet Union.
" North America includes Canada. USA and Mexico.Chapter 3 Determinants of Dutch investments in transition countries .•: i* «;-,«- ;'.M: -.-*•*"='... s;'.--».-«.-^-»'-^: {
Figure 3.1: Stock and Flows of Dutch Outward FDI (million euro)
• Europe • North America • Rest of the world
Source: Oe Nederlandsche Bank Balance of Payment data
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Source: Survey data "Dutch direct investments in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia"
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Figure 3.4: Number of Dutch Investments in the CEEC and FSU by year
1966 1986 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
Source: Survey data "Dutch direct investments in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia" f 5" i *; .
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Source: Survey data "Dutch direct investments in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia"
As expected, the bulk of inflow of Dutch investments started in the early 1990s and the amount of
investments has continued to grow ever since (see figure 3.4)." Looking at the timing of the 1*' until
the 5'" investment in the region it is clear that follow up investments become more important and more
frequent over time. This tendency indicates that several firms are successfully exploring the region
and expanding their business. The number of first investments, the upper line in figure 3.5, is stable at
around 20 new investments per year since 1995. This number indicates that, besides the growing
number of follow-up investments, many Dutch entrepreneurs still take the step to invest either in the
region for the first time or in a transition country where their company is not yet active.
The dataset used in the remainder of this chapter includes information on all eligible respondents of
the survey between 1989 and 1999, being 79 Dutch firms with a direct investment in Central and
Eastern Europe or Central Asia and 211 Dutch firms without an investment in this region." All 290
firms had some business interest in the transition countries when answering the questionnaire."
" The decline of investments in 2000 is caused by the fact that the survey was taken in the first half of 2000. so the data for
that year are underestimated since more than half of the year is not included.
" The total sample includes 81 investors and 217 nomnvestors. but 2 investors and 6 noninvestors indicated they invested or
were interested before 1989 or after 1999.
" More specifics on the survey procedures and respondents can be found in Annex A.
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics of investors and noninvestors in the survey
Charactensti Summary statistics Summary statistics
c influencing Investors Noninvestors
international (79 firms) (211 firms)
activities





















































































































The sector division is significantly different between firms that
invested and firms that did not invest, at a 1% level.
(Pearson chi2(5)= 16.3196, Pr = 0.006
-....-. ...-,.... -^ •:,- .- f. t>-.-er '••-=*••
The age difference in years between investors and
noninvestors is significant at a 10% level (p>t=0.0674). Non
investors are significantly older than investors at a 5% level
(P>t=0.0337)
However, when taking age categories, the age difference is
insignificant (Pearson chi2(5) = 8.2350 Pr = 0.144)
Investors have on average more offices in The Netherlands,
but the difference with noninvestors is insignificant.
Nr. of offices absolute numbers: P>|t|= 0.1682
Categories: Pearson chi2(5) = 7.4316 Pr = 0.190
The difference in revenue between investors and noninvestors
is insignificant when taken in absolute numbers, but significant
at 5% level when looking at categories.
Revenue absolute numbers: P>|t|= 0.1169
Categories: Pearson chi2(7) = 18.1646 Pr = 0.011
Investors are significantly larger than noninvestors. at a 5%
level when looking at the absolute numbers, but the difference
is insignificant when comparing size categories.
Absolute numbers: P > |t| = 0.0266
Categories: Pearson chi2(8) = 12.8097 Pr = 0.171
There is no significant difference in profits between investors
and noninvestors, when taken in absolute numbers or in
categories
P>|t|= 0.1333 _.,. ,_
Categories: Pearson chi2 = 3.3333 Pr 0.343 '
Noninvestors grew faster, but the difference is insignificant.
P > |t| = 0.4034
There is a significant difference at 10% level, that
internationally owned firms invest less in the CEE region
P > |t| = 0.0030
Pearson chi2(1)= 7.5093 Pr = 0.006
Investors have significantly more previous business
experience in the CEE region
Pearson chi2( 1) = 43.9667 Pr = 0.000
Investors more often considered full ownership than joint
ventures
Pearson chi2(1) = 6 4300 Pr 0.011
Source: Survey data "Dutch direct investments in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia"
(1) All Pearson Chi2 tests are done with equal variance assumption
(2) With respect to expected mode of FDI, I have taken the mode chosen by investors and the mode considered by
noninvestors. This information was only available for 49 noninvestors. that made an analysis before they decided not to invest
and provided information in the questionnaire on their investment analysis.
In line with what was expected based on the literature overview in section 3.2, investors are on
average larger than noninvestors, though the result is either significant or insignificant depending on
the variable chosen to measure size. Firms with an FDI are only significantly larger than noninvesting
firms when size is measured by number of employees. The variable measuring previous trade
relations also shows the expected results; before making the investment investors did have trade
37Chapter 3 Determinants of Dutch investments in transition countries -•••>*- •: .' • i-«;« :-.••!•'•
relations with companies in a transition country significantly more often than noninvestors. Investors
and noninvestors have different sector divisions, in line with the expectations based on the option
model. Investors are in general less active in agriculture, industry and construction than noninvestors.
On the other hand, several variables show opposite signs from what was expected. The expectation
that investors are on average older entities is not apparent in this dataset. At a five percent level of
significance noninvestors are older than investors. Firms that invested in a transition country more
often have a complete Dutch ownership than noninvestors, whereas was expected that they would
have a more multinational ownership division. And last, firms that invested in a transition countries
more often used an investment mode with full ownership than noninvestors intended to do. This could
be an indication that the use of joint ventures as platform investments may not be so regular, though
this conclusion would be too hard based on these data and a lot more research should be undertaken
to support that statement."
In section 3.4 I test whether the factors that significantly differ between investors and noninvestors
in 2001 are also the factors that increase the probability that a firm invests in a transition country.
3.4 First FDI in the Central and Eastern Europe or Central Asia since 1989
This section includes a logit analysis to find out which microlevel firm characteristics infiuence the first
investment of a firm in a transition country since 1989. A logit regression is selected as the most
suitable econometric test, given the fact that investing is a binary variable. Firms included in the
database either invested or did not invest and in this analysis I study which firm characteristics can
explain this investment behavior. For a more elaborate explanation of the logit regression model, see
annex 3.1.
A survival time analysis or hazard rate analysis would methodologically have been an elegant
solution to include the timing of those investments as well. Hazard rate models calculate the
probability firms are at risk for a certain event, taking into account the time that has passed and the
events that have occurred before. However, a survival time analysis was not possible with this dataset
since there were only a limited number of time periods and multiple events per period (more firms
invested in the same year). In this database the investments in a single year cannot be ordered
chronologically in terms of time, since the month of investment was unknown." Therefore I opt for
logit regression including only the first investments of each firm as dependent variable. In section 3.5
multiple investments per firm are allowed and event related variables incorporating FDI experience
are included." All regressions included in sections 3.4 and 3.5 were also run correcting for
nonresponse bias. The results of the regressions with probability weights do not change in terms of
signs and significance of variables compared to the unweighted regressions, therefore only the
unweighted results are presented in these sections."
" Full ownership modes of FDI are Greenfield and Brownfield investments: joint ventures include joint ventures with existing
firms as well as newly started enterprises with a local partner.
" Defining time on a monthly basis would not only have increased the number of time periods but also decreased the periods in
which multiple events occurred Unfortunately information on the month of investment was unavailable.
" I am aware that more competitive firms are more likely to invest sooner The impact of this effect is lost in the analysis, since
no data are available to include a variable for competitiveness.
'* In Annex A I show that larger older firms were more likely to respond to the survey In order to control for that effect I
calculated probabilities of response, based on company characteristics including age and size. The inverse of this probability is
included as probability weight in the weighted regressions The results of these regressions do not change in terms of signs
and significance of the coefficients. Therefore those results are not included here.Chapter 3 Determinants of Dutch investments in transition countries
Table 3.3: Number of firms in the sample period of 1989-1999
Years
Firms that invested in
this year for the first
time in the CEE region
Total nr. of firms that
invested in the CEE for

































' Two firms that invested in 1986 and 2000 are excluded from the logit analysis.
The dependent variable of the logit regression is whether the firm invested in a transition country
during the years 1989-1999.*"
In table 3.2 the summary statistics show that investors are on average larger and younger than
noninvestors, prefer 100 percent Dutch ownership and had trade experience in the region more often
than noninvestors. In terms of sector division, investors are more often active in the sectors logistics
and others and less often in industry or construction than noninvestors. Based on these findings I
expect larger, younger, 100 percent Dutch firms with trade experience to invest more often and
sooner in a transition country than other firms.
In total 79 firms invested in the region in the period 1989-1999. Most of the first investments were
made during the second half of the 1990s (see table 3.3). The variables included in the analysis are
the firms age in 1988, size of the firm measured in number of employees, sector dummies, number of
owners, percentage of Dutch ownership, trade experience in the country before investing in that
country and FDI experience in one of the transition countries before 1989. The variables revenue,
profit, growth and mode of FDI are included only in the fourth model due to the many missing
observations that may bias the results." *
The results included in table 3.4 show that age affects a first investment negatively; being older in
1989 decreases the relative chance the firm will invest in the region the next decade for the first time.
The size of the firm does not significantly influence the odds of a first investment. These results
contradict the argument that firms without financially binding constraints (older larger firms) are more
likely to invest. With respect to sector division, only firms active in logistics are significantly more likely
to invest than firms in the industrial sector. As expected, construction and agriculture carry a negative
sign but the coefficients are insignificant." Equally, the sector trade and other have the expected
positive sign, but they are insignificant as well. This is in line with the expectations that high
irreversible set-up costs, often present in the agricultural, industrial and construction sector, lead to
postponement of an investment. Trade experience increases the relative chance a firm will invest in
the region significantly, confirming that experience decreases uncertainty. However, experience with
an FDI only negatively affects the odds of investing.
The survey was taken in spring 2000. so the number of investments made in 2000 included in the results is incomplete.
Therefore the investments undertaken in 2000 were excluded in order to avoid underestimation of investments.
^ There is a possibility that only firms with positive revenue and profits answered this question in the questionnaire.
See note two table 3.2 for information on missing observation of the vanable mode of FD/.
There are only four firms in the sector that invested in the region. Those firms vary from small to large. Based on these data it
is hard to conclude whether these firms are market seeking service onented offices without large set-up costs or larger offices
that invested in machinery and thus face larger set-up costs. I am aware that the evidence to conclude that the sign is as
expected is limited, but the conclusion is already weak given the fact that the coefficient is insignificantChapter 3 Determinants of Dutch investments in transition countries
Table 3.4: Logit analysis for the first FDI in 1989-1999
Dependent variable.











Trade experience before 1989
FDI experience before 1989
Age2
Size2
Revenue (in million euro. 1989)




























































































































* 10% significant, " 5% significant, *" 1% significant; Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; Prob > CHI2: 0.0000 in all
four regressions. Industry is taken as baseline.
Note 1) Two successes completely determined in model 3 and 4. Those observations are dropped from the regression. Note 2)
In model four the dummy variable logistics predicts failure perfectly. This is a one-way causation problem. The observations
with sector logistics are dropped (9 observations). Note 3) The variables Revenue and Profit (million euro) are taken for 1989.
In case this observation was missing it was replaced with the value of 1994 or 1999 Note 4) Growth is measured in growth of
employees in 1989-1994. In case this value is missing it is replaced with the growth rate of 1994-1999. Note 5) Joint venture
observations are available for only 130 firms that seriously considered an investment in the CEEC. All observations without this
variable are excluded from this regression.
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Adding squared variables for age and size does not add explanatory power to the model. Neither
does the inclusion of three variables used as indicators for competitiveness and the likeliness of
financially binding constraints. Higher revenues and higher growth have a positive but insignificant
coefficient and the coefficient of profit is even negative. Investing in (or intending to invest in) a joint
venture increases the relative probability a firm invests; it carries a highly positive coefficient. Thus,
there is some evidence for the argument that investments in joint ventures increase the chance a firm
actually invests and this could be explained by the platform investment argument. , .,,.„„.,.
•. •••- «Ulf
3.5 Multiple investments in Central and Eastern Europe or Central Asia
Contrary to section 3.4, in this section multiple investments are included in the dataset. Every
investment of a firm, be it the first, second or tenth FDI, is counted as an event. Firms do not fall out of
*•" • the sample if an investment is made, but remain included for the full 11-year sample period. Thus,
- '-''•' investments in different years and in different countries are included, as well as several investments in
^~ one country. More investments done by one firm in one year are incorporated in the changing of two
*,. event-related variables, but are measured only as one event in the logit regression."
Two event-related variables measuring the experience of a firm are included as explanatory
variables. The variable fote/ measures the total number of investments a firm has in the region at the
start of the year. The variable experience measures the number of years of experience a firm has with
investing in the CEE region. I expect both variables to have a positive sign, indicating that firms with
more experience are more certain about the situation in the region and invest sooner. These two
experience variables incorporate to some extent the competitiveness effect mentioned before; more
competitive firms invest sooner than their less competitive counterparts. Table 3.5 shows the number
of firms that invested in each year of the sample period and registers if that was the first FDI of the
firm in a transition country or a subsequent one.
A yearly analysis, for the years 1989 - 1999 was undertaken to see whether a time effect was
visible over the years. If the region became less uncertain and more stable over time this
development could influence investment behavior, and the sign or significance of the coefficients of
the control variables and experience variables could change. As firm characteristics the control
variables age, size and number of owners are included. The sector dummies, which were insignificant
when included in the regression, are excluded from the logit regression displayed here since their
inclusion frequently resulted in a one-way dummy bias, leading to a drop of many observations." The
variable indicating the percentage of Dutch ownership is excluded, since it was insignificant and
caused observations to drop out due to missing values. Similar arguments apply for the exclusion of
revenue, profit and growth.* ... _ .. . . .
When a firm makes an FDI in a specific year, the dependent variable changes from zero to one. A second or even third or
fourth investment in the same year does not change the dependent variable, since this variable already registered that an FDI
was started in that specific year
One-way dummy bias is caused by the fact that for instance all firms from the sector transport do not invest in one year
Thus, as the dummy transport equals zero, the dependent variable invest also equals zero.
When included the coefficients of the variables were insignificant, the coefficient of revenue was positive and the coefficients
of profit and growth were negative
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Table 3.5: Number of firms and investments in the CEE region (1989-1999)













































Table 3.6: Logit regression explaining investments in Central and Eastern
Europe and Central Asia after 1989, allowing for multiple investments




Total number of FDI at start of the year
Number of years experience in CEE
since first FDI
Pseudo R2















































































The table displays the coefficients
Number of observations: 290
' significant at 10% level, " significant at 5% level. *" significant at 1% level
With respect to the logit analyses, several facts can be observed (see table 3.6). First, age, size and
number of owners are mainly insignificant. The most influencing variables are the event-related
variables tote/ number of FO/ in fhe fransrt/bn coun/ries af fhe stert of fhe year and number of years of
experience /n fhe frans/f/on countries after FD/7. When included in a logit regression separately, both
variables display a positive coefficient and are significant over the whole time period." Having
experience in the region increases the relative chance that the firm invests again in the following year.
The impact of one additional unit (FDI) or year of experience declines over time (in other words, the
coefficient becomes smaller). It shows an inverse relationship with the increasing value of total
experience, since the number of investments and the years of experience since the first FDI was
undertaken both show a continuously increasing trend over time. In general, therefore, the effect of an
additional investment or year since the first investment still increases the odds ratio of investing next
year (see annex 3.2 for a more detailed explanation of this effect). When both event-related variables
are included jointly in the analysis, the effect becomes less clear. The total number of FDI mainly
shows a positive and significant effect, but the number of years of experience becomes insignificant
for some years and sometimes even negative." Still, the model including both variables is highly
significant in total and the fit is better than in the models including only one of the experience-related
variables.
These regression results are not included in the table; the table shows the coefficients when both event-related variables are
jointly included.
In the years 1990 and 1991 the variables total and experience display a collinear relation. This explains the fact that the
coefficients of both variables are rather unstable during those two years, when both variables are included simultaneously.
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Total number of FDI in CEE
before start of year
Years of experience in CEE
since FD11
Years of experience in CEE
since FDI2
Years of experience in CEE
since FDI3
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since FDI4

















































































































Number of observations: 3190
Sector industry is the baseline sector.
Size is defined in categories 1-5, 5-20. 20-50, 50-100, 100-200, 200-500 and >500 employees.
All models were significant at 1% level, displaying a Prob>chi2: 0 0000
' Coefficient is significant at 10% level, " significant at 5% level, *" significant at 1% level
Table 3.7 shows the results of a similar regression, but the time is now added as a separate
variable. All firms are included in the sample with one observation per year, no firms drop out. Control
variables age, size, sector", number of owners and percentage of Dutch ownership" are included, as
well as six event-related experience variables. The variable total counts the number of investments a
firm has in the transition countries before the start of a year. The variables years of experience one-
five count the number of years of experience a firm has in the region since the first, second, third,
fourth and fifth investment. The basic model, without including event-related variables (model one),
shows a significantly positive time trend; the more years passed since 1989, the larger the relative
chance is a firm will make an investment. In addition, larger firms are significantly more likely to make
investments in a transition country (the odds of investing increase with 12 percent per increase of one
size category). ^ .;-.-.
Firms from the transport sector are more likely to invest than firms with an industrial activity. The
number of owners also positively influences the relative chance that a firm will invest once or more in
the region positively. The odds ratio of investing compared to not investing of a firm with two owners
increases with 25 percent compared to the odds ratio of a firm with only one owner. The largest
"* Due to the increase in number of observations it is possible to include the dummy variables for sector again without causing a
one-way dummy bias leading to a drop in observations.
* Given that there were a substantial number of missing observations for the variable percentage owners/wp, the variable is not
included in the regressions that are reported in the text When percentage was included in all variations of the logit regression,
the variable had a slightly positive coefficient (0 003) and was insignificant.
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impact comes from the event-related experience variables that are included in models two to eight.
The total number of investments in the CEE region, when included separately, has a positive
significant coefficient. Per additional investment a firm has in the CEE region the odds that it will
invest in the next period increase by 92 percent (model two). Models three to seven include the
variables measuring the years of experience of doing business in the CEE region, determined for the
first five investments. The experience gained from the first two investments consistently shows a
positive significance, so firms with basic experience in the region are more likely to invest in the
region the next period. The years of experience after the third, fourth and fifth investment give less
consistent coefficients, with both positive and negative influence and changing from significant to
insignificant. With respect to years of experience, the conclusion therefore is that the maximum effect
of experience comes from the first two investments in the region and all additional investments fail to
significantly influence the investment decision. In model eight of table 3.8 all experience variables are
jointly included. The variable total number of investments in the CEE region becomes dominant. With
a coefficient of 1.083 and significance at one percent level, every additional FDI a firm has in the CEE
region at the start of a year increases the odds that a firm will invest in the CEE region that year with
almost 200 percent. The years of experience after investing, irrespective of whether they are after the
first up to the fifth investment, all become insignificant."
3.6 Conclusions -
The literature studying the investment behavior of firms generally finds that older and larger firms are
more likely to invest abroad than their smaller counterparts. In addition, it is often expected that firms
in labor intensive industries, or industries where scale economies are possible are more
internationally active. Based on the option theory these expectations are adjusted in this chapter. In
agreement with the mentioned literature in chapter two I expect larger older firms to be less financially
constrained, better able to obtain finance for their investments and thus invest sooner. Firms active in
sectors that have high irreversible set-up costs, like industry, construction and agriculture are
expected to invest less often than firms in sectors that require a lower initial investment sum.
Experience is expected to have a positive impact on investment decisions, since experience is likely
to decrease the uncertainty surrounding an investment.
This chapter uses data from the Dutch sample described in Annex A, which deviates from a random
firm sample most often used in similar kinds of studies. The Dutch firms included in the sample are all
firms that at some point between 1989 and 1999 were interested in investing in Central and Eastern
Europe or Central Asia to some extent. Results in section 3.3 show that of those Dutch firms that
considered international activities, the ones that decided to become active in the region are
significantly larger than the firms that decided not to invest. They are also, as expected, less often
active in the industrial and construction sector. In contradiction to the expectations, they are younger
than firms that did not invest and firms with a diverse international ownership are not more likely to
invest in a transition country. Finns that invested in a transition country did have more experience with
trade and FDI. These results deviate from the earlier literature. This can be explained by several
" In an additional analysis, a variable containing the combined years of experience after investment one to five was included
instead of the five different experience variables. Contrary to the expectations, the coefficient of this variable was significantly
negative (coefficient equal to -0.085) at a 5 percent level. However, the coefficient of the variable tola/ increased compared to
the coefficient in model two to 0.88 and remained significant at a one percent level.
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factors. First, the sample selection is different. When taking a random sample of firms, many small
local firms are included that may not have any interest in investing abroad. By selecting only those
firms that are interested in international operations, the characteristics of the firms included in this
sample are already much more converged and the difference between those firms investing and not
investing becomes less evident. In addition, only looking at firms interested in investing in a high-risk
region like the transition region just after its transition started is already a preselection. The results
indicate that risky regions attract young adventurous enterprises more, whereas older established
firms are more interested in the stable economic environments.
The logit regressions in section 3.4 test which characteristics influence the chance a firm invests in
a transition country, all indicate that firm characteristics are not the major explanatory variables for
investment decisions. In fact, only larger firms are more likely to invest. The age, sector, number of
owners and percentage of Dutch ownership hardly influence the investment choice. Experience
effects are of great importance in explaining investment behavior; having experience increases the
odds that firms invest in the region. Allowing for multiple investments per firm, in section 3.5, does not
change the results a lot. Addition of a time effect shows that transition time influences the investment
decision. The more time that has elapsed after transition started, the more likely firms are to invest in
the region, indicating that some time to make the investment decision and prepare the investment is
needed. In addition, as time went by, many transition countries developed economically and
institutionally and became less risky. This changed the economic environment for an FDI considerably
and the region as a whole became increasingly popular as investment destination. In addition to time,
mainly size and experience are most important in explaining FDI decisions.
The results all support the option theory, that predicts that small firms invest later, since firms with a
binding financial constraint postpone their FDI more often than firms without financial constraints. The
option theory also predicts that firms invest more often as the risk decreases. In transition countries
the country risk decreased continuously over the decade described and as expected time influences
the investment decision, since the year effect on investments is positively significant. The analyses in
this chapter also indicate that uncertainty related to an investment decision is important at the
microlevel. Firms with more experience with FDIs or trade in the transition countries are probably also
the firms that have a lower uncertainty attached to their investment decision. They already have
experience; possibly have networks and maybe better access to information as well. Those factors all
decrease the uncertainty of an investment decision, increasing the chance a firm invests.
The complete transition region in 1989 was a very risky region in which to invest, but it displayed
large deviations in the country risks over the last decade. Some transition countries in 2002 had
almost reached the levels of development and stability of the least developed EU countries, whereas
some other, mostly former Soviet Union Republics, can still be classified as high-risk regions. This
diversification of risk over the region, with the uncertainty surrounding investments in the transition
region in some countries decreasing and in others remaining rather high, leaves a market interesting
for firms willing to take higher risks with their investment, but also for firms that are more interested in
a stable investment climate.
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Annex 3.1 Methodology of the empirical tests ^
The question to be answered in this chapter is which characteristics indicate what firms invest in the CEE
region once or multiple times after 1989 and which firms do not invest. The dependent variable y, to
invest or not, is binary. Investors in the CEE region are assigned a value of y=1 and noninvestors are
assigned a value of y=0. The independent variables x are a vector of firm characteristics, that are used to
predict which firms are more likely to invest in the CEE region.
In order to answer this question empirically, a limited dependent variables model is used. The two
approaches most often used are the logit and probit model. In this section I follow the description of
Maddala, chapter two section 2.5 (Maddala (1983)). Both assume that there is an underlying response
variable y,', defined by:
y,' = /? x, + M,
In the probit analysis the cumulative distribution function for «, is normal, so F(- /? 'x,) is normally
distributed. In the logit model the cumulative distribution for i/^ is logistic. Generally speaking the
outcomes of both models are similar using small samples with limited outliers and different with samples
with large outcomes in the tails. In the estimations of the chapter the logit analysis was followed
(assuming less outliers), though the results of the analysis using a probit model are not distinctly different
in this chapter.
In practice the underlying y' is unobservable. What is observed is the dummy variable y, defined by:
y. = 1 if y. > 0 , indicating the firm invested in the CEE region
y. = 0 if y^ < 0 , indicating the firm did not invest in the CEE region
In the logit model /? 'x, equals £(y*|;t,). Therefore the probability of a firm to invest in the CEE region
equals:
Prob (y, = 1) = Prob (w, > -/? 'xj = 1 - /""(-/? '*,•), where F is the cumulative distribution function
for M .
The distribution function equals: Fl-Z? 'x )= ^ , ^-r= , 1
^ '' l + exp(-/? 'x,j l + exp(/? 'x,j
The likelihood function L equals:
The results of the logit probability model show which variables increase or decrease the likelihood of
investing in the CEE region and whether these influences are significant.
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For example, the estimates of all combined variables for the period 1989-1999, which are described in
table 3.4 of the chapter, are significant. P>Chi2 = 0.000, which is low enough to reject the hypothesis that
all coefficients equal zero.
The predicted logit, L, equals the constant + the coefficient times the variables. The predicted . ,. ,
logit equals Z. = In —— —-
The coefficients of the variables can be interpreted as follows. The coefficient for the variable "Age in
1988" in the logit regression in table 3.4, a variable significantly different from zero at a five percent level,
is -0.024. This coefficient describes the effect of age on the odds ration to invest in the CEE region versus
not to invest. An increase of a firm's age with one year decreases the odd with 2.4 percent. Thus, image
that for a firm of 50 years, the relative odd to invest versus not to invest is 2. This odd ratio decreases
with 2.4 percent for a firm which is one year older (51 years), thus the relative odds to invest versus not to
invest for this firm of 51 years old firm would be approximately 1.952. The impact of this variable age is
significant, since the coefficient is significantly different from zero at a five percent level.Annex 3.2 The effect of experience on investment behavior
Annex 3.2 The effect of experience on investment behavior
Table A3.2.1: Effect of experience on investment behavior
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Coefficient of total number of FDI
at start of the year
Averaqe number of total FOI
Multiplying coefficient of total



































The coefficient for total number of FDI at the start of each year is positive in all years. This means
that the more direct investments a firm has in the transition countries at the start of a year, the
larger the relative chance it will invest that year again. However, the coefficient is declining,
indicating the impact of one additional FDI becomes less important over time. On the other hand,
the second row in table A3.2.1 shows that the average number of investments firms have in the
transition region increases over time. Thus, as becomes clear from the third row, the combined
effect of experience increases, meaning that the more experienced firms are with direct
investments in the region, the more likely they are to invest again (relatively to not investing).mwir.« ne «jmiwe« « a***« «HT S
«Q
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Recenf/y severa/ Dufch businessmen /n Moscow and / had a meeflng wlfb fbe Russian
ambassador. 'Write down on a p/ece of paper why western bus/nesses won'f Invesf /n Russia",
Fjodorov fv/ce pres/denfj said. The Dufch businessmen footed af each ofher a /Iff/e bewildered.
Inhere for heaven's sa/ce to sfarf? "***"
Sfabl/lfy, /...y, If fbey wou/d sfarf nof changing fhe ru/es every week, /nvesfors wanf to make p/ans.
Debfs, /•.../, as tong as fhe debfs are nof seff/ed, no Western company w/7/ /nvesf /n Russia.
Russ/a sfl// owes governmenfs and bus/nesses b/7/iöns. Taxes, £..y, on goods Imported from fhe
wesf you pay more fban 50 percenf. Russia says /f needs cap/fa/, buf /n rea//fy If scares us away.
The /aw, /'..J, /aws are confrad/ctory /n a/mosf every area, /f /s a mess; ;n such an /nvesfmenf
cl/male no one iv/// /nvesf. Corrupf/on, ^..J, how can you do bus/ness //fhe c/v/V servanfs af a//
/eve/s are corrupted. Honesf companies can hard/y do business here. Hierarchy, /...y, 'f 's fofa//y
unc/ear who In fhe govemmenf Is responslb/e for which Issue. Sflcfc to agreemenfs, /...y, one of
our fe/foiv businessmen recenf/y bul/f a factory /n Russia. The agreemenf was fhaf fhe
govemmenf wou/d buy part of fhe production. They yusf don 'f commlf; after fhree monfhs fhe
factory Is c/osed again.
/ footed af fhe ambassador and said, "Try to summarize fhaf on a piece of paper".
fDerfc Sauer f200f j, Typisch Russisch;
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter the main research questions are how firms make an investment decision, what kind of
decision processes and decision rules they follow and if this process of decision-making can be
modeled. In chapter three the characteristics of firms were discussed that influenced whether a firm
invests. Now the focus is on how the firm decides whether to invest. In order to answer this question,
several assumptions and predictions on investment decisions, based on the option theory literature,
are formulated in section 4.2. This chapter builds on survey data containing information on the
decision-making process of Dutch firms (see annex A). The data contain information on the process
leading to the decision whether to invest in the CEE region. They are used to see if the derived
assumptions and predictions with respect to the firm's decision-making are confirmed by firm level
data. The focus is on the investment decision process of the first investment of the firm in the CEE
region since 1989 (section 4.3).' One of the advantages of this survey database is that it includes
information on the investment process of firms that decided to invest in the CEE region after 1989, as
well as that of firms that were interested in an investment but decided not to invest. Therefore, it is
possible to check whether the process was substantially different for the hereafter-called "investors"
and "noninvestors" (section 4.4.1). The information also allows to test whether investment decision
processes are influenced by the presence of experience with a direct investment in the CEE region.
Several firms indicated they have more than one FDI in the region. The survey included questions
related to the investment process of both their first and last investments in the region after 1989.* In
' The CEE region includes the transition countries from Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
' The survey data are very suitable for bivanate analysis, mostly used in this chapter. They are less suitable for mullivanate
analyses; the only multivanate analysis included is the logit analysis in section 4 4.1
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section 4.4.2 a comparison of the process of their first FDI with the last FDI is made. Last, in section
4.4.3 I check whether there is a link between the format and extensiveness of the investment decision
process and the degree of satisfaction with the FDI at the time of the survey. Section 4.5 provides a
framework that allows us to explain the decision process of companies. The basis for the framework is
the trade off between the costs and benefits of information. Collecting information costs time and
money, but information reduces the uncertainty attached to the investment decision. Assuming
markets and information are imperfect, the investment decision process can be considered a way to
increase or decrease the perceived risk of the actual investment, leading to the choice whether to
invest.* .. , ,..,-...•.„., .,; .. ... , ..,•'- .. .-„h. ,<••«».••-..•.-.•.,..• . :« •-! ..i-.•.-..••.-.,• ••• •>,.,-,..., :,;, <,-.,v..-.:
In this chapter the investment process is defined as the complete process a firm follows from the
moment it considers an investment up to the moment it decides whether to invest. It includes all forms
of information acquisition and analysis, but also internal discussions, study trips or meetings with
possible partner firms or contact persons. The investment calculation or investment analysis is the
study undertaken to investigate the viability of the investment. This is not a strictly defined concept
and can be interpreted differently per firm. For one firm a calculation can, for instance, be a simple
single-page description of some key data, whereas another firm makes complete business plans or
uses external advisors to map out the investment alternatives. The calculation or analysis is part of
the investment process and considered a tool on which to base the investment decision. ,„ „,^ < ^
4.2 Hypotheses based on assumptions and predictions of the option theory
The real option model is an appropriate instrument to describe an investment decision, specifying a
rule to invest if the expected value of an investment is positive and higher than the option value to
wait. While often applied in the financial sector, it is also very useful to apply to direct investments to
Central and Eastern Europe since it specifically includes uncertainty and timing issues. The option
theory, while with clear rules when to invest, does not specify how firms can implement these rules in
their decision-making. In the current FDI literature there are, as far as I know, no empirical studies
relating the firm's decision-making process to the theoretical decision rules. This observation may be
due to the fact that the investment literature is complicated and hard to apply empirically as a
complete model. However, based on the assumptions from the option model and the prediction from
theoretical extensions of the option model, it is possible to define a number of hypotheses that focus
on certain aspects of the option model and can be directly related to firm-level decision processes.
For example, based on the option theory, I expect that larger firms invest abroad more often and
sooner than smaller firms/ In chapter three several assumptions related to the characteristics of firms
investing abroad were tested and these tests confirm that the option model is suitable for investments
in Central or Eastern Europe or Central Asia. Other expectations based on the option model can be
related to the company decision-making processes and can only be tested using company-specific
information related to the decision-making process. Therefore, in this chapter several hypotheses are
' Note that information reduces the uncertainty attached to the investment decision, not the risk and uncertainty of the actual
investment. Additional negative information can very well increase the perceived risk of the investment, thereby decreasing the
uncertainty of the decision not to invest.
' If firms face a binding financial constraint, theory predicts they invest less often and less soon than firms without such a
constraint (Chapter two. section 2.3). I assume smaller firms face financial constraints more often than larger firms and thus
smaller firms invest less often and later than larger firms. . . ..«/.,:
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tested using the survey data on Dutch FDI. " ' '"""" '
Following the option model, firms invest when the expected value of an investment is positive. This
implies that the firm somehow has to quantify future revenues and costs in order to evaluate whether
an investment is viable. The terminology used in this chapter explains that firms make an investment
calculation or investment analysis. In practice however, firms do not have to make an investment
analysis. > . >• > • ••..•••••-•' • •>-i;v • '•,;•"•>• :-o • •••*?•-/.- '•f.-vv-i; '-^:- <^VT; •:•,-• v. -)b;-:r</; ^iiis
In addition, the option theory decision rule implies that if the expected value of a firm is positive,
firms will invest. The expected value of the investment is generally defined as the discounted
expected revenues minus costs. In order to estimate the expected value, economic indicators are
often used, but firms can have different arguments for their investment decision as well. Profit may
just be one of the many decision criteria; profit expectations do not always have to be the main
guideline for the decision. Economic indicators, like expected cost and revenue, are not always the
best tools for making an investment decision. Firms can for example rely more on networks or
experience of other firms and base their expected value of the investment on the opinion of those
informed people, instead of on economic indicators.
A third assumption of the option model is that uncertainty surrounding an investment plays an
important role in the investment decision. The higher the risk of an investment project is, the lower the
probability that a firm will invest in that project since the expected profit should be able to compensate
for the higher risk (thus, the expected profit should be higher). It is therefore interesting to find out
whether firms take the risk or uncertainty into account in the investment decision calculation and link
the concept of uncertainty to expected profit. . .•>: •••••- •. * . ;. '
Another aspect of the option model is that firms include time as a variable in their decision models.
Firms not only consider the possibility of investing at the current moment, but also take the option to
postpone the investment into account. This behavior does not mean they decide not to invest at all,
but they do not invest at that moment and remain interested in investing at a later time. In option
terminology, a firm can take a "call option" on the FDI, keeping the right to invest (buy) at a later time
without having to engage in the FDI now.
Summarizing, the option theory builds on the idea that firms make some kind of investment analysis
or calculation before making an investment-decision and use mainly economic or business indicators
in this calculation. They explicitly take uncertainty into account in their decision and also consider
timing of an investment, allowing for the possibility to postpone an investment.
Aside from these assumptions, the option theory extensions in section 2.3 and 2.4 of this
dissertation led to several predictions, which can be formulated in terms of testable statements. The
first extension of the basic option model is to combine the ability to postpone an investment with the
various degrees of uncertainty investment projects have. Following the option theory, a higher
uncertainty of a country or project leads to a larger chance an investment will be postponed. This
impact of uncertainty can be reflected in the choice of the host countries. An FDI in a low-risk country
will have a lower option value of waiting and thus firms will invest more often or sooner in low-risk
countries. A higher risk surrounding the FDI in a host country leads to a higher uncertainty for the
investing firm and a higher option value of waiting, which may cause the firm to decide not to invest or
to postpone the investment.^ , • -, ,• . , .... .... . .: ,... ;. >.
There is a causal relation between the risk of a country and the uncertainty of the investment project in that country. If a
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H1. Firms will invest more often and earlier in low-risk countries than in high-risk countries (ceteris
isi* paribus).^
Another extension of the basic option model is the possibility to consider more investment projects
with similar degrees of risk, while being able to postpone an investment for the moment. Firms not
only consider one investment project (or one host country) in their investment process, as is assumed
in the basic model in section 2.2, but look at several alternatives from which to select the best one
(see section 2.3). In theory, the "perfect" investment possibility for a firm is always available,
especially when considering many investment projects and a long time span. Theory therefore
predicts that the more alternative investment options the firm considers, the less likely a firm is to
invest and to invest early. -- •• •- •-•-:•.••• ^ - .. *. -> B ••.. .-- -: »• «-u<
H2. Firms that consider more alternative host countries when making an investment •"'•' «••
decision will invest less often or later than firms with only one host country alternative. - ". -i--
The last theoretical extension made in section 2.4 allows for different degrees of uncertainty
between the countries from which a firm can choose. The conclusion of that section is that the more
diverse the uncertainty between the host countries, the more likely it is that the firm will postpone its
investment.
H3. A firm is more likely to postpone the investment if the uncertainty between the possible host
countries is diverse. •• •
In order to test these assumptions and three predictions, information on the actual decision-making
processes of companies is analyzed. The only possible way to obtain such detailed information is by
approaching companies directly. Therefore a survey was developed (annex A) and these survey data
were used to obtain a clearer picture on the investment decision process. In the next section, the
assumptions described and hypotheses formulated in this section are tested using these survey data.
4.3 The investment decision process in practice
In section 4.3 and 4.4 survey data from the questionnaire Dutch FDI in the CEE region are used.
Figure 4.1 gives an overview of the response rates relevant to this section. In total 1550 firms were
asked to participate in the survey. All firms were interested in doing business in the CEE region and
either participated in a seminar or had requested information about doing business in the CEE region
from the Dutch Chambers of Commerce. Of the 1550 firms in the sample, 322 firms responded by
answering the questionnaire. A total of 86 had an FDI in the CEE region and 236 did not have an FDI,
including the pretest results of two investors and six noninvestors. Eligible criteria for this research
were that the firm had to be (partially) Dutch and the investment decision was made in the
Netherlands. As a result, 32 firms were ineligible based on those criteria and excluded from the
country has high risk, the uncertainty of the investment results in that country is also high, since they depend directly on the
country's economy.
* Due to the limited number of time periods included in this survey, postponing an investment until after the year 2000 is
translated in this analysis as "not investing'.
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database. Before questioning firms about their investment process, those firms interested in the CEE
region but not interested in an FDI were excluded (74 firms), as well as those firms that were in
principle interested in an FDI but not in an FDI in the CEE region (94 firms). 130 firms remained in the
dataset that had entered the investment process and indicated that they seriously considered an FDI
in the region. Their answers were the basis for the analyses in sections 4.3 and 4.4. For section 4.4.2
only the answers of 37 firms with several FDIs in the CEE region were used.
,i .••.-' ' * , .. .... _ __.-.-_>•.„ ,Vi!t£;-^^;.
4.3.7 Tesf/ng Me assumpf/bns re/afed to »nvesfmenf dec/s/on-mafc/ng
The first assumption I test is if firms base their decision on an investment analysis or calculation and if
they use economic indicators in this analysis. The survey data, depicted in figure 4.1, show that this
assumption is not confirmed (summary statistics of the survey data are included in annex 4.1). Of the
288 eligible firms that visited a seminar on business in the CEE region, only 130 firms answered that
they were seriously considering an FDI in the CEE region. 74 firms were not interested in FDI but
interested in the CEE region for other business purposes and 94 firms were interested in an FDI but
not in an FDI in the CEE region. Those 168 firms decided not to invest without making an investment
calculation. Of the 130 firms that were interested in an FDI in the CEE region, 72 percent (94 firms)
indicated that they made some kind of investment analysis to support their decision; 28 percent
answered they did not make any investment calculation. The three most frequently mentioned
arguments firms gave why they did not back up their decision with an analysis were: 1) the personal
relationship of the owner with an individual or company in the host country, 2) the fact that an FDI was
a logical continuation of existing trade relations and 3) the availability of natural resources limited the
choice options. The assumption that firms make an investment analysis is thus only partially true.
There can be numerous arguments, ranging from personal relations to the mere presence of natural
resources in a specific region, that make a time-consuming investment calculation unnecessary.
The idea that firms mainly use economic or business indicators in their investment calculations is
confirmed by the data. Not all firms that enter the investment process make an investment calculation,
but still 94 firms indicated they made some kind of calculation to support their investment decision.
The question remains what firms consider being "an analysis". Following the option theory decision
rule, firms estimate the expected value of their investment. Even though many firms estimate this
value without any calculation, economic theory often assumes economic indicators like the expected
NPV are useful tools on which to base estimations. The expected value of an FDI can be calculated
by discounting the expected revenues minus the expected costs.
If that approach is followed in practice, firms need to specify expected values for the costs and the
revenue of their FDI, and they need to target a discount rate. The survey data show this assumption is
realistic since firms often take economic indicators into account. 87 of the 94 firms that indicated they
made an investment analysis used cost and revenue factors in their calculation/
' Only three of the 130 firms indicated they did not use any cost factors, another three indicated they did not use any revenue
factors and only two indicated they did not use any uncertainty factors Therefore the answers to these questions should be
considered with care. Answering survey questions is subjective and when asked to answer about events of a number of years
ago, one loses accuracy. The fact that the variables were mentioned and firms were asked to mark them creates a bias in firms
marking one or more variables because while reading them it seems reasonable that they used them, while in practice they
may not have considered this variable at the time.Chapter 4 The investment decision
Figure 4.1: Response of the survey
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Table 4.1: Most frequently mentioned cost, revenue and uncertainty factors
used in the analysis
itaae of firms that considered
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The variables most often referred to by firms as being used in the investment calculation were the
costs of buying or renting the location, costs of furniture and equipment and labor costs as cost
factors and GDP per capita, expected market share, income growth and population size of the host
country as revenue factors.'
Concluding, the assumption that firms make an investment calculation or analysis to base their
decision on was not confirmed by the survey data. Many firms indicated they were interested in doing
business in the CEE region or in setting up an FDI, but knew without any calculation they were not
interested in a direct investment in the CEE region. In addition, many firms that were seriously
interested in an FDI in the CEE region did not make any analysis to support their investment decision
and used other forms or mechanisms to support their choice. However, of those firms that indicated
they did make an investment analysis, the majority answered they indeed used economic indicators in
their decision process.
The option theory also assumes that firms take uncertainty into account while making an
investment decision. This hypothesis can be tested in two ways. Firstly, the survey includes a
question enabling firms that made an investment analysis to report which uncertainty factors they took
into account. As can be seen in table 4.1 the indicators poW/ca/ sfafi/Wy off/?e hosf counJry', d/sfance
;n km and curtura/ cMerences were often mentioned as uncertainty factors and a large majority of the
firms that made an analysis included these indicators in their calculations (about 80 percent) (see
footnote eight).
Another way to see whether firms take uncertainty into account is the reference they use to target
the success of the FDI. There is a trade off between risk and return. As the risks surrounding an
investment are high, the expected return should be high as well. Consider, for example, a Dutch firm
that has funds to invest and has three investment alternatives. It can put its money risk-free in a Dutch
savings account and receive a low but secure interest rate. It can also invest in an expansion of the
firm in the Netherlands.
A table including the complete answers of this question is included in Annex A4.1
67Chapter 4 The investment decision
Table 4.2: Reference for expected
Reference for expected profitability
Profit percenlaqe Dutch company













Doing so is more risky than putting the money in the bank and therefore the expected return of that
investment should be higher than the risk-free interest rate the bank offers. The expected return could
for instance be compared to the profit rate of the Dutch headquarters. The third alternative is an
investment in an FDI. Of the three alternatives, this is the most risky one and therefore the expected
return ofthat investment must be the highest in order to remain interesting.
The firms that participated in the survey mostly mentioned that the target of their FDI in terms of
expected return was the profit of their Dutch firm. Thus, as long as the FDI had a profit rate as high as
the Dutch profit rate, the Dutch firm considered the FDI successful. Other references often mentioned
were the returns on shares in the Netherlands. Other risk-free returns, such as the interest rate in the
Netherlands or the return on Dutch obligations were not often mentioned. This leads to the conclusion
that the risk-return trade-off is partially confirmed. Firms did consider the FDI to be more risky than
relatively risk-free investments such as saving accounts and expected the FDI to have a higher return.
However, in their answers they did not reflect the fact that the FDI is more risky than an investment in
the Dutch firm, since they selected the Dutch profit margin most often as benchmark for their FDIs.
Overall can be concluded that the assumption that firms take uncertainty into account is correct.
Not only do those firms that make an investment calculation often include uncertainty indicators in
their analysis, but also firms most often compare the expected results of the FDI with the moderately
risky profit rate of their Dutch enterprise, instead of a rather risk-free interest rate.
The last assumption relates to the possibility that firms can postpone their investment. This can be
verified using the survey data received by those firms that considered an investment in the CEE
region, but decided not to invest (noninvestors). 49 noninvestors mentioned the country in which they
considered an FDI. Those firms were asked if they were interested in an FDI in the CEE region within
the next two years, even though they did not initially engage in an FDI. Of the 49 firms, 26 firms (53
percent) mentioned that they were considering a new investment in the CEE region within two years
and of those 26 firms, and 20 even considered an FDI in the same country in which they initially
decided not to invest. Clearly this confirms that the postponement of an investment does occur.
The main reasons firms gave to initially postpone their investment were the lack of time and
capacity in the Netherlands to sufficiently support the investment (34 percent of the 49 firms), the high
uncertainty in the host market (27 percent) and insufficient expected profits or returns in the
Netherlands at that time to support an FDI investment (ten percent).
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Table 4.3: The time between the investment decision and operationalization of
the FDI
















Another way to test whether postponing an investment occurs is to look at the time between an
actual investment decision of a firm to invest in the CEE region and the time of implementation of this
investment. This information was gathered from the 58 firms that did set up an FDI and made an
investment analysis. As table 4.3 indicates, in most of the cases there was a lag between deciding to
invest and actually investing, which was often substantial. For 72 percent of the firms this time period
was longer than expected. If the time period was longer than expected, it could be interpreted as a
postponement of the implementation of the investment. The main reasons for postponing the
implementation were the regulations that made getting paperwork right and obtaining the necessary
documents and licenses difficult (36 percent), unstable economic or political developments in the host
country (21 percent and 14 percent respectively) and the fact that the Dutch company found a more
appropriate alternative in which to invest, like a new host country or partner firm (14 percent).
4.3.2 Tesf/ng fAie pred/cfrbns derived from toe opf/on tfieory us/ng firm /eve/ date
The assumptions made by the option theory are largely confirmed by the firm level survey data. It still
remains unclear if the conclusions derived from the mostly theoretical derivations of the option theory
are also relevant. The remainder of this section will therefore include tests whether the predictions, as
formulated in hypotheses one to three, hold in practice or need to be rejected based on the survey
data.
The first prediction of the option theory is summarized in hypothesis one. It states that firms invest
more often and earlier in low-risk countries than in high-risk countries, ceteris paribus. This hypothesis
relates to the effect of uncertainty on an investment decision; higher uncertainty increases the chance
a firm will postpone its investment at this moment. One way to check these conclusions is to combine
the actual investments of Dutch firms in the CEE region with the country risk indicator for the
respective countries.' This risk indicator provides each country with a score between zero and ten;
zero being extremely risky and ten being risk-free. Graph 4.1 represents the number of firms that
invested in the CEE region to the risk score of the country they invested in. If the firms invested more
often in low-risk countries than in high-risk countries, the bars should display an increasing trend. This
upward sloping relation is indeed visible. ,, ^ . •
* For this comparison, the euromoney country risk indicator was used. Country risk data were available for all countries in the
CEE region and all years included in the survey database. ......Chapter 4 The investment decision
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The fact that the number of firms investing in low-risk countries with scores higher than seven is
zero is not because firms were not interested in investing in such low-risk countries, but because no
transition country had a risk score above seven in the respective years. This is represented by the
area behind the bars, indicating the possibility to invest in a country with that score (total number of
countries that had that risk score in 1989-1999). There were only a few possibilities to invest in a
country with a risk score of seven or higher. Graph 4.2 shows the number of investments in the CEE
countries divided by the number of possibilities to invest in a country with that score, as well as the
number of interested but noninvesting firms divided by the possibilities.'" Both ratios show an
increasing trend up to a risk score of six and a decline for the low-risk score of seven. This confirms
that firms are investing more often in low-risk countries than in high-risk countries, again with a bias
given the fact that there were not many low-risk transition countries.
Including the timing of an investment, the option model predicts that firms are more likely to invest
sooner in low-risk countries than in high-risk countries. In graph 4.3 the investments are included by
year of investment, with number of firms divided in three country risk categories. Graph 4.4 gives a
yearly percentage division of investments per risk category. If firms invest not only more often but also
sooner in low-risk countries than in high-risk countries, the bars indicating the number of investments
in low-risk countries should be higher than those of the medium-risk countries and the bars of the
medium-risk countries should exceed the bars of the high-risk countries. This result is not obvious
from graph 4.3 and 4.4, where in fact the number of investments in high-risk countries is larger in the
early years of transition than the investments in medium and low-risk countries. However, this
outcome is again largely due to the fact that in the early years of transition there were only limited low-
risk investment options. In fact, the absence of investment in low-risk countries in 1991, 1992 and
1993 is caused by complete absence of low-risk countries in the region.
" The possibilities to invest are the sum of countries that had that risk score in 1989-1999.
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Graph 4.5 corrects for this fact, by taking the yearly ratio of investors in each risk group over the
number of countries in that risk group that specific year. The results are in line with the option theory
predictions since the line for low-risk countries (excluding 1991-1993) generally exceeds the line for
medium risk countries, which is again higher than the line for high-risk countries. A deviation in small
and medium/large firms does not show any additional findings, neither in timing if the investments nor
in risk selection." Therefore the argument that platform investments in high risk countries can be
considered an option to expand later is not supported; there is no evidence that smaller firms invest
more often or sooner in high risk regions than larger firms.
The second main prediction of the option theory, summarized by hypothesis two, is that firms use
several investment alternatives when making a decision. It is realistic to assume that firms consider
several countries as possibilities to invest in during the investment process, instead of focusing solely
on one host country. Firms use their investment analysis to choose which country is most appropriate
for their firm to invest in. The option theory predicts that firms that consider several alternative
investment possibilities will invest less often and later than firms that consider only one investment
alternative, since the option value of waiting in the first scenario is higher.'* Of the firms in the survey
that indicated they were seriously considering an FDI in the CEE region, 43 percent considered only
one country as possible host country, while 57 percent considered several alternative host countries
(hypotheses eight and nine). Of the firms that considered only one alternative host country, 60
percent invested in the CEE region and 40 percent did not invest. However, of those firms that
considered several alternatives 76 percent invested in the region and only 24 percent did not. This
difference is large and contradicts the expectation that firms that consider only one alternative invest
more often (see table 4.4). It remains unclear whether firms that considered only one alternative
invested sooner. Graph 4.6 shows the investments of these companies over time, split up by those
firms that considered only one country and those with multiple alternatives.
" Small firms are firms with less than 50 employees The results of this additional test are not included in this chapter.
" If more countries are considered as investment alternatives, there are different uncertainty scenanos The chance is higher
that one of the alternatives will perform very well in the next period This increases the value of that project in the next period
and given the uncertainty of investing now. it will be more attractive to wait. Thus, the option value of waiting is high (see
chapter 2.4).
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Table 4.4: Number of alternative host countries that firms considered (n=117)






















Graph 4.6: FDI by number of alternative host countries
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If the predictions of the option model are in line with the data, the line of firms with only one
alternative should on average be higher than the line of firms with several alternatives. This
conclusion is not true. The number of investments made by firms that considered several alternatives
is over the whole sample period equal or higher than that of the companies that consider only one
investment. When considering several alternatives, the possibility that one of those alternatives is
interesting for the firm to invest in, is higher than when considering only one alternative. This idea is
contrary to the predictions of the option theory extension in section 2.4, that firms are more inclined to
wait when considering several alternatives, since one of those alternatives may be even more
promising next year."
The third hypothesis mentioned is section 4.2 relates to the diversity in uncertainty. If the degree of
uncertainty related to the various host countries a firm considers is large, the firm is more likely to
postpone the investment. The reason is that the expected value of the investment today in the host
country should not only exceed the expected value of investing in that country next year, but should
also exceed the expected value of investing this year or next year for the alternative country. The
higher the uncertainty of the alternative country, the higher the expected value of investing in that
country next year will be, making an investment less likely. To see if these theoretical expectations
also hold for the Dutch firms in the sample, pairs of alternative countries are grouped and combined
with the country risk indicators of their specific years. If the hypothesis can be accepted, the years of
Again, a test dividing the sample in small (<50 employees) and medium/large firms does not change this conclusion.Chapter 4 The investment decision • - : - u s fv.o
investment should be negatively related to the deviation in country risks of the alternatives.'" This is
not confirmed by the data. There is no relation between the deviation in country risk and year of
(considering the) investment. In addition, the deviation in country risk is also an insignificant indicator
in explaining whether a firm will invest.'^
In section 4.2 assumption the option model builds on were given and three hypotheses were
formulated based on the option theory extensions in chapter two. In this section those statements
were tested, using Dutch firm level survey data, in order to see whether the assumptions of the option
theory related to the investment decisions, as well as predictions derived from the option theory hold
in practice. Table 4.5 gives an overview of the results. These tests show that even though the option
theory does not give any hints on how firms should make an investment decision but only derives
decision rules, a large part of the assumptions of the option theory fit reality well. Firms do not always
make an investment calculation, but those firms that do make an analysis often include economic
variables. In addition the postponement of an investment, a crucial aspect of the option model, occurs
frequently in practice. As expected, uncertainty surrounding the investment affects the investment
choice negatively. This is an interesting phenomenon, because this indicates that if a country has
possibilities to decrease uncertainty surrounding an investment in a country, the amount of FDI to that
CEE country likely increases. Sound policies, political stability and good institutions decrease the
uncertainty of a country. In chapter five, using the gravity analysis, I conclude that a lower country risk
positively influences FDI to a country. In practice this is a longer run process for countries to influence
the FDI inflow positively, firms themselves can hardly influence country uncertainty.'^ However, the
three hypotheses formulated based on the theoretical extensions of the option model in section 2.3
and 2.4 are partially rejected based on the data. Firms invest more often and sooner in low-risk
countries. But considering several alternative host countries increases the probability a firm invests
instead of leading to postponement of an investment. In addition, even though uncertainty influences
an investment decision, the uncertainty differences between alternative host countries influence an
investment decision less than expected. It is interesting to consider to what extent a firm can limit the
uncertainty surrounding its FDI in advance, by means of a thorough investment analysis. Is it true that
firms with a more extended investment analysis are also the ones more confident about the
investment? Do they engage in an FDI more often?
Chapter three concluded that experience with FDI in the CEE region increases the chance a firm
will invest again in the region, indicating a learning effect. An interesting question is whether factors
such as experience directly decrease the uncertainty surrounding a new FDI. To what extent can
those factors function as a substitute for an investment calculation? Are they just complementary to
each other in reducing the uncertainty? Those questions will be elaborated on in section 4.4.
" This test would yield a more accurate result if the deviation in the host country's risks were be measured at the start of the
investment process and this deviation were related to the year of investment. In this analysis, the year of investment were also
considered the year of country risk. The deviation selected was the largest deviation between the preferred host country and
the alternative countries. Thus, if a company selected one host country and two alternative host countries, the difference in
country risk was calculated for both alternatives and the highest difference was used
" This relationship was tested by means of a probit analysis.
" Of course, when firms invest, the country may economically benefit from those investments and country risks may decrease.
However, at the decision-making time, this consideration does not decrease the uncertainty surrounding the FDI. In addition,
FOI helps local institution building and decreases the chance for policy reversals. Last. FDI present in a host country serves as
attractive factor for new FDI.
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Table 4.5: Conclusions related to the assumptions and hypotheses tests
Assumptions and hypotheses
A1. Firms make an investment calculation before making an
investment decision
Conclusions from test
No, many firms do not make an investment analysis.
A2. Firms use economic indicators in their investment analysis Yes. firms that mentioned that they made an analysis
often use cost and benefit indicators
A3. Firms take uncertainty of an investment into account in their
investment decision
Yes, firms that mentioned they made an analysis often
use uncertainty indicators.
A4. Firms can postpone an investment and decide not to invest at
the current moment but wait until at a later time
Yes, of the firms that decided not to invest in a country, a
large percentage still considers an investment in the
same country within two years.
H1. Firms will invest more often and sooner in low-risk countries
than in higher-risk countries.
Yes, countries with low or medium country risk received
more FDI than high-risk countries.
H2. Firms that consider several alternative host countries when
making an investment decision will invest less often or later in the
CEE region than firms with only one host country alternative.
No. there is no significant relation between investment
behavior and number of alternative host countries.
H3 Firms that consider alternative host countries with large
deviations in country risk will invest less often and later in the CEE
region than firms with only one host country alternative or small
deviation in country risk of the alternative host countries.
No, there is no significant relation between investment
behavior and timing of the investment and deviation in
host country risks
4.4 Differences in the decision-making process -
4.4. J /nvesfors versus non/'ni/estors
If thorough preparation reduces uncertainty of the investment decision, firms with an in-depth
preparation process should be the ones more likely to invest. Naturally, this argument could be
reversed easily: if firms are not sincerely interested in an FDI, they will not need an extensive
preparation before they decide not to invest. Either way, I expect that firms with an FDI (investors)
make an investment analysis more often than noninvestors and investors include more decision
variables in the preparation analysis.
Table 4.6 gives an overview of information on the investment process of investors and
noninvestors. The assumption that investors make a more elaborate investment analysis is not
confirmed by the data. A similar percentage of investors and noninvestors make an investment
analysis (71 versus 73 percent). Investors indicate they made the analysis slightly more often then
noninvestors and for this analysis they also use slightly more revenue, cost and uncertainty variables.
On the other hand, noninvestors indicate they visited seminars more often, made study trips more
often and performed market research or were more often advised by institutions. None of the
preparation variables differed significantly between investors and noninvestors, with the exception of
"advice from institutions", which was significantly more given to noninvestors". Thus, there is no
evidence that the kind of investment analysis differs between investors and noninvestors. In addition,
in a logit analysis testing whether any of those variables significantly influenced investment behavior,
all variables were insignificant. The results of this logit analysis are included in annex A4.1.
Consequently, it is not possible to conclude that firms doing extensive analysis invest more often.
For each variable Chi2 tests were taken to test the difference between investors and noninvestors, with significant difference
accepted at the ten percent levelChapter 4 The investment decision
Table 4.6: The investment preparation of investors and noninvestors
Investor Noninveslor
(N=81 or 58) (N=49 or 36)
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4.4.2 Rrsf versus /asf /nvesfmenf /n fhe CEE reg/on
The information on the investment decision was collected for the first and last investment a firm made
in the CEE region between 1989 and 1999. As was evident from chapter five, experience is important.
Experience with an investment in the region decreases the uncertainty surrounding a new investment.
Based on such findings I expect firms with an FDI in the region to have a reduced risk perception with
respect to a new FDI in the CEE region. Because of this experience they feel more confident about
this second or later investment in the region than about the first FDI. This could result in a less
elaborate preparation or decision process, a shorter time span between the start of the investment
process and the time the firm becomes operational, or a lower risk valuation the firm attaches to the
host country.
Firms indicated the investment analysis with respect to their last FDI was in most cases (68
percent) equal or more extensive than for their first FDI. For 14 percent of the firms, the time period
between the investment decision and operationally for the last investment was still longer than
expected, compared to 24 percent for the first FDI in the CEE region. Thus, firms were less often
negatively surprised by this time period, but the percentage is still rather high. Interestingly, the
reasons for the delay in implementation varied. For the first FDI, procedural issues (obtaining the
necessary documents) and the unstable political and economic situation in the host country caused
most delay. For the last FDI, in addition to the unstable political and economic situation in the host
country, financial difficulties as well as problems with the partner firm in the host country caused most
of the delays. The time required to handle bureaucratic issues was less of a burden for the last FDI.Chapter 4 The investment decision
Table 4.7: Investment analysis of the last FDI
Investment analysis of the last FDI compared to first FDI was
No analysis
Less thorough and less elaborate
Exactly same analysis
More thorough and elaborate




compared to the first FDI -»-•-»•








(1) For six firms the answer was missing for either the first or last FDI. making the comparison impossible
Table 4.8: Evaluation grades for the last FDI compared to the first FDI
Percentage of firms still operational
Evaluation grade (between 1-10) for all investors (unpaired)(1)











(1) The grade for the last FDI is significantly larger than for the first FDI, at 5% significance (t=-1.9432, P<t: 0.0276)
(2) The grade for the last FDI is not significantly larger than for the first FDI
Another relevant and interesting question is how valuable or effective experience is for the success
of a firm. Are firms more likely to remain operational if they already have experience with an FDI in the
region? Do they evaluate their last FDI more positively than their first FDI? As the data in table 4.8
show, 86 percent of the firm's first investments in the CEE region is still operational. This percentage
is almost equal for their last FDIs (84 percent). In terms of evaluation, a distinction is visible. Firms
were asked to give both FDIs a success grade, with zero being completely unsuccessful and ten
being highly successful. Firms evaluate the success of their last FDI on average one score higher
than their first FDI, indicating that experience leads to more successful companies in transition
economies.
4.4.3 /nfluence of Me in vesfmenf ana/ys/s and eva/t/afon of fhe FD/ afterwards
Another interesting question is whether the preparation method affects the risk of an FDI once the
decision to invest is made. It is likely that firms with a very extensive preparation face less uncertainty
than firms with a less extensive preparation. They probably less frequently face unexpected events
during the setup of the FDI or once the FDI started operating. Equally, firms that rushed into the
investment without thorough preparation probably encounter more hindrance from circumstances they
had not expected beforehand and experience such events as negative. An example is the acquisition
of documents. In the early years of transition the institutional process to set up an FDI was often
unclear. Obtaining the necessary documents was crucial to setting up the FDI, but took a long time, a
lot of money and often included informal processes as well. Firms, that considered those bureaucratic
processes during preparation and incorporated the time and money it would take into their decision
and preparation processes, were more likely quicker in receiving the documents than firms not
considering bureaucracy. They knew what kinds of documents were needed and where they could be
acquired. In addition, they would not be negatively surprised by the time and money involved to obtain
the documents. Firms that decided to invest without much preparation could be overwhelmed by the
enormous bureaucracy and translate this into a negative feeling towards their investment.Chapter 4 The investment decision
Table 4.9: Evaluation of the risk of the country and FDI and overall success of
































Evaluation score FDI in total
5.25
6.08







The survey contained three questions in which firms were asked to evaluate the current risk of their
FDI, the current risk of the host country and the overall success of the FDI. The grades ranged from
one, being extremely risky or extremely unsuccessful, to ten being risk-free and very successful.
Table 4.9 includes summary statistics related to the evaluation scores. When looking at the number of
countries a company included in their analysis, the evaluation scores show that conclusions regarding
the amount of preparation are correct. With respect to the starting year of the FDI, I expect the risk of
the FDI undertaken in the early years to be lowest (the highest score), assuming the risk of the firm
decreases with the number of years the firm is operational. However, the data show that firms that
were established latest (1998-2000) are the firms that consider their FDI and host country least risky.
A lower level of experience of those firms that invested latest could possibly explain this. They are not
as familiar with the FDI and region they invested in yet and do not fully acknowledge the risks
involved. All risk scores are below the value of six, meaning on average firms consider both their FDI
and the host country risky. The success grades have a slightly higher average, score six, thus the
investments are evaluated sufficiently successful. • ".,<.!£
In the second part of table 4.9, the same average risk and evaluation scores are given, split up
according to different aspects of the investment calculation. I expect a firm that has more knowledge
about the host country, either through experience or through a more elaborate investment calculation,
to evaluate the country and the FDI less risky. If good preparation pays off, the evaluation of the
success of the FDI should correspondingly be higher. Indeed, more experience in the region leads to
a higher success evaluation of the investment, but it does not lead to a lower risk evaluation.
Experience is thus useful in coping better with the risk, but the experienced firms do not consider the
region or their investment less risky than firms with less experience. A more extensive investment
preparation, measured by the numbers of variables included in the analysis or activities undertaken
during the preparation, does not lead to higher success evaluations of the FDI or lower risk
evaluation. ;..•••••...-•...•,•.••;• - .. t ,;•:•• •_<•. .:«js.^:!;•;.« •,-•:..-.•. .:•«•,. ,. • •.:•-. A-V ;-•-.>>*,'»(>"> :.f-i
There is an increase in success evaluations visible when looking at the frequency of the analysis.
Firms that continuously reconsidered their investment choice evaluate their FDI now more
successfully than firms that made the analysis only once. Experience does increase the value the
firms gave to their investment; the most recent investment the firm made scores on average higher in
terms of success than their first investment. .Chapter 4 The investment decision -«,-•>«• i, *• i--:,i, »-: i -v-j* .-•'".•
Table 4.9 continued: Evaluation of the risk of the country and FDI and overall
success of the FDI
(1 = very risky/unsuccessful, 10 = risk-free/very successful)
Risk grade FDI Risk grade country (1) Evaluation score FDI in total (2)




Nr. of revenue factors » ,. ,.,.
1.4 V<- -"-
5-9
Nr. of cost factors










































































































5.72 -. *. .
5.25
8
(1) The risk of the host country is considered significantly higher (lower grade) by firms with more experience (>3 FDI in the
region) and significantly lower by firms that received advice from institutions than by firms that did not receive this advice. All
other risk sources, for both country and FDI are not significantly different with respect to the variables included in the table.
(2) The evaluation of success of the FDI increases significantly as the number of revenue factors included in the preparation
increases, but the difference is insignificant for all other variables mentioned.
Based on these results it is not possible to give conclusions on the impact of an investment
preparation to the success of an FDI. It appears that those firms with elaborate analysis evaluate the
success of their investment higher than those firms with limited analysis, but the distinction is marginal
and not significant in most cases. Experience increases awareness of country and investment risks,
but also leads to higher success evaluations.
4.5 An investment decision framework • . ^ •
The tests in section 4.3 and 4.4 show that some kind of decision rule, as formulated by the option
theory, is often applied at firm level. Firms often incorporate cost and benefit expectations in their
investment decision process. In addition firms indeed take the impact of uncertainty and the strategic
possibility to invest at different times into account during their investment decision process. However,
the theory does not explain the process of firm's investment decisions. All kinds of factors can beChapter 4 The investment decision ^' • «.-**•• '• •••- -
included in the model and the decision rule when to invest is well defined, but how firms arrive at
certain conclusions remains unclear. After studying the survey data of Dutch firms considering an
investment in Central or Eastern Europe and Central Asia, it becomes apparent that the model does
not incorporate several situations that occurred at firm level decision-making. First, not all firms make
an investment analysis. Many firms are only interested to a limited extent in investing in the region
and decide not to invest in the region without entering the investment decision process. They do not
select possible host countries and never consider possible prospects for their firm to invest abroad.
Second, many firms that seriously consider an FOI, thus entering the decision-making process, make
the investment decision without any form of investment calculation. Third, there is a group of firms that
enters the investment decision process and makes an investment calculation. However, the data
show that the extensiveness and frequency of the analysis varies substantially between those firms.
The information on the firms' investment decision processes indicates only moderate differences
between investors and noninvestors. The expectation that investing firms will have a more extensive
investment decision process is not confirmed. The effect of experience is also surprising. Firms with
more experience with FDI in the CEE region do not have a less elaborate investment analysis than
firms without experience in the region. In addition, the majority of firms with experience prepare their
last investment in the region equally well or more elaborately than their first one. This better
preparation pays off, since firms also evaluate their last investment as more successful than their first
investment. With respect to the preparation process a firm followed and the evaluation of the success
of the FDI afterwards, it can be concluded that more extensive preparation does not lead to lower risk
evaluations but does lead to a better success evaluation of the FDI.
In practice there appears to be a mechanism for firms to decide whether they make an investment
analysis and if any, how extensive that analysis will be. Some firms are, for whatever reason,
confident enough to invest in a transition country without any investment calculation. Other firms
indicated that, even though they were interested in visiting a seminar on doing business in the region,
they decided not to invest without making an additional investment calculation. A third group of firms
studied the costs and benefits of the investment in detail before deciding whether to invest. The
perceived risk surrounding the investment is a crucial factor for a firm to determine whether to start
the investment process and seriously consider investing in a transition country.
In this section I build a framework that adds to the understanding of FDI decisions. I follow the line
of reasoning of Wadeson (2000), who introduces the theory of meta rationality. Wadeson argues that
firms face the situation of bounded rationality, given there is imperfect information.^ Being aware of
this situation, firms need to make decisions based on the information they have, realizing they will
never be able to completely incorporate everything that is available. While collecting information, firms
take the cost of collecting into account and only collect information up to the point at which they find
additional information worth spending money on.
The focus in this section is on the investment process within the firm Assume the investment
decision process is a multiperiod one and firms that enter the investment process are in principle
" Bounded rationality refers to the fact that given rational choice, firms may not be utility (profit) maximizing and full information
is absent Decision-making under uncertainty is difficult, since predicting the future is hard and humans face cognitive limitation
Those critiques are largely accepted and theory is adjusted based on empirical evidence The decision-making solution
bounded rationality offers is that firms do not attempt to search for all investment possibilities but choose a solution satisfying to
all parties (Simon. 1997).
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interested in an FDI in the CEE region. Each firm (or owner of a firm) initially attaches a certain
perceived risk to the FDI in the CEE region. This initial risk level varies between firms since it is not an
objective risk indicator but the perceived risk of a firm. It is based on the subjective view of the
decision-maker and is influenced by for instance history of the firm, the links of the firm to the country
or region, the general knowledge of investing abroad, personal ties to the region and so on. This initial
risk level at the start of the investment process is called /?„. In addition each firm has a threshold /?,
a maximum risk level /?^ above which in principle the firm will not even consider an investment
abroad and a minimum risk level /?„,,„. below which the firm will invest abroad without any calculation.
If the risk level of investing in the CEE region /{„ is below or equal to the minimum risk level of the
firm, the risk of investing is considered low enough to invest without spending time or money on
collecting additional information. In other words, the probability that additional information collected by
the firm will increase the perceived risk so that it exceeds the nsk threshold /? is zero. If /?,, equals or
exceeds the maximum risk level of a firm, the firm will not even consider setting up an FDI in the CEE
region. The probability that additional information will decrease the perceived risk so much that it
declines below the threshold level /? is zero. If Ä„ is higher than the minimum risk level and lower
than the maximum risk level, the firm will not be able to decide at that time whether to invest and it will
postpone its investment and look for additional information to support its investment decision.
(1) A firm will: Not invest if: /?„> Ä^,
Invest if: ^o < Ä„,„ I
Postpone investing if: /?„,„ < rt„ < /?^„ j
Firms that either invested, or decided not to invest leave the investment process. Firms that
postponed the investment start an investment analysis that will assist them in determining whether to
invest in the next period. The firm can acquire information (I) in order to reduce the uncertainty of the
investment decision. Obtaining information is costly and the costs increase progressively. Thus, the
more information a firm already obtained, the more expensive it is to collect additional information.
Intuitively, this is clear. If a firm has limited background information on the possible host country, it will
be relatively easy and cheap to become better informed by. for instance, reading books or searching
the Internet. If a firm is already well informed, books do not add much to the knowledge of the firm
and it will have to rely on more expensive sources of information such as field trips to the host
country. The costs of obtaining information are included in equation two. The cost efficiency of
collecting information, c. is low if firms are very efficient in collecting information.
(2) C(I)=F(I) with—>0and—7— >0
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The obtained information will decrease the uncertainty the firm faces when making an investment
decision. The more information related to the FDI is known, the less uncertain is the choice the firm
faces regarding the investment. I define this decrease in uncertainty the benefit of information
gathering (B). The decrease in uncertainty per unit of additional information varies among firms. Some
firms will be very sensitive for information and every additional source of information will lead to a
large decrease in uncertainty, whereas the same information would lead to only a limited change for
another firm. This difference is included by means of a sensitivity indicator s. The impact of
information on uncertainty is of decreasing scale, meaning that the marginal return on information is
higher for the first unit of infonnation than for following units.
(3) B(I)=F(I) with — > 0 and -^- < 0
a/ a'/
A firm will collect information as long as the costs of obtaining the information are lower than the
benefits it receives of the information in the form of a lower uncertainty of the investment decision.
Figure 4.2 depicts the cost and benefit function of two different firms. Firm one has a steep upward
sloping cost curve, indicating that the acquisition of information is expensive and the firm is not
efficient in obtaining the information. The benefit function of firm one is also steeper than the benefit
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function of firm two, so the firm benefits a lot from the first units of information. Its equilibrium is at l*t,
the maximum amount of information firm one will collect because for every additional unit of
information above I*, the costs of obtaining the information are higher than the benefits of the
information in lowering uncertainty surrounding the investment decision. Firm two is less sensitive to
information, but is more cost efficient in collecting information. The result is a higher equilibrium level
of information l*2. This larger amount of information is less costly but also yields less benefit in
lowering uncertainty than 1*1 does for firm one. • J| . .••*-:••••••- •• • .^ •=. V' '
The risk a firm attaches to an FDI in the CEE region is a function of the initial risk assessment, the
amount and kind of information obtained and the impact (i) the information has on the firm's perceived
risk. Assume the firm can absorb one unit of information per time period and will collect this
information as long as B(I)>C(I). The information can be positive or negative with respect to the
investment in the host country. Negative information will increase the firm's perceived risk of the FDI;
positive information will decrease this risk. The impact of the information on the risk perception of
each firm is different. Firms with a large impact will increase or decrease their risk rate more than
firms with a low impact coefficient. After each time period in which the firm collected information, it will
incorporate this information in its risk rate and make an investment decision based on the decision
rule stipulated in equation one. If the firm decides to invest or not, it leaves the investment process. If
the firm again postpones the investment, because the perceived risk is above R„„ but below R„a». the
firm will remain in the decision process and start obtaining additional information in the next period.
(4)R, = F(^.lp».Lg) - with-J^-< 0, ^-> 0 and 44 < 0
The complete model is depicted in figure 4.3. In the upper right section, the cost and benefit
functions of information are included. The horizontal axis measures the information in units and since
firms can only obtain one unit of information per time period it also represents time. Given the shapes
of these two curves, the maximum amount of information a firm will collect is I*. In the lower right
section, this is shown per time period. In each period, a firm will collect one unit of information until I*.
In the upper left quarter of the figure the risk curves of three firms are included. At time t=0, each firm
has an initial risk perception of the FOI, in all cases above R„„ and below Rma» Thus, all firms start
collecting information. After period one this information is incorporated in their risk perception. Firm
one is now more certain about the investment, decreases its risk perception R, to below R„„ and
decides to invest. Firm two also consideres the received information as positive and decreases its risk
perception, but it is still uncertain about its investment decision. The firms keeps collecting information
in period two, three and four. After each period it postpones the investment decision, since its risk
remains between R„„ and Rma«- Even after five periods, when the firm has reached the point that it is
no longer beneficial to collect more information, it still postpones the investment decision. Firm three
initially also postpones its investment decision. The risk perception increases after incorporating the
information in period one, two and three. After period three R3 exceeds Rmax and firm three decides
not to invest.
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Figure 4.3: The investment decision process
R C(l)
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The interpretation of the framework provides the possibility to answer some of the finding arising from
the firm level data that remained unexplained by the option theory. All firms that initially have a high-
risk perception of the CEE region will never enter the investment decision process, but decide
immediately that this region is unfit for their investment. Equally, firms with a very low-risk perception
do not engage in an investment analysis, since they are confident enough to invest without further
collection and analysis of information. In addition the framework can put forward an explanation as to
why some firms collect more information than others and take a longer time to make their decisions.
For example, the data indicated that firms with experience with an FDI in the CEE region prepared
their follow-up investments more careful and thorough than their first investment. This observation
could be due to the fact that, because of their experience in the region, they are able to determine a
more precise risk indication of the FDI, possibly higher than of the inexperienced firms. Given the fact
that they are aware of the problem areas, they may want to collect more information in various fields,
resulting in a longer decision period.
The survey data additionally indicated that firms that decided not to invest in the CEE region did not
have a less extensive investment preparation. This can be very well explained using the example,
comparing firms one and firm three in figure 4.3. Firm one decided to invest after having collected only
a limited amount of information, but given that its initial risk perception was close to the threshold level
Rmin and the information it collected was positive, the firm decided the risk of the investment was
acceptable after one time period. Firm three not only had a higher initial risk perception, but also
interpreted the information negatively. As a result the firm decided, after having collected three units
of information, that the risk of the investment was too high. The example is of course based on
nonexistent firms, but the context shows that collecting and analysing information does not have to
lead to a decreasing perceived risk but might as well increase the firms perception of the investment
risk. Equally, increases or decreases in the perceived risk do not always increase or decrease the
investment decision uncertainty. The closer the risk perception is to the risk threshold, the larger the
uncertainty of the investment decision is.
The fact that firms invest less often and later in high-risk regions can also be explained using the
framework. Investments in high-risk regions most likely have a high perceived risk rate at the start of
the analysis. Relatively more information is needed in order to decrease the uncertainty surrounding
the investment decision than for countries with a lower initial risk perception.
The framework should not be seen as an alternative to the option model, but can be considered a
useful addition to the option model. Both the option theory and this framework focus on the large role
uncertainty plays when making large, irreversible investments and are therefore very suitable for
modelling and explaining FDI investments in high-risk regions.
4.6 Conclusions . • >
The option theory is a flexible and useful tool in modeling investment decisions. Uncertainty and
timing play an especially important role in the model, making the option model very suitable for
studying direct investments in high-risk regions. However, the option model basically only provides
rules regarding when to invest and does not indicate how firms should interpret or implement these
rules. In this chapter the main focus was to give an answer to exactly that question: how or on what
basis do firms make an investment decision?
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In order to be able to answer that question the assumptions the option model builds on as well as
three hypotheses derived from the predictions of the theoretical extensions of the model in chapter
two were tested. These hypotheses were tested in section 4.3, using the survey data from the
questionnaire research Dutch FDI in the CEE region. One of the interesting findings was that of the
many firms that were interested in the CEE region decided not to invest without even entering the
decision process and without applying any decision rules. They were either not interested in direct
investments in general, or not in a direct investment in one of the transition countries.
In addition, many firms indicated they had considered a direct investment in the CEE region, but
decided whether to invest without making any type of analysis or calculation. On the other hand,
many firms also mentioned they did make some kind of analysis to support their investment decision
and often they used cost, revenue and uncertainty indicators in the analysis.
The country risk of the host country negatively affects the investment decision. Firms invest more
often in countries with a lower country risk and also invest sooner in those countries. However, while
tow and medium risk countries were more popular than the high-risk countries in the region, firms do
not take this country risk and thereby the higher uncertainty of the firms performance into account in
their expectations of the investment. Most firms expect the FDI to produce a profit rate equal to the
Dutch investment. The idea that if an investment is undertaken in a high-risk region the return or profit
should likewise be higher in order to make up for this higher risk is not apparent in the firms' answers.
Many firms consider more than one country as alternative host country when making an investment
decision. Considering multiple possibilities does not affect the decision to invest or the timing of the
investment. Though the theory of section 2.3 and 2.4 concluded that several alternatives would lead
to postponement of the investment, the data indicate the reverse is true. The more alternatives
considered, the larger the chance one of the alternatives is an interesting host country for the FDI.
With respect to the investment analysis the data show two interesting findings. First, the internal
investment analysis was equally large or extensive for firms that decided to invest and firms that
decided not to invest. This outcome contradicts the idea that firms that decide not to invest are less
well informed than firms that decide to invest. Second, firms with an FDI in the CEE region prepare
consecutive direct investments equally well or even more thoroughly. The presence of experience
with an FDI in the region does not lead to a more restricted analysis, but in fact extends the analysis.
The extensiveness of the investment analysis influences the success evaluation of the firm positively,
though the differences are small and often insignificant.
Combining these results, there is no direct evidence that a good investment analysis leads to more
or more successful investments. In section 4.5 a framework is developed explaining these findings by
comparing the costs of collecting information and the benefits of the information in terms of
decreasing the uncertainty surrounding the investment decision. Finns collect information as long as
the benefits of this information exceed the costs of collecting the information. In addition, firms have a
perceived risk of the direct investment and subjective (firm specific) risk threshold values. Firms invest
if the perceived risk of the FDI is lower than a for them maximum acceptable risk of investing and do
not invest if the risk exceeds the threshold of risk above which investment is not worthwhile anymore.
Between those two risk threshold levels the firm will postpone the investment decision and remain
collecting information. Applying this framework, many of the findings contradicting the expectations
based on the option model can be explained. First, firms do not need an investment analysis if their
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initial risk perception is above the maximum threshold or below the minimum threshold, since then
they decide immediately respectively not to invest or to invest. Second, a long investment analysis
period is no indication that firms invest eventually, since the additional information can increase the
perceived risk as well as decrease it. Third, the fact that firms invest less often and later in high-risk
countries than in low-risk countries can be explained by an initial high-risk perception of investing in
those countries. More information is needed in order to reduce the uncertainty of an investment
decision related to investing in those countries, thus before investments reach an acceptable risk level
for the firm.
For host countries these conclusions can be interpreted in different ways. Easily comprehensible
and accessible information concerning investments in the country could be a relatively cheap channel
of attracting FDI. Clear information on the necessary processes, institutions and requirements can
decrease the perceived risk of firms. On the other hand, good FDI promotion institutions and
information can only do part of the job. FDI goes hand in hand with good macroeconomic
developments and political stability. Once negative news reaches the investor, because of for
instance internal conflicts, political upheaval or economic recessions, firms will adjust their risk
perception negatively. For transition countries this deviation is clear. Countries with a relatively well-
developed economic climate, good institutions and stable macroeconomic developments attract the
most FDI. The less developed, more risky countries, irrespective of their supply of information to
potential investors, have not been able to attract much FDI. Uncertainty of the investment decision,
directly linked to the perceived risk of the investment, are key factors in the investment decisions of
firms.Annex 4.1 Questionnaire summary tables
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Average age of firm in Netherlands
(standard deviation)
Average nr. of locations in the Netherlands
Number of owners
1" (Dutch) owner .. : ... , •,. ;_.







(before tax in million NLG)
Average profit 1999
(before tax in million NLG)
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Table A4.1.2: Characteristics of investments (investors) and considered
investments that were not undertaken (noninvestors)
Investors Noninvestors
(considered FDI)
Average number of investments in the CEE region




1991 . . ' _, ._ ... .••.!:
1992 -<; -•
1993 :. !*.:_• ir.'.-.
1994 .*.••'
1995 ..«: •;:


































Financial options used / considered"
Private capital
Funds Dutch company
Borrowed by Dutch company in NL
Borrowed in host country
Capital provided by other owners
Other



































































































































































'Only investments done just before or during transition are included, the investments done before 1985 are excluded.
" Numbers and percentages do not add to 100. multiple answers were possible, so 10% means 10% of the investors used this
option
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Table A4.1.3: Number of Dutch FDI in CEE region, by country ' '
(n=81)




















































































































































































































(I) The planned investments before 2002 arc the results of
region in the next two years and include the response for 79
question
investors
whether firms planned to invest in the CEE
and 236 noninvestors.
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Table A4.1.4: Information on the investment decision making procedure of
investors considering their first FDI after 1989 and noninvestors considering
an FDI in the CEE region
Preparation activities
- Seminars
- Study trips A- '••'.. v • - ' ; "
- Internal market research " ' r • --.--- "
- External market research :....;..._ '";-;•
- Advice from Dutch institutions • • ' .
- Advice from local institutions
- Other
Average number of alternative locations
An investment analysis made for:
- 0 countries . , .
- 1 country
- 2 or more




Number of analysis undertaken
-1
-Incidental
-Monthly ' ~ * • . '
-Continuous
-Other
Goals for the FDI
-Profitability





How long did you expect it to take before profitability
-Less than a year
-2-3 years - .
-4-5 years
-6-10 years






-1 year or more




-Risk of the FDI
-Risk of the host country
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Table A4.1.5: Comparison of the first and last FDI in the CEE region after 1989
The investment analysis made was:
- More extensive than for the 1" FDI
-Equal to the 1" FDI
- Less extensive than for the 1" FDI
- No analysis made





1 year or more




- Risk of the FDI
- Risk of the host country
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;Annex 4.2 Logit analysis on the impact of the investment preparation
Annex 4.2 Logit analysis on the impact of the investment
preparation






Number of cost variables included
Number of revenue variables included
Number of political variables included
Visited a seminar/study day or lecture
Made a studytrip
Internal or external market research














Number of observations = 130
* significant at 10% level, " significant at 5% level, "* significant at 1% level
LRchi2(12) = 11.27 .
Prob > chi2 = 0.5062
Pseudo R2 = 0 0654
The logit regression tests the impact of the investment preparation variables on the decision to
invest, with 1 being an investment and 0 being no investment. The investment preparation variables
are all insignificant. Thus, once companies engage in an investment analysis, the extensiveness of
this analysis does not influence odds of investing. This is in line with the conclusions of chapter four.L« i^a
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5.1 Introduction
In 1989/1990, the transition from communist states to market economies started for most of the
countries in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. One of the major aspects of transition was
the liberalization of markets, allowing foreign goods and services to enter the market either through
trade or direct investments. Soon after the start of transition, it became clear that there was a large
deviation in the amounts of direct investments among the transition countries; a few countries received
a large proportion of the total inflows whereas most other countries in the region received very low
amounts of FDI inflows. The respective countries often considered these large differences unfair, but
studies using the gravity model show that the size of the FDI inflows can largely be explained by a
limited number of basic country characteristics (Brenton et al. (1999)).
In this chapter I compare Dutch FDI flows to the ten EU accession countries* with the FDI flows to
the other Central and Eastern European and Central Asian countries' and the rest of the world. In
doing so, I try to find out why some transition economies receive relatively more FDI than other
countries. Can the investment flows be explained by the degree of economic reform or development of
the respective countries, or are the EU accession countries receiving preferential treatment?
There are several important reasons for studying these investment flows. First, the more integrated
the EU accession countries are with the EU, the smoother the accession to the EU is expected to be.
Second, and somewhat counter to the previous argument, those accession countries that currently
experience levels of investment flows below what is expected stand to gain the most from future EU
accession. Third, the stage of and relative position in the accession process influences net investment
flows to the different countries entering the EU. Fourth, a medium- to long-term catch-up effect of the
transition countries needs to be financed. There is ample evidence in both the more theoretically
oriented growth literature (see Barro (1997) for an overview) and the more empirically oriented
research into the finance-growth nexus (De Haas (2002), Szanyi (1998), EBRD Transition Report
' This chapter is written jointly with Jaap Bos. working at the department of Banking and Supervision Strategies of De
Nedertandsche Bank. I thank Ralph de Haas, Chris de Neubourg, Gerard Pfann, Ben Knechel, Allard Bminshoofd, Jan Kakes,
Iman van Lelyveld and the participants at the Nederiandsche Bank and Maastricht University seminars for their comments I
also thank De Nederiandsche Bank and specifically Danny v.d. Kommer and Hans Ammeriaan for constructing and providing
this excellent database.
'Since the focus is on transition countries, there are only ten countries included as EU accession countries, of which eight
countries are joining the EU in 2004 (Czech Republic. Estonia. Hungary. Latvia. Lithuania. Poland. Slovak Republic and
Slovenia) and two countries are still negotiating EU accession (Bulgaria and Romania). The remaining three countries joining
the EU or negotiating (Cyprus. Malta and Turkey) are not in transition from a socialist state to a market economy, and thus not
considered as EU accession countries in this chapter.
' The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are in the literature often referred to CEECs.
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(1999), Borenszstein, de Gregorio and Lee (1998)) that significant well-allocated investments are
crucial to a country's ability to structurally enhance its economic growth. At the same time, there is
evidence (Koivu (2002), Bonin and Wachtel (2000) and Pissarides (2001)) that the financial system
that serves to facilitate and channel investments is still underdeveloped in (most of) the transition
countries. FDI can play a very important role in providing these countries with the necessary
investment money. Finally, whereas research of trade flows is frequently undertaken, studies on FDI
flows are still relatively rare for the Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
In order to see whether if there is a split between advanced and less advanced transition countries,
yeariy investment flows from the Netherlands to the transition economies are studied in the empirical
section. I use a modified version of the standard gravity model, which allows measuring
overinvestment or underinvestment compared to what is expected based on a country's economic,
geopolitical and social fundamental characteristics. From a theoretical point of view, the Netherlands is
very appealing for this type of study. It is an EU member state, but lacks the historical ties with the
CEEC region that some other EU member states (cf. Austria) have. As a result, it is possible to
emphasize the receiving countries' characteristics in explaining FDI flows. The Netherlands is also a
small, open economy. Its foreign direct investment outflow constituted on average 7.22 percent of its
GDP over the period 1987-2001 and 12.57 percent in 2001', which was directed towards a large
number of countries.
The database used is a balanced panel of FDI flows to 207 countries over the period 1987-2001, as
well as 1987 FDI stocks. These data are matched with a (unbalanced) panel of economic and socio-
political data from other sources.'
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in two respects. First, the scope and depth of the
data set allows reaching beyond a standard gravity model. It includes FDI determinants for a large
group of 207 countries' over a relatively long period of 15 years. In addition, the analysis is not limited
to basic macroeconomic fundamentals, but takes into account other factors that influence the
distribution of FDI flows. The second contribution to the literature is that in examining the results from
a standard gravity model, I use a series of different methods trying to extract as much information as
possible from the data.
The remainder of this chapter continues as follows. Section 5.2 contains a literature overview. In
section 5.3 I present the methodology. Section 5.3.1 contains an introduction of the basic gravity
equation, which indicates how Dutch FDI flows are in general related to a set of basic indicators. Next,
I discuss the recent advances with respect to the estimations of gravity models and elaborate on a
number of inherent problems with the standard gravity model. In addition, I make a case for a second
stage analysis, in which I want to analyze whether under- and overinvestment can be explained by
different factors. Section 5.3.3 elaborates on how to use the information contained in the basic gravity
model in the most effective way. In section 5.4 the data are introduced. Section 5.5 contains the
empirical results. In section 5.5.1 are the results of the most rudimentary version of a gravity model,
and 5.5.2 focuses on the over- and underinvestment patterns. In section 5.5.3 a set of country-specific
variables are added to explain the investment behavior over the last 14 years. In addition, this analysis
gives an indication of whether additional catch up effects for transition countries are to be expected in
the near future, or if the major catching up has already taken place. Section 5.6 concludes.
' Sources: DNB and the OECD.
*IMF. World Bank. Euroscope. Euromoney, CIA.
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5.2 Literature
This section contains a brief overview of the literature on the gravity model that is used as the basic
vehicle to study relative investment flows. The focus is on studies that have estimated this model for
transition economies. In section 5.2.2,1 elaborate on some studies that have tried to identify the major
types of determinants of foreign direct investment. Section 5.2.3 includes a discussion of a number of
articles that have tried to explain differences in FDI flows to the CEECs.
5.2.7FD/Graw<ySfud/es >•*..*•
The gravity equation is often used in comparative FDI studies. The standard gravity equation relates
the outflow of FDI from country /' to country y to country /s GDP, population (POP) and the distance
(D/sf) between both countries. Thus:
(1) FD/„=/(GD/>,,/>O/>,,D«r„) -' • ''•
If predicted investment, FD/,,, exceeds actual investment I observe underinvestment, and if
predicted investment falls below actual investment, there is overinvestment'. The gravity model
predicts that the effects of GDP and popu/af/on on FDI are positive, since investments are expected to
be larger if the host market is larger and more developed. D/'sfance can have a negative effect, since
countries that are further apart are likely to have larger economic and cultural differences, thus making
FDI less attractive. However, distance can also have a positive effect, since an increase in distance
means that trade (through an increase in transportation costs) becomes more expensive and is
substituted by FDI. D/sfance itself is then both geographical distance and psychic distance'. Table 5.1
presents an overview of studies that have adapted a (somewhat extended) version of the basic gravity
model to transition economies.
Döhrn (1996) specifically focused on EU enlargement and its role in channeling investment flows
from the EU to the CEECs. In an effort to quantify the effect of EU enlargement, he estimates a gravity
model, albeit without correcting for the size of population. He includes a variable that measures net
trade flows. With the help of a separate regression, he makes trade orthogonal on (factors that
explain) FDI in order to better capture possible substitution effects between trade and FDI. In order to
reduce bias from differences in starting levels of investment, Döhrn estimates the model both with FDI
flows and FDI stocks as dependent variable. Although the results included in table 5.1 are for the flow
estimations, the results for stock estimation are qualitatively similar. The models are estimated using
OECD data for 1990-1992. The coefficient for GDP has the expected, positive sign; distance has a
negative sign. On the basis of these estimations, Döhrn concludes that "the enlargement of the EU as
well as the transformation in Eastern Europe have significant consequences for international FDI. The
magnitude of the impact of the EU enlargement, however, is far from being clear. This is due to the
fact that the rather complex process of 'integration' can be introduced into the regressions only by
some dummy variables" (p. 130).
' The terms overinvestment and underinvestment are new to the gravity literature, and will be used according to this definition
throughout this chapter.
' Psychic distance covers geographical, cultural, legal, religious, linguistic, historical, economic and ethnic aspects of the
differences between two locations of business activity In practice, geographical distance proxies for psychic distance. See
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Table 5.1: Overview of Basic FDI Gravity Studies
GDP POP DIST Pen
Bevan & Estnn (2000)
Bevan & Estnn (2000)
Brenlonetal (1999)
Brenton & Di Maura (1999)
Buchetal (2001)
Döhrn (1996)
Garibaldi et al. (2002)
Level estimation (model one)




Trade included orthogonal on other factors











































In case a study contained several gravity estimations, the results reflected by the majority of those regressions are included in
this table
Buch et al. (2001) also look at possible substitution effects. However, they focus specifically on
substitution between different regions. They estimate a basic model using FDI from Austria, Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the U.K., U.S. and Japan to 48 host countries for 1991,
1993, 1995 and 1997." After performing out-of-sample tests, specifically for Germany, the authors
conclude that no evidence is found for substitution of FDI flows from Southern countries to the CEECs.
The observed increase in FDI to the CEECs can be explained as a stock adjustment.
The results of Bevan and Estrin (2000) are somewhat difficult to compare with Buch et al. (2001),
since distance is missing in their analysis and there is no overlap with respect to the period estimated.
Bevan and Estrin use bilateral FDI flows from the EU-14 (Belgium and Luxembourg are merged),
Korea, Japan, Switzerland and the U.S. to the CEECs. They estimate a panel of 151 bilateral FDI
connections, for the period 1994-1998. Again, the coefficient for GDP carries a significant, positive
sign. Population negatively and significantly affects the FDI stock. With an R^-ad/usted of 0.35, the fit
is remarkably low. With the help of structural shift dummy variables for key announcements of
progress in EU accession, the authors show that EU accession has influenced FDI, but country credit
ratings have no effect. When the analysis is performed using first differences (model two), these
results remain standing, but the fit worsens to 0.05.
Brenton et al. (1999) use a bilateral gravity model approach to assess the impact of the growing
integration between the EU and the CEECs, in an attempt to see whether an increase in the
attractiveness of the CEECs to foreign investors has affected the magnitude of FDI going to other
European countries. The authors add an adjacency variable and separate the two possible effects
distance has on FDI (as mentioned above). The authors test what the effect is of concurrent trade and
investment liberalization. Their methodology differs somewhat from the studies discussed so far. First,
they estimate a gravity model using FDI stocks. Then, they also estimate a gravity model using
exports and imports. Next, they use the residual from the FDI regressions in the import and export
regressions in order to assess the impact of FDI on bilateral trade. They let these residuals interact
with dummies for different groups of countries. Finally, they investigate "whether changes in FDI flows
to particular countries or regions, in response to an increase in economic integration, had a noticeable
impact upon the flows of FDI going to other, excluded, regions" (p. 119). They do so by graphically
comparing the distribution of FDI flows over time (specifically for Spain and Portugal). The analysis is
performed for all EU countries. Table 5.1 shows that the coefficient for GDP carries the expected
positive sign. Population is negative, as is distance. Again, however, no substitution effect between
FDI and trade is found. For Spain and Portugal also no evidence for substitution of FDI between the
' They also run a separate analysis for FDI flows from Germany to 37 countries, for the period 1981-1997. Results for this
analysis are not presented here, but are very similar.
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CEECs and other European countries is found.
In Brenton and Di Mauro (1999), the main aim is to check whether inflows of FDI from EU countries
to CEECs are "disappointingly low" (p. 59). Both for (net) exports and FDI, Brenton and Di Mauro first
estimate an extended gravity model, with dummy variables representing preferential relationships.
Next, they regress the residuals from the trade model on the residuals from the FDI model, in order to
find out whether there are substitution effects. The analysis is performed with pooled FDI and export
data over the years 1992-1995, for Germany, France, the U.K. and the U.S. and a panel of around 35
destination countries. The fit is reasonable (R^-adyusfed ranges between 0.50 (U.K.) and 0.64
(France)). The results are as expected, with a positive significant impact for GDP. The distance
variable is negative and significant, indicating that countries further away receive less FDI inflow.
Population is insignificant. The authors conclude "the amount of overseas investment by EU countries
in the more advanced transition economies [is] already greater than one would expect given their
current level of income" (p. 59). With respect to regional preference, Brenton and Di Mauro find that
EU countries receive about three times more FDI from their EU neighbors Germany, France and the
UK than can be expected based on the gravity model. The transition countries Poland, Hungary and
the Czech Republic receive more FDI than the gravity variables predict as well, but Romania and
Bulgaria receive a smaller share than expected based on their gravity variables. Contradictory to some
of the other studies described so far, they find complementarities between exports and FDI.
Garibaldi et al. (2002) go one step further and distinguish between different types of capital flows.
They estimate an extended gravity model for both FDI and portfolio investment. Their study is
indirectly motivated by the fact that, unlike FDI, portfolio investment does not involve large sunk costs.
As a result, portfolio investments can be withdrawn rather quickly in adverse conditions. This
possibility to withdraw the money puts the transition economies at a risk, especially in times when they
desperately need foreign capital. Garibaldi et al. (2002) try to find differences between the behaviors
of both types of capital. They use data for the CEECs and the former Soviet Union for the period 1990-
1999. Their regressions have a very high fit and the gravity variables carry the expected sign. The
findings indicate a diverse pattern for overall capital flows, but FDI is found to be a "relatively stable
source of financing in most countries during the early transition years, and continued to play an
important role in most [...] countries at least until 1998" (p. 30). In contrast to FDI, "portfolio investment
is very poorly explained by fundamentals" (p. 30).
Summing up, the results of empirical research using the gravity model indicate that a higher GDP in
a host country leads to higher FDI inflows. However, contrary to expectations, a larger population not
always leads to a larger FDI inflow. Smaller countries indeed receive relatively more investments than
larger countries. Distance between the host and home country limits FDI flows; the farther the host
country away the less often firms invest there. In general, the conclusion from the studies cited up to
this point is that the countries from Central and Eastern Europe receive an amount of FDI as high as
can be expected on the basis of the simple gravity model.
5.2.2 Types of Dete/m/nanfs ofFD/
Given the fact that only three variables are included in standard gravity model, the model's explanatory
power is surprisingly large. However, aside from the very basic effects of relative size and distance,
the model tells very little about the forces of gravity that cause a country fs actual flow of FDI to
another country; to differ from the expected flow of FDI. The fact that it has thus far proven impossible
91Chapter 5 Explaining foreign direct investment flows to Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia: a gravity approach :'
to derive a single formal underpinning to the model means I have very few priors as to what the major
determinants of foreign direct investment are. In the empirical literature, however, there is a growing
body of evidence pointing to specific determinants. Even though most of these studies do not
conclude whether a region is receiving as much FDI inflow as can be expected based on its
performance, the macroeconomic variables that significantly determine FDI flows may also increase
the fit of the gravity model. In addition, some specific aspects for transition economies can be included
in the gravity model to increase the fit.
Several different groups of factors can be traced in the literature. They are summarized in table 5.2.
Altomonte (2000) and De Haas (2002) emphasize the importance of a strong legal framework.
Although rarely made explicit, there is a distinction between the political situation and country risk that
several others (Bevan & Estrin (2000), Holland & Pain (1998) and Lehmann (2002)) have identified.
The main difference is the extent to which the uncertainty resulting from a sub-optimal situation can be
deemed structural. A temporary political crisis can be caused by but also worsened through the lack of
a strong legal framework. However, a weak legal framework can exist without causing a political crisis.
The role played by differences in national or regional culture, as emphasized by Hogenbirk (2002),
is hard to quantify and perhaps therefore rarely included in an analysis of determinants of FDI.'° The
price of labor, on the other hand, plays an important role. Lansbury et al. (1996), Meyer (1995) and
Hogenbirk (2002) find that the relative cost of labor is a very important determinant of FDI flows. The
quality of labor, and overall productivity can also stimulate investment, as described by Altomonte
(2000), Holland & Pain (1998), Lansbury et al. (1996), Lehmann (2000) and Altomonte (1998) with the
help of e.g. production indices.
Of special importance to the CEECs is the finding that the choice and timing of a particular
privatization scheme can help explain FDI flows. In sum, direct sales to investors are found to be more
successful than voucher schemes and management buyouts (cf. Holland & Pain (1998)) and early
privatization schemes perform the best (Resmini (1999) and Lansbury et al. (1996))." Related, the
size and trustworthiness of the financial system (mostly banks in transition economies) helps channel
investment flows (De Haas (2002) and Holland & Pain (1998)).
A good infrastructure and a good overall economic climate help promote foreign direct investment
(Martinez-Zarzoso & Nowak-Lehmann (2003) and Altomonte (1998)). Surprisingly enough, exchange
rates are not very often included as a determinant (cf. Martinez-Zarzoso & Nowak-Lehmann (2003)),
perhaps because of the inherently long-term nature of FDI. Existing trade and other economic links
with the country that receives the FDI have received a lot of attention (Hogenbirk (2002), Holland &
Pain (1998), Lansbury et al. (1996) and Meyer (1995)).
™ Hogenbirk uses Hofstede's four cultural dimensions to determine the cultural distance between two countries (Hogenbirk,
2002. pp.71).
Outsider privatization is a sale of the company to an external party, often by means of an auction or direct sale. This form of
privatization allows foreigners to buy the company, and often leads to restructuring of the firm Insider privatization is a sale or
giveaway of shares to the company's management or employees Due to conflict of interest, this form of pnvatization often leads
to postponement of restructunng. and does not allow for foreign influence In mass or voucher privatization shares are sold or
given to the population of a country Due to dispersion of the ownership nghts this form of pnvatization often delays reforms, and
foreign ownership is only possible in a second degree, through establishing pnvatization funds or by buying shares on the stock
market
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So far I have discussed a number of articles written on the determinants of FDI. Summing up, I
observe two things. First, no study really takes the full spectrum of possible determinants into account.
As a result, it is difficult to assess the relative importance of each variable. Second, not all studies
focus explicitly on the characteristics of transition economies.
5.2.3 FD/ to me CEECs and Centra/ >As/a
I therefore now discuss more elaborately a number of articles that have studied the forces explaining
the development of FDI to transition countries. These studies are summarized in table 5.3.
Claessens et al (1998) suggest that FDI flows to transition economies are largely the result of their
economic reforms. In their panel data analysis (OLS) they use a sample of 21 countries for the period
92-96, and distinguish between push and pull factors in their analysis. They find that mainly the reform
index and EU accession dummy are highly positively significant in attracting FDI.
Brock (1998) studies Russian FDI inflow, and specifically looks at regional division. He finds FDI is
very much concentrated in Moscow and St. Petersburg, and mainly the variables output, education
and crime are influencing FDI. Institutional development and tax rates are not important in determining
FDI inflows. Using a five-year panel data set for the period 1992-1996 including 11 transition
economies, Holland and Pain (1998) try to find to what extent FDI is increasing technological
knowledge in the transition region. They find, in contradiction to several other studies, that lower labor
costs (measured in levels, differentials over countries and productivity) do attract FDI. In addition, the
way privatization was undertaken is important. Outsider privatization is more suitable for attracting FDI
than insider or mass privatization." Resmini (1999) focuses on sector patterns of FDI in the CEECs, in
order to see whether the influence of certain characteristics varies among sectors. For a cross-section
of 3000 observations, she finds that the degree of openness of a country, measured by trade divided
by GDP is positively influencing FDI inflows, and the country risk has a negative effect on FDI inflows
in transition economies. However, wage differentials are insignificant. She finds an unequal division of
FDI in the region, with some countries being specialized in more technologically advanced FDI
(vertical), and others are still more specialized in the horizontal low wage FDI.
See footnote 11.
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Bevan and Estrin (2000) have a panel data set of FDI from 18 countries to 11 transition countries
over the period 1994-1998. They use these data to estimate two regressions, in order to determine the
indicators significantly explaining FDI inflow. First, they create a risk indicator based on private sector
share, privatization progress, macroeconomic variables and a bribe tax indicator. This risk indicator,
jointly with several other variables, is used to determine the significance of FDI inflows. They find that
of the 10 variables they added to the gravity equation, only the risk indicator (high risk leads to low
FDI), labor costs (low wage attracts FDI) and regional dummy variables" are significant.
Garibaldi et al (2002) use capital flow data of 25 transition economies for the period of 1991 to 1999,
to find out to what extent inward FDI to transition countries can be accounted for by individual country
characteristics. The study distinguishes between FDI and portfolio investments. For FDI flows, 32
variables are included, grouped in scale variables, macroeconomic variables, interest rate data,
structural reform variables, institutional quality variables, initial conditions, market perceptions and
" Germany invests more than average in transition economies, and the Baltic countries receive a proportional larger share of
FDI compared to other CEEC countnes.
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specific FDI variables such as wage, trade index, FDI restrictions index and a privatization variable".
Using a general to specific model, the most significant variables are selected. Besides the general
gravity variables, fiscal balance, liberalization and trade reforms positively influence FDI flows, while
insider privatization and FDI restrictions negatively influence FDI flows. Inflation seems to influence
FDI with arbitrary signs, and wages do not influence FDI if GDP and GDP growth are included.
Variables measuring the degree of institutionalization, and a subjective variable indicating managers'
market perceptions are highly correlated, and may be more influential than the general
macroeconomic predictors.
Based on this literature overview it is hard to conclude which variables are significantly influencing
FDI flows. Studies do not use the same variables, and variables are often significant in one study and
insignificant in another. Therefore a broad selection of variables has been made to include in this
study to provide a more complete picture of the individual and joint effects on FDI. . . ..
5.3 Methodology
This section includes a description of the methods used in this chapter for analyzing whether or not the
transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia receive a proportional share of
Dutch FDI when compared to the rest of the world. It starts with a critical discussion of the standard
gravity equation. Subsequently, I introduce my own method for finding out what the major
determinants for FDI are, and discuss some alternative ways to analyze the residuals from a gravity
model.
5.3.7 /4 Stendarcf Graw'fy Eguaf/bn
FDI flows are generally volatile in nature. Sizes of the flows differ highly between countries and over
time. The gravity model is often used on order to explain some of the high variance often observed in
the FDI flows. The basic gravity model was developed in the 1960s to explain bilateral trade flows from
a home country /to host country; (Linnemann (1966), Bikker (1982 & 1987), Morsink (1997), Brenton
et al. (1999)). The concept of gravity refers to the forces that are expected to, over time, bring actual
trade flows in line with expected trade flows. In that respect, the term 'gravity model' is somewhat of a
misnomer: the gravity model explains expected trade flows and is thereby used to measure gravity". It
does not, however, give any guidance as to what the forces of gravity are. The gravity model is of a
highly applied nature. Much of its success can be attributed to its remarkable predictive power and its
intuitive appeal. The latter can be seen from the basic gravity equation (applied to FDI and in line with
Deardorff(1995)):
with:
FD/,y = the actual FDI flow from home country i to host country j.
GZ)f) =the actual GDP of the home country.
GDP, =the actual GDP of the host county.
" The privatization variable is a categorical variable indicating how a country is privatized, being by direct sales, mass
privatization or insider privatization.
* Gravity refers to the fact that countries attract trade or FDI based on some basic pull factors it has and cannot easily
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Dis/jy = distance between the home country i and host country j. - -,--..- -,. , • :• -
This equation is seen as a long-run equilibrium condition and I expect FD/,, = FD/,^ (with FZ)/,y as
predicted FDI). In the short run, however, the equilibrium does not have to hold. Hence, if
FD/V. > FD/,^ a country receives less FDI than expected based on the gravity variables, and if
FD/,^ < /TD/,, a country receives more FDI than expected. The model is multiplicative to ensure that
as CZ)/| (or GDP;) approaches zero, so does FD/,,. In this basic model therefore, the variables
GD/^ and GDP^ measure the relative potential to invest. Second order effects from G£>/) and G£>/>
are negative. It also follows that D/.«,, , the distance between countries / and y, is always larger than
one kilometer, thus strictly positive. Finally, the model has incorporates a proportionality vector /!„ ."
When applied to predict FDI flows, population size of both home and host country are often included
as variables in A,,, assuming larger populations support and attract larger FDI flows. Here those
variables are the only proportionality variables included in the basic model, thus the model becomes:
, , fGDP*GDP
(3) FD/ = (POP * POP ) * :i
where FD/,, increases with PO/> and /WJ. This can be rewritten as:
(4) FD/^=(POP/GDP,)*(/>OP,*G£>/>)*—J— . ' /"''... ' . "
Now FDI flows are defined as a function of per capita GDP in two countries and the distance
between these countries. Since is equal for all host countries and thus cannot explain
POP
deviations over countries, the term is 'dropped. In logarithmic terms, the estimation made in this
chapter becomes:
(5) In FD/,, =/?„+/?, In GDP, + /3, In POP,-/?, In D«/,^ ' , . !
Since the home country per capita GDP is equal for the countries, it is absorbed by the constant
/?„. The gravity model predicts that the coefficients /?, and /?, are positive, since investments are
expected to be larger if the host market is larger and more developed. Distance can have a negative
effect, since countries that are farther apart are likely to have larger economic and cultural differences
thus making FDI less attractive. However, distance can also have a positive effect, since an increase
in distance means that trade (through an increase in transportation costs) becomes more expensive
and is substituted by FDI. Distance itself is then both geographical and psychic distance. Therefore,
the coefficient /?, can be either positive or negative depending on which effect dominates.
The model is a good predictor of the FDI flows to a country in the long run. With the help of this
gravity model, it is also possible to examine whether transition countries receive more, sufficient or not
enough FDI, compared to this long run equilibrium amount. The deviation of the actual FDI and the
long run equilibrium amount is caused by the volatility in FDI flows, and is of a short run nature. This
amount and direction of this deviation (above or below the predicted FDI) can be explained by adding
more variables to the basic gravity model.
In the discussion of the gravity studies (section 5.2.3) that have tried to identify these major short
" Contrary to Deardorff (1995), I allow this measure to vary per country. As a result, the derivations that follow are my own.Chapter 5 Explaining foreign direct investment flows to Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia: a gravity approach •••*•?
run determinants of the (relative) FDI flow to a transition country, there are three recurring problems.
First, all studies assume that key determinants affect countries that receive more FDI than expected
the same way they affect countries that receive less than expected. A second problem, as Döhrn
(1996) observed at the end of his study, is that the use of regional dummies to measure short run FDI
excesses or shortages is a very crude measure." A third problem is that the basic gravity equation is
generally estimated using only a limited number of host countries, after which this gravity regression is
used to draw conclusions for those same countries. Specific region or country effects are then already
included in the basic gravity model, making the conclusions less reliable." The next section includes a
theoretical solution to the first problem. An alternative to the use of regional dummies follows in section
5.3.3, and the extensive dataset used in this chapter as described in section 5.4 solves the third
problem.
5.3.2 /4na/ys/s of Me Determ/nante of FD/
Section 5.3.1 started with the following basic gravity model, estimating a long run equilibrium level:
Extending the model to include a set of determinants to FDI amounts to minimizing:
Put differently, I expand the vector ^ so as to minimize the prediction error. Empirically, this means
adding a set of variables C*, to control for country-specific factors. However, it is uncertain that for
each measure /(, <?/•£>/„ /rQ,, is strictly positive or negative. A certain control variable may not have
the same impact on countries that receive more FDI than expected and countries that receive less
than expected. To take this into account, a theoretical solution is the following: for any distribution of
the residual £•„ from the standard gravity equation, one can conclude that countries with positive
values of £•„ receive more investment and countries with negative values of ^ receive less
investment than expected based on the standard gravity equation. Thus, it is possible to identify what I
define as overinvestment and underinvestment. And for any distribution of £„, one can be certain that
the higher (lower) its value for a country /, the higher the probability that there is indeed
overinvestment (underinvestment). I therefore create separate dummy variables for the 50% largest
positive (for overinvestment) and negative (for underinvestment) values of £, . The interaction terms of
these dummy variables with the FDI determinants in the gravity model, allow to identify 4*, A and A.
For £ = !,..., AT the model becomes:
" Problem of omitted variables, meaning other factors not included in the equation very likely explain some of me FDI flows that
are now all captured by one regional dummy variable
" In many gravity studies for the transition region, the basic gravity model is estimated using FDI flows to a limited number of
host countries located in the transition region Conclusions with respect to FDI flows can then only be seen in relation to those
countries. No generalization with respect to Dutch investment behavior can be made, only conclusions with respect to FDI flows
in the region In this study, Dutch FDI flows to all countries in the world are included in the basic gravity model, given the most
correct estimation of the Dutch investment behavior in general This gravity equation can be used to draw conclusions related to
over or underinvestment in the transition countries compared to the rest of the world. Countries in this region are found to
receive their predicted amount of FDI, or face Dutch underinvestment.
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(8) ifiFD/,, = A/A In GDP,
where Ö' and D are dummy variables for countries with overinvestment and countries with
underinvestment, based on the standard gravity equation. This way, I can measure the marginal effect
of a determinant /c on overinvestment or underinvestment respectively, and test whether this impact is
significantly different from what I observe for the observations where investment is in line with what
can be expected based on standard gravity model."
Based on the literature described in section 5.2.2 and 5.2.3, an extensive range of possible
determinants of FDI is selected. Table A1 in annex 5.1 contains an overview of these variables, and
the expected sign on FDI inflows. In addition, the dummy variables overinvestment and
underinvestment are used as interaction variables, in order to see whether some additional variables
may be more suitable to explain overinvestment or underinvestment specifically.
5.3.3 Res/dua/ ana/ys/s
As a final part of the analysis, I take a closer look at the performance of individual transition countries
in three ways. First, it is possible to evaluate the sensitivity of the model results to the definition of
regional dummies. Second, I analyze the extent to which individual countries structurally receive over-
or underinvestment and/or if there are certain turning points in time. Finally, I graphically demonstrate
the volatility of actual investments vis-ä-vis predicted investments.
5.4 Data
For this research the database includes yearly data for 207 countries for the period of 1987 to 2001. A
list of countries in included in Annex 5.1 table A-2. The FDI flows are country aggregated investment
data from the Dutch Central Bank." The GDP, and population data have been taken from the World
Development Indicators 2001 (WDI). Distance in km is calculated based on the geographic
coordinates of the capitals." This leaves a dataset of 3090 observations.
With respect to regional classifications, several dummy variables in order have been created to
capture the transition effect sufficiently. The variable Western Europe consists of all countries and city-
states geographically located in Western Europe, that are not transition economies." -
" The decision to define overinvestment and underinvestment at the 50% level is arbitrary In order to find out how sensitive the
approach is to the choice of 50 percent as a cut-off point, the percentage over- and underinvestment has been set at different
levels between 25 percent and 75 percent, in order to check whether the model fit and marginal effects change significantly The
regressions using 50 percent as boundary gave the best fit The coefficients did not change in signs or significance.
*° Quarterly flow data have been accumulated to figure yearly flow data, and have been converted from Dutch Guilders to USD
using the average yearly exchange rate In order to deal with the negative and zero values of FDI flows and GDP. I combined
the two approaches usually taken in gravity studies. In general, either all negative and zero values of FDI and GDP will be
deleted from the analysis, or a very small positive number will replace them. In the Dutch Central Bank data the division
between missing data and a flow of 0 has been identified. Missing data are indeed missing in the original dataset. and a flow of
0 in the dataset means a flow between 0 and 1 000.000 euro. Missing observations are dropped from the dataset, and values of
zero FDI were replaced with the average value of 500 000 euro. In addition, I dropped the negative values from the analysis,
instead of including them as a small positive value (negative values mean the sum of firms in a country divested in that country
in a specific year Replacing those values with small positive numbers would give the wrong conclusions). The total number of
FDI values deleted from the database is 405 in total. Replacing all negative values with a small positive value of FDI instead of
deleting them, does not change the results of the gravity regression significantly except for generating a lower fit (adjusted R-
squared of 0.42). but does lead to a complete group of outliers in the error analysis in section four.
'' The dataset contained 441 observations with missing values of GDP or distances. Those observations were dropped from the
analysis.
" Andorra, Austria. Belgium, Channel Islands, Denmark, Faeroe Islands. Finland, France, Germany, Greece. Iceland. Ireland.
Isle of Man. Italy. Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta. Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal. San Marino, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom.
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Table 5.4: Classification of transition countries, geographically and
economically
Economic division





































Table 5.5: Summary statistics 2001




















































Source: 1) Population, GDP and GDP per capita from WDI 2001 (for Western Europe n= 19), 2)FDI from De Nederlandsche
Bank database 2001, Central Asia for 2000. 3) Distance between Amsterdam and host country capital in km, as the crow flies
(own calculations (Internet distance calculator)).
The variable Transition countries takes the value one for all countries located in Central and Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union undergoing the transition from a planned economy to a market
economy. These transition countries have been subdivided in categories marked by dummy variables
in order to take their geographic position and economic development into account. Geographically, the
transition countries are divided in Central and Eastern European countries and former Soviet Union
countries. Economically, there is a clear division between those countries entering the EU or
negotiating EU accession which are economically most developed, the rest of Central and Eastern
Europe and the countries of Central Asia. Table 5.4 shows this classification of countries.
In section 5.5.2, the database is extended with macroeconomic and social indicators from the WDI
2001 dataset, and financial variables from the IFS statistics for monetary and financial variables. In
addition, three different risk indicators: country risk, political risk and economic risk are taken from the
euromoney database." Given that the WDI and IFS databases are large, and not all variables are
Euromoney provides a score twice a year, ranging from 0 to 100 with 0 being a very high risk and 100 being a very low risk I
used yearly averages for the years after 1993. when two scores were available per year For the years before 1993 the available
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available for all sample countries and the time period 1987-2001, I made a selection of variables to
include in the regression. These variables are classified into subgroups, and a summary is included in
Annex 5.1 table A1. Summary statistics for the main gravity variables for the main regions are included
in table 5.5.
5.5 Empirical Results
5.5.7 Standard Grawty equation "
Dutch yearly FDI flows are very volatile, and there is no time effect visible." In order to explain the size
of the flows, I start with a basic gravity model, extending that with regional dummies to capture the
long run equilibrium level. The first analysis includes the basic gravity model variables, being a
constant, GDP of the host country, population of the host country and the distance between the capital
of the home country, Amsterdam, and the capital of the host country:
with:
FD//y = outward investment flows from the Netherlands to a host country, in million USD.
GDPy = the gross domestic product of the host country in million USD.
Pop; = the population of the host country in millions of inhabitants.
D/sfj-= the distance between Amsterdam and the host country capital in km, as the crow flies.
In line with the literature, FDI flows are expected to be higher if the GDP of the host country is
higher, the host country population is larger, and the distance to the host country is smaller. Using
region dummies for the transition countries will allow concluding whether or not Dutch firms are
investing in this region proportionally to their other investments worldwide. This analysis will also be
undertaken on a yearly basis, in order to see possible turning points in FDI relationships to certain
countries. When estimating the basic gravity model, the results are as expected. In table 5.6, the joint
coefficients are significant, and the explanatory power is remarkably high, given the fact that only the
three basic variables have been used (adjusted R-squared of 0.52). All three variables display the
expected sign. GDP and distance are significant at a one percent level, and popu/af/on is
insignificant." In order to see whether countries in the transition countries indeed receive FDI flows
based on their gravity values, regional dummies are added to the gravity equation.
I used the regional dummies as defined in table 5.4, namely Western Europe, the EU accession
countries, the rest of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. If the coefficient for the dummy
variable is significantly positive, a country already receives more than the expected FDI inflow. When
negative, countries in that specific region receive less Dutch FDI than expected based on their GDP,
population size and distance. If the coefficient is insignificant, there is no substantial evidence that a
region receives proportionally more or less FDI than other countries in the world.
score was used as yearly average. Political risk scores are only available from 1992 onwards. The economic risk is available
starting 1986. but 1988 and 1989 are missing. These values are substituted by the average of the 1987 and 1990 score.
Country risk scores are available for all years.
" When estimating the basic gravity model with the extension of the variable year the variable year was insignificant. Also when
estimating FOI only with explanatory variable year the variable was insignificant.
** When clustering the results over countries in order to take into account that FDI flows to a certain country may not vary too
much per year, I find no changes in the result.
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Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses,' significant at 5%; " significant at 1%
All variables are included as the natural logarithm In, or as dummy variable, see Annex 5.1 for details.
The results in the table 5.7 display some interesting facts. The coefficients for GDP, population and
distance have the same sign, and are of similar magnitudes for all regions. In terms of significance of
the coefficients, the regression including Western Europe as a regional dummy variable shows a
different picture than the other regressions, since distance is insignificant but population size becomes
more important, with a higher coefficient, than in the other regions.
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Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; " significant at 1%
All variables are included as the natural logarithm In, or as dummy variable, see Annex 5.1 for details.
These coefficients are an indication that countries further away are be disadvantaged with respect
to Dutch FDI inflow as long as they are member countries of the EU.^ For the regressions with other
regional dummies this distance effect is significantly negative: countries further away from the
Netherlands, ceteris paribus, receive less FDI. Thus, the inclusion of the Western Europe dummy
compensates for the effect distance has within the EU. Its high and significant coefficient indicates that
Dutch FDI in the EU was significantly higher than expected based on the gravity variables of the
Western European countries. In fact, the flows were six percent higher compared to Dutch investment
behavior in the rest of the world. This positive relationship cannot be detected for the transition
countries, as reflected by the negative coefficients for the regional dummy. This negative effect is
highest for the countries in Central and Eastern Europe that are not negotiating EU accession yet.
They receive only about 20 percent of the Dutch investment inflow that is expected based on their
GDP, population size and distance. The coefficient for the EU accession countries is insignificant,
indicating that those counties do receive the amount of FDI as expected. They do not face the
negative effect of transition anymore. However, they also do not have the positive regional effect from
being a EU member, since the coefficient is still not significantly different from zero. Given that they
are on the verge of entering the EU, and the Western European countries have a positive regional
effect, continuous increase of inflows is to be expected for the accession countries in the coming
years." Including all regional dummies jointly does not lead to different results compared to including
This can be caused by the presence of free movement of persons, goods and services, eliminating procedures at borders,
and making travel costs less high.
" Bulgaria and Romania are in this analysis included in the EU accession countries, even though they are not entering the EU
in 2004. However, including these countries in the CEECRest group does not lead to significant changes. The Euaccession
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the regional dummies separately.
In table 5.8 a time effect is included, starting in 1988. This time variable is included to cover the
expected effect that the FDI flows in the late 1980s and early 1990s was low, as a direct result of the
closeness of the region the second half of the 20th century. As a result, you can expect a catch up
effect, which would be indicated by a positive time trend. However, the variable time is insignificant,
and incapable to capture the transition effect sufficiently. In order to double check whether this
transition effect exists, a yearly analysis is done. Table 5.9 contains the yearly regression results. The
coefficients for the gravity variables and the Western European dummy variable do not lead to
surprises. Like the time variable, which was unable to capture a transition effect, the regional dummies
also do not give evidence for a time shift.™ The yearly regressions for EU accession countries are half
of the time positive and negative, but always insignificant. The rest of Central and Eastern Europe and
Central Asia show consistent negative coefficients, but only the coefficient of the rest of Central and
Eastern Europe is significant in half of the years. This insignificance is an indication that the EU
accession countries and Central Asian countries have received FDI inflows in line with what is
expected, whereas only the Rest of Central and Eastern Europe received below what is expected, and
therefore they can expect a catch up effect to take place. The regressions confirm the previously
detected regional disparities between the EU accession countries and rest of the CEECs and Central
Asia. A remaining question is why these regional dummy coefficients are of such importance in the
gravity equation. It is unlikely that receiving a low inflow of Dutch FDI can be attributed mainly to a
geographic variable. In fact, the use of a regional dummy variable simplifies the results considerably,
and oversimplifies reality.
The large impact of the regional dummy variable is probably not a geographical effect, but has
macro-economic, social or cultural underlying reasons. This statement will be tested in section 5.5.2
where I add several additional variables in order to see whether the large regional impact is indeed
explainable by additional variables, or if the deviation is simply explained through geography. It is also
very well possible that the regional dummy effect is biased because of an unequal division of FDI
among the countries within a region. For example, the positive effect of including the EU accession
dummy may be the result of high FDI flows to the top three transition countries Poland, Hungary and
the Czech Republic, while the remaining countries in the region are performing less well with respect
to attracting FDI. In section 5.5.3 these effects will be studied further.
coefficient becomes higher, but remains insignificant, and the CEEC Rest coefficient becomes less negative, and remains
significant. Excluding Russia from the CEEC Rest group and including it as a separate regional dummy also does not change
the coefficients, both Russia and CEEC Rest are negatively significant.
™ The absence of a time effect could be the result of the database I only have data from 1987 onward, thus only two years
before the start of the transition is included. Possibly, this time period before transition is too short to indicate a clear breaking
point after 1989.
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5.5.2 Wnaf exp/a/ns under- and ovennvesfmenf?
52 percent of FDI inflows are explained by basic gravity variables, giving the long run perspective. There
still is a huge volatility in FDI that is not taken into account in this model. It thus remains interesting to see
which additional variables can be influential in explaining the short run volatility in FDI flows. First, a
geographic continent variable is added to the basic gravity variables. As can be seen in table 5.10, the
continent coefficients are significantly different from zero. This significance confirms the validity of the
research question whether it is really geography that explains FDI flows and magnitudes, or if there are in
fact different underlying reasons. To increase the understanding of the magnitude of Dutch FDI flows,
model two to eight include infrastructure and lagged FDI, and categories religion, macroeconomic, sector,
balance of payments, and risk indicators. A description of all variables, the abbreviation used, how they are
included and the sources, as well as the followed selection procedure of the variables is included in Annex
A5.1."
All models have an equal or better fit than the basic gravity model, and the joint variables remain
significant. In addition, several of the added variables are significant. As expected, the geographical
dummies included in model one add a lot of explanatory power to the model, but the question remains
what the underlying reasons are. With the Western European countries as baseline category, assuming
the Netherlands is trading most with other EU countries, all other continents' coefficients are expected to
have a negative sign. Contrary to expectations, countries located in North America attract significantly
more FDI than the countries in Western Europe. With the exception of South America, South East Asia
and the rest of the world, all continents indeed receive significantly less FDI than Western European
countries. Including religion gives the expected results. Countries with a similar religion as the
Netherlands, Christianity, attract significantly more FDI than countries with a predominantly different
religion. There is no real difference in the size of the coefficients of the three major religions (Muslim,
Orthodox and Buddhism). Larger countries measured by land area attract significantly less FDI than is
expected, but countries with a better-developed infrastructure, measured in kilometers of highways.* In
order to see which effect is dominant, dividing land area over kilometers of highway in a country creates
the variable infrastructure. Countries with a less-developed infrastructure attract significantly less FDI than
countries with a more developed road net (model three). The coefficient of population decreases as well as
the variable infrastructure is included, thus as countries become more developed in terms of infrastructure
provisions, population size becomes less important since it becomes more convenient and less costly to
do business also in smaller countries. In addition, having a large country area with a relatively small
population size is not negative as long as the infrastructure is developed well.
Model four, including macroeconomic variables, is harder to interpret. The exchange rate negatively
influences FDI inflows, and population becomes insignificant, though the link between those two effects is
unclear.^" Agricultural countries attract less FDI than industrial or service oriented countries (model five)."
* Some variables that can be expected to influence FDI because of financial, cost-related or socio-economic aspects are not
included in the model due to missing data Examples of such variables are the costs of labor, education level, interest rates and
poverty rates. This exclusion does not mean I do not believe those variables to be influential; on the contrary, I believe they can have
a large influence on FDI. One of the planned steps for future research is to extend our database and include those variables.
Both regressions were run including the variable land area and highways separately. The results are not included in the table, but
the combined variable "infrastructure" is included. If the coefficient is negative it means that a better infrastructure attracts FDI (a
higher "infrastructure value indicates the country has a less developed infrastructure).
In this macroeconomic model interest rates are missing. Interest rates in both home and host countries could be good determinants
for FDI flows, since financing of investments is often difficult and frequently mentioned by firms as reason why firms decided not to
invest. See for instance van de Laar (2004), Klapper et al. (2002) or de Haas et al. (2002).
This is in line with the country development path, that less developed countries often specialize more in less R&D intensive
products such as agriculture, and more developed countries specialize in industry and services. More developed countries (high GDP
per capita) also receive more FDI inflows. (InFDI = -1 99 + 0.33lnGDPpercapita, with GDP per capita significant at one percent and
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Table 5.10: Gravity model with additional variables
Model 4 Model 5
Macro
economic Sector















































































































































































































Absolute value of I statistics in parentheses." significant at 5%; " significant at 1%
All variables are included as the natural logarithm In. or as dummy variable, see Annex 5.1 for details.
the Adj. R2 = 0.44)
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The export of goods negatively influences FDI inflows, and the imports are positively significant. Thus,
as exports from the Netherlands to a host country increase (imports for the host county), FDI flows also
increase, and thus trade and FDI are complementary. The income flows in the country also positively
increase FDI. This relationship seems logical, given that FDI is essentially income to the host country. As
expected, less risky countries receive significantly more FDI, with political risk being the most important
risk factor." The (one-year) lagged FDI also positively influences this year's inflow. In this model (model
eight) population becomes insignificant, indicating lagged FDI includes a size effect of FDI flows making
country size unnecessary.**
In order to see if there are variables that specifically explain FDI in countries that receive proportionally a
lot of (respectively very little) investments, I created two dummy variables called UnderFDI and OverFDI
(see section 5.3.2). From the countries with positive residuals in the basic gravity model, the observations
within the upper half of the distribution have been marked as OverFDI observations, and the observations
in the lowest 50 percent of the negative residual group are marked as UnderFDI observations. Multiplying
these dummy variables with the added variables creates interaction variables, in order to see if some
variables display different effects for countries receiving more FDI than can be expected, average
receivers and countries that are receiving less FDI than can be expected. For example, a country at war
will most likely receive low inflows of FDI. In addition, I expect the political stability of such a country to be
lower than that of countries not at war. As such, I expect the interaction variable created by multiplying the
UnderFDI dummy and the political risk indicator to be large negative and significant, whereas I expect the
coefficient to be less large for the overinvesting countries. Table 5.11 shows the results of the eight gravity
models used in table 5.10, with the addition of OverFDI and UnderFDI interaction terms for all variables
except the basic gravity variables. The analysis shows that for all models the fit increases significantly, with
adjusted R^ between 0.77 and 0.94. In all models the UnderFDI and OverFDI interaction terms are highly
significant and they carry opposite signs, whereas the coefficient and significance of the original variable
diminishes. When I look at the impact of the Over and UnderFDI variables for the different specifications, I
notice several interesting things. Originally, the signs for the continent coefficients South America and
South East Asia were positive. Now, they have become negative. However, the coefficients for the
overinvestment interaction term are high and significant at the one percent level.
This result is an indication that in those regions there are some countries that are attracting large inflows
of FDI, and are included in the "OverFDI" category. These countries influence the general coefficient
probably to such a large extent that the coefficient became positive, whereas this positive effect now is
taken into account in the interaction term. Thus, without the interaction term the conclusion of the gravity
model is that these regions receive more FDI than can be expected based on their basic gravity
performance. With the inclusion of the interaction term, for South America the conclusion has to be that in
general this continent receives FDI according to the gravity predictions, but there are some countries within
this continent that receive significantly more, and some countries that receive significantly less. For South
East Asia the shift is even more visible, since instead of having a positive significant coefficient, it now has
a negative significant coefficient. Thus, on average countries in this region receive significantly less than
expected, with an additional effect for the least receiving countries, but there also some countries that
receive significantly more than predicted.
Also when taken separately, political risk has a significant positive coefficient of 0.19, and country and economic risk of 0.04.
A variable including lagged GDP has been included as well. However, the value added of this variable was minimal. Though
positive and significant, the coefficient off GDP was decreasing with exactly the size of the lagged GDP coefficient. Thus GDP and
lagged GDP were substitutes.
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Inclusion of religion does not show surprises; countries with Christianity remain the most successful
in attracting Dutch FDI. • T • I
The effect of the infrastructure variable remains negative (meaning less developed infrastructure
attracts less FDI). However, if infrastructure is included, the size effect measured by population
decreases. As was evident from table 5.10 as well, this result indicates that large countries in terms of
population (like Russia) are not necessarily advantaged by large inflows of FDI and large countries in
terms of land area (like Canada) are not necessarily in a disadvantageous situation. If infrastructure is
well provided, this substitutes for the size effect.
The results of the specification including sector are interesting. Being an agricultural country clearly
acts as a negative factor for attracting Dutch FDI, whereas industry has no effect and services show
small positive effects. These results are confirmed by the Balance of Payment model, that shows
imports and exports if goods are insignificant, and the service inflows and outflows of a host country
as well, except for the underreceiving host countries. Thus in general, countries' imports and exports
of goods and services have no clear effect on FDI inflows. This conclusion is contradictory to the
results of table 5.10, where FDI and exports from the Netherlands to the host countries were
complementary.
With respect to the specification including the risk indicators, it is hard to draw sensible conclusions,
also because they show high correlation.^ Lower country risk (as reflected by a higher score) clearly
positively influences FDI, but the political score seems to act in a reverse way. A high political risk
increases Dutch FDI.
The impact of lagged FDI shows the expected significant results, but does not lead to a much better
fit with inclusion of the interaction terms.
In general, the interaction terms increase the understanding of the gravity forces in the short run. It
seems fair to conclude that a linear gravity model is an oversimplification of reality, and the use of
non-linear estimation techniques, or a division of countries in high FDI receivers and low FDI receivers
shows that certain countries react differently to certain variables.
5.5.3 Res/rfua/ ana/ys/s for frans/fon econom/es
As the basic gravity model already shows, the amounts of FDI to transition economies vary
substantially within the region since the signs and sizes of regional dummy coefficients show large
deviations for the EU accession countries, the rest of the CEEC and Central Asia. In section 5.2
became clear that a large part of this deviation is explained by variables omitted in the basic model,
including the interaction variables emphasizing an additional effect for high and low receivers. Part of
these regional effects is also the result of heavy influence of only a subset of countries, causing an
upward or downward bias in the regional average. There can be a misspecification of the dummy
variables for the regions, which leads to incorrect conclusions based on those dummies.
When including all transition countries as separate dummy variables, the results show that the
Czech Republic and Hungary receive significantly more FDI than can be expected on the basis of
"There is a correlation of about 0.9 among all three risk indicators. Included separately, all coefficients show the expected sign
and are significant. A lower risk increases FDI, this is especially so for the over receivers, and there is a negative effect for the
under receivers. The model combining all three indicators has the best fit.
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their gravity equation, and Poland is the only country with a positive insignificant coefficient." Studying
the average residuals from the basic gravity model for all the years from the transition countries gives
similar results. Only Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovak Republic and Kazakhstan have
positive residuals, all other countries have negative residuals. These five countries thus positively
influence the regional dummy coefficient, possibly causing the EU accession dummy to be
insignificant, and reducing the negative significance of the Central Asia dummy.
In table 5.12 variations of the basic gravity model with new regional dummy variables are
estimated. The EU accession countries are divided in a EU1 group consisting of Poland, Hungary, the
Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, and a EU2 group with the remaining six countries. The
dummy for the rest of the CEECs remains unchanged.
Kazakhstan is excluded from the Central Asia group, and included as a separate dummy. The
results show that for both the EU accession countries and the Central Asian countries the coefficients
change dramatically. The ten EU accession countries combined receive less FDI that can be
expected based on the gravity variables When divided, the four most advanced EU accession
countries (EU1) receive significantly more FDI than predicted by the gravity variables, whereas the six
remaining countries (EU2) receive significantly less. In Central Asia, Kazakhstan receives an inflow of
FDI as can be expected, since its coefficient is insignificant, but the other Central Asian countries
(CenAsial) now have a larger negative significant coefficient.
Both adding variables to the gravity model in order to explain short-term volatility in FDI flows, as
well as the definition of the regional dummy variables influence the gravity results significantly. A more
elaborate analysis of the countries receiving a lot more that can be expected (OverFDI) or less than
expected (UnderFDI) adds to understanding FDI flows to transition countries." Because the groups of
countries that receive a lot more (less) than can be expected are defined each year, trends in the
inclusion of countries from the different regions in the OverFDI group and UnderFDI group can be
expected.
For example, Western European countries receive on average relatively more FDI, and are
expected to be more included in the OverFDI group and less in the UnderFDI group than for instance
Central Asian countries.
All other countries have a significantly negative coefficient, except for Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Romania
and the Slovak Republic, that have negative but insignificant coefficients.
OverFDI = upper 50 percent of the positive residual distribution, UnderFDI = lowest 50 percent of the negative residual
distribution.
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Table 5.12: Basic gravity model with new definition of regional dummies


























































































































Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%: " significant at 1%
All variables are included as the natural logarithm In, or as dummy variable, see Annex 5.1 for details.
Time trends can be visible as well. If countries from the EU accession group receive more FDI
since the start if their negotiation process, their inclusion in the UnderFDI group should be declining,
and their inclusion in the OverFDI group should be increasing. Table 5.13 shows that the inclusion of
countries in the overperforming and underperforming group varies largely per region. Countries from
the EU and the EU accession region are often included in the OverFDI receivers (on average 21
percent and 25 percent respectively), while countries from the rest of the CEEC and Central Asia are
rarely included (on average only three percent and ten percent). However, countries from the CEEC
not entering the EU and Central Asia as two regions are more often included in the group of
underreceivers (65-64 percent). In addition countries from the EU accession region are on average
still more often included in the underperforming category than in the overperforming group (39 percent
versus 25 percent of the countries). Only for the EU countries the average percentage of countries
included in the Under receiving group is 13 percent, so countries from the EU are not often receiving
far less FDI than can be expected based on their gravity variables. The column Tofa/ shows the total
number of countries included in that category in 1987-2000. The EU countries are more often
included in the OverFDI category than in the UnderFDI group (73 versus 44 times) whereas the
transition countries are more often included in the UnderFDI category.
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Table 5.13: Countries included in OverFDI/UnderFDI group by region




































































































































































































































































(1987-2000: numbers and percentage of countries from that region)
Studying the inclusion of countries from the region on a yearly basis shows the development of the
region as a result of opening up for investment. If Dutch FDI went more often to transition countries
than to countries in the rest of the world (catch up effect compared to the world), you would expect
these countries to be relatively less often included in the UnderFDI group, and more often in the
OverFDI category. The data do not confirm this expectation. There appears to be no time trend, so
countries are not moving out of the UnderFDI category or into the OverFDI category in the last years.
Table 5.14 includes country specific performance, and represents the actual and predicted FDI for
1987-2000. As expected, and confirmed by the regressions using country dummies, only Hungary
and the Czech Republic, clearly have larger actual than predicted FDI. Poland and Romania also
have higher actual FDI than predicted in more than half of the years. All countries have large volatility
in actual FDI whereas the predicted FDI is stable. This finding is in line with the gravity model theory.
The basic gravity model only provides a long run equilibrium level, and short run volatility is not taken
into account. For countries reforming so drastically, and only recently allowing FDI, a structural
prediction model is not very valuable given that these short run developments are major determinants
of FDI and largely overlooked by the basic gravity model. Still some interesting country specific
findings are detected. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland almost constantly receive more FDI
than predicted by the gravity model. Some of the FDI inflows can be directly linked to the countries
respective policies. For example the method of privatization is important. Hungary and Poland's main
form of privatization of former state owned enterprises were the direct sales, also to foreigners,
encouraging FDI inflows. The Czech Republic, and Russia opted for voucher privatization, making
direct ownership of foreigners harder to achieve. The flows to the Slovak republic before 1993 are
included in the Czech inflows, since the two countries only split in January 1993.
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Actual (log oO FDI in black columns, predicted (log of) FDI in white columns (based on basic gravity model)
(1) The reason predicted FDI for Poland is not stable is because of missing values for GDP in 1988. 1994, 1996 and 1997.
Those values were replaced with averages of the previous and next year, not reflecting the actual situation fully correct.
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After 1993, the Slovak Republic opted for direct sales as main form of privatization, allowing for
large inflows in 1993 to 1995. Romania, Slovenia and Ukraine used management-employee buyouts
as the main format of privatization, which failed to attract FDI. Economic and political reforms
influence FDI inflows heavily. Romania received a lot of FDI in 1995 and 1996, when they
implemented their economic recovery program, but the inflow declined as quickly in the next years
when the country entered a recession. Russia received about the amounts as predicted by the gravity
model. The major inflows occurred in 1994-1997 was during the period of economic growth (second
Yeltsin period), but the inflows decreased again during the ruble crisis of 1998, remaining low until
2001. In the Slovak Republic a decrease in the inflows occurred in 1998, the period Mr. Meciar was in
power. As Prime Minister Mr. Meciar also assumed presidential power, putting democracy at stake.
Slovenian and Ukrainian inflows are hard to interpret, given that they are highly volatile.
5.6 Conclusion o'u ••>' ••—> ^.-•' ..•v.-w«^-!.-: .. . • .-.•:••-.--,. :. .... ..,M-->:. . •••*:.... •.
This chapter focuses on aggregate Dutch FDI flows, specifically explaining FDI inflows to Central and
Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The gravity model is taken as the basic tool for the analysis. The
methodology followed and data used add to the existing literature in three fields. There are substantial
theoretical advantages, new and interesting empirical results and practical implications. 77)eore//ca//y,
the approach adds to the existing research in several ways. First, much can be learned from the basic
gravity model when it is interpreted as a long run equilibrium model. The basic gravity variables
explain FDI flows to a large extent, and their explanatory power merits the model's inclusion in a study
of this kind. However, the basic model fails to incorporate volatility of FDI flows. Thus, the unexplained
variance of the basic model should be treated with care, and studying this unexplained variance
increases the insight into the nature and pattern of investment flows. Second, a rich and elaborate
dataset can enrich the results obtained from a gravity model. Most importantly, erroneous conclusions
based on omitted countries or regions (as opposed to omitted variables) can be avoided. Catch up
effects of certain countries or regions can only be detected if there are a representative number of
countries included to measure the general trend of FDI flows. Similarly, substitution between countries
can only be proven if the pool of countries in addition to the countries studied is large enough. Finally,
having a large database eliminates the chance of having a sample bias. Most gravity studies use a
database including data from developed (OECD) countries as a basis, since those data are most
easily accessible, and add data on the region studied. However, selecting countries on availability of
the data most often means excluding those countries, which are relatively less developed, and
receive lower FDI inflows. As a result, the FDI flows will be upwardly biased, and results derived from
those data will be incorrect. By including 207 countries, almost the whole world, in this database and
using all of the countries information to estimate the gravity model, this problem is avoided in this
chapter. Third, as mentioned already, the basic gravity model is a simple linear regression, including
only three explanatory variables. Besides omitting variables, assuming linearity can also be a
theoretical drawback of the model. In an attempt to deal with the problem of omitted variables, 60
additional indicators have been added to the basic gravity equation. The study also allows for
nonlinearity, by creating dummy variables for countries receiving far more (less) FDI than can be
expected based on the basic gravity model, and using those dummy variables to add interaction
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effects. Results show that certain explanatory variables have a relationship with FDI flows that is of a
nonlinear nature.
Emp/ncaWy, the focus of the chapter was to explain the size and pattern of Dutch FDI flows to
transition countries. The first result is that there is no evidence of an overall catch-up effect of the
region. In general the expectations are that transition countries, after having been closed to FDI for a
long period, should be catching up and receiving relatively large FDI inflows. However, the more one
controls for the heterogeneity of the transition countries in the data set (through the inclusion of the
basic gravity variables, additional variables, and interaction effects), the greater the evidence that
there is no such a thing as an overall upward gravity pull for these countries. There is also no reason
to assume the flows of Dutch FDI to the EU accession countries will increase in 2004, once the first
eight countries join the EU. Currently, those countries have already reached their long run equilibrium
level. The rest of the transition countries are still receiving FDI inflows below their long run equilibrium
level, but those countries are not affected by EU accession. Thus, also for those countries it is not
realistic to expect a more than average increase in FDI inflows in 2004. A careful conclusion that
follows also from the literature overview is that past evidence in favor of such an effect is the result of
measurement bias. Second, there is no reason to believe in a regional FDI impact. The nature of
investments is such that the relative amount of FDI a country receives is mostly dependent on its own
characteristics, and far less on the region in which it is situated. The fact that Hungary and the Czech
Republic receive large inflows of FDI is not due to the fact that they are situated in Central Europe.
For instance the Slovak Republic, also situated in this region, performs less in attracting FDI. Third, in
line with what has been found elsewhere, I find some weak evidence of a complementary relation
between FDI and trade. Thus, there is no support for the argument that firms first explore the market
by exporting, and engage in an FDI later. More likely, companies follow their customer. Dutch firms
are exporting goods and services to Dutch companies abroad (increasing the import of the host
country), and Dutch companies abroad transport or sell their goods again in the Netherlands
(increasing the export of the host country).
These results incorporate some pracf/ca/ /mp//c3fröns for transition economies, and business
making investment decision. The main lesson learned for transition economies trying to attract FDI is
that the own country performance is the main trigger for FDI. Promotion of the country can have some
influence, but given that there is no evidence of substitution of FDI between countries, the country will
not attract FDI that would have otherwise gone to neighboring countries. In addition there is no
specific regional effect. There is a large deviation in country performance within each region, thus the
fact that a country is located in a well performing region does not necessarily mean the country is
doing well in attracting FDI. Besides size, distance and economic performance, factors like historical
ties, religion, accessibility, and country risks influence FDI flows. For example a stable political
environment, good institutions and infrastructure are increasing the FDI flows. Free trade is another
important factor in increasing FDI, given that trade and FDI are complementary. Opening up for trade
increases the FDI flows, and a higher FDI stock in the country again leads to higher trade, both
beneficial for the host country. Summarizing for transition countries, not all countries in the EU
accession region are doing well in attracting FDI flows. FDI does not follow a stable time pattern,
since volatility in flows over the years is high. When I look at individual countries, the Czech Republic
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and Hungary, and to a lesser extent Poland are the star performers in the region when it comes to
attracting FDI. A second tier group consists of Romania and the Slovak Republic. There is no
evidence that those countries can account for large catch up effects once joining the EU in 2004. The
FDI flows to other countries in the region are instable, perhaps reflecting the situation in these
countries. However, for those countries, as well as the countries in the rest of Central and Eastern
Europe and Central Asia, an increase in FDI flows can be expected within the near future. "•
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Annex 5.1 Added variables to the basic gravity model
Table A5.1: Added variables to the basic gravity model
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FDI in millions of USD (3)




1987=1, 1988=2 ...2001 = 15
Dummy variable:
One if located in region, zero
otherwise
-Dl in million USD
Number of square kilometers
Dummy variable:
One if majority of the country has that
religion, zero otherwise
Highways in km
.and area in km . highways in km.
=>assenger-km per year






Ratio of dependents to working-age
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Value added of agriculture as
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Gross fixed capital formation
Gross fixed capital formation


















































_n Export of goods
.n Import of goods
Ln Export of services
Ln Import of services
Ln outflow of income
Ln inflow of income
_n outflow of transactions
_n inflow of transactions
_n outflow of capital
















Percent of gross domestic fixed
nvestment
ndex: 1995=100
Annual percent increase of consumer
prices
Annual percent increase of GDP
deflator
Local Currency Unit per USD
'eriod average
nsignificant
Percent of total labor force
ndex, base year varies by country
Labor force total in million
Current USD
Exports by host country in million
USD
mports by host country in million
USD
Services credit in million USD
Services debit in million USD
Income credit in million USD
ncome debit in million USD
Current transfers credit in million USD
Current transfers debit in million USD
Capital account credit, not including
exceptions, in million USD
Capital account debit, not including
exceptions, in million USD
Not included since capital account
debit and credit included separately
Trade/GDP)' 10Opercent
Country risk score between 0 and 10,
0 is risky, 10 is nskless
Political risk score between 0 and 10
0 is nsky. 10 is nskless
Economic risk score between 0 and
10. 0 is risky, 10 is riskless
~DI lagged with one year





































DNB data: De Nederiandsche Bank balance of payment data 2002
WDI 2001: World Development Indicators 2001 •
IFS statistics: International Financial Statistics
CIA factbook: Central Intelligence Agency data 2002 •
Distance calculator: Internet site http://www.indo.com/distance/
Euromoney: Euromoney indicators - Internet site www.euromonev.com
Note (1): A categoncal vanable for continents was highly significant However, since the purpose of the chapter is to explain the
enormous effect of geographical position with underlying factors, these high coefficients should be interpreted as confirmation
that geography may have underlying reasons, and the size of the coefficients only validates our research question.
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Note (2): Ln (Lagged GDP) was also significantly different from zero, but when included the coefficient of InGDP was decreased
by the size of the coefficient of the lagged GDP. The total effect of GDP remained the same, the addition of lagged GDP only
created a shift in the coefficients I therefore decided not to include it in the regression.
Note (3): In the Dutch Central Bank data the division between missing data and a flow of 0 has been identified. Missing data are
indeed missing in the original dataset and a flow of 0 in the dataset means a flow between 0 and 1 000 000 euro. Missing
observations are dropped from our dataset and values of zero FDI were replaced with the average value of 500 000 euro
Note (4): Rest of the word includes Antarctic, Arctic and Oceania
Note (5): Dominant religion > 75% of the country, Mixture: more religions with 25-50% followers in one country, other includes
dominantly Jewish, Hinduism, Indigenous and Atheist countries
All variables in the table were added to the gravity regression per variable to see whether their
influence on FDI is significant. Most factors were significant, though the fit of the complete regression
hardly improved. The insignificant variables were dropped from the dataset. The remaining variables
are included per category and jointly in the gravity equation.
As a control test, I performed two stepwise regressions, one in which I started with the basic gravity
model and added all variables that were five percent significant (forward inclusion, starting with
variable with lowest p) and one in which I started with the complete regression and eliminated all
variables that were not significant at five percent level (starting with the variable with highest p). These
tests showed that in order to explain FDI the gravity model in itself is fairly accurate and only few
additional variables increase the fit and significantly influence FDI. Those are the variables
export/import of goods, income debit and credit, land area and highways. These results clearly
coincide with the existing literature, where the effect of additional variables is also limited. As a result
of this selection process, I include: Continent, Religion, Infrastructure (combining land area and
highways), Sector division as percentage of GDP, Inflation, Total Labor Force, Balance of Payment
data, Risk indicators and Lagged FDI in the regression discussed in the chapter.
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Chapter 6 Integrating emotions and intuition in FDI decision-
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The peop/e wenf abouf fhe/r bus/ness footong uncomprom/s/ng/y sfem, and fhe afmosphere,
though nof hosf/'/e, was hard/y one of gen/a//ty. -4 priw/eged few saf oufs/de cafes s/pp/ng coffee
and basfc/ng ;n fhe w/nfer sun, buf /augbter and /WvoMy was nof fbe order of fbe day. / guess fbaf
fhe years spendYng //V/ng under an oppress/Ve rsg/me w/fb /fs /nsf/fuf/ona//sed system of secref
po//ce and /nfof7T»ers had /eft fhe popu/af/bn favouring a cauf/ous approach to any pub//c d/sp/ay
of emof/ons. A/of here fhe heated sfreef-corner debates of Soufhem Europe w/fh ra/sed vo/ces
and an/mated gesf/cu/af/ons, öuf /'nstead a measured, deadpan exchange of fhe requ/retf
/nfomjaf/on. No fri//s."
(Tony Hawfcs f2000;, P/ay/ng fhe Mo/dovans af Tenn/'sJ ' ' - '
6.1 Introduction
The previous chapters of this dissertation were based on concepts of economic rationality.' In chapter
two the option theory was described as an investment decision theory. Based on the assumptions of
the option theory, firms chose the best investment alternative by estimating the expected values of
alternative investment options. By doing so, firms allow for uncertainty and take irreversible set-up
costs into account. In chapter four, the assumption that there is full information was relaxed and the
costs and benefits of obtaining information were introduced. Collecting information has certain costs,
but the benefits are that it reduces uncertainty surrounding the investment decision. Firms collect
information as long as the benefits of the information exceed the costs of collecting. Still firms decide
whether to invest in an FDI based on expected Net Present Value information only.
Several results from the survey among Dutch firms considering an investment in Central or Eastern
Europe, or Central Asia (the CEE region) are hard to interpret using these theories, since the theories
only focus on the objective decision rules and ignore the influence of the subjective decision-maker.
The focus of this chapter is therefore on the decision-maker and his or her influence on the
investment decision.' In section 6.2 of this chapter the survey data are discussed, specifically the
questions that asked for individual influence or personal aspects of the decision-maker. Such
personal influence is difficult to interpret using standard economic theories and hard to integrate in
expected NPV calculations.
In section 6.3 the findings of section 6.2 are interpreted using the concept of bounded rationality.
Bounded rationality refers to the fact that firms do not attempt to search for all investment possibilities
but choose a for all parties satisficing solution. Behavioral economics takes this as a starting point and
extend economic theory based on empirical tests. Several theories add to our understanding of
investment decision in the light of the survey results, like network theories, learning/experience
In fact basic economic theory requires three sets of assumptions to hold:
- Limited and given resources, given tastes/preferences and technology.
- Pure economic goods, perfect information and perfect competition.
- Absence of value judgments.
' Ideas and concepts included in this chapter are in part based on the article "Emotions and Foreign Direct Investment: a
theoretical and empirical exploration" by M van de Laar and C. de Neubourg (2004).
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theories and the limitation of cognition. bnfi anoiJOm? $>rvi?G-;0£<ri' 3 *";!^*fc:"J
However, also with bounded rationality the influence of the decision-maker is ignored, even though
there is consensus among psychologists and economists that each individual behaves differently in
an investment decision-making process. It is important to consider the differences of decision-makers
on an investment decision. Interesting questions are for instance to what extent the different personal
aspects influence the final decision, how individuals interpret the information, how they value the final
decision and how confident they feel about an investment. In section 6.4 the impact of the decision-
maker on an investment choice is stressed using the concepts of emotion and intuition. Emotions are
defined as multifaceted processes that unfold over time and cannot be directed or prevented. People
experience emotions and lack tools to resist them. An example is anger. Imagine a businessman that
started a firm in Poland in the early 1990s, whose firm went bankrupt due to malicious practices of the
Polish business partner. It is very likely that the businessman feels angry when thinking about an
investment in Poland and that this negative emotion will inevitably influence an investment decision
with respect to a new investment in Poland. Another example is sudden collective eagerness to invest
in a certain region. History learns that sometimes a country or region becomes "hot", without
economic trends that can explain an increased interest from investors. FDI flows are based on not
much more than positive expectations, as if companies blindly follow their fellow investors and fail to
analyze the investment climate objectively. This happened for instance in Russia in the mid-1990s.^
Intuition is defined as thoughts that are reached with little apparent effort and typically without
conscious awareness. They involve little or no conscious deliberation. A businessman can intuitively
think an investment in Russia is a good idea, without making an analysis to back up this intuitive
judgment. Intuition can be a good or bad tool in decision-making, but either way it is likely to influence
the opinion of the decision-maker.
In section 6.5 a framework is given regarding how to integrate the rationally based economic
theories, concept of bounded rationality and emotions and intuition in one decision-making process.
Section 6.6 summarizes the difficulties with the inclusion of emotions and intuition in economic
models. These difficulties range from defining emotions and intuition, measuring them and including
them in a model. Section 6.7 concludes.
6.2 Survey results
6.2. f The survey da/a
During the preparation of the survey on FDI decisions of Dutch firms the informed observer approach
was followed. In the interviews we asked decision-makers to comment on the research questions and
draft questionnaire. Several interesting facts became apparent with respect to firms' investment
decisions. Firms were not only considering profit expectations when deciding to invest but often had
very personal motivations for investment. Many decision-makers indicated in the interviews that they
initially had noneconomic motivations for the choice of country in which to invest. Examples are a firm
that invested in Hungary because the manager had participated in an exchange programme in
Budapest during his study. He enjoyed living in Budapest and became aware of the growing market
economy and the possibilities for him to set up a business there. Another example is a Bulgarian
* FDI and other investments and loans were flowing to Russia in enormous amounts, without the proper economic
improvements to support these investments. Similar inflows occured in Asia at the same time. In 1997 both the Asia crisis set in
and the Russian bubble bursted (EBRD (1998)
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entrepreneur that lived in the Netherlands for decades. After Bulgaria opened its borders to trade and
foreign investments, he considered investing in Bulgaria. The firms in the previous examples did not |
consider several alternative host countries, but only looked at the possibilities to invest in one specific ,{$ j
country. Another firm that participated in the interviews was invited by a foreign business partner to
take over the business in Moldova. This Dutch firm did not consider any other alternative that could be j
more profitable but solely focused on the one business in which to invest. The last example is the j
owner of a firm that set up foreign affiliates in Romania with the purpose of training local people to run !
the business profitably. Once the location was operating self-sufficiently, the Dutch owner sold the ;
firm to the local management. The incentive to invest was purely altruistic; the Dutch firm was
breaking even at best but still invested with the purpose of assisting in the development of the sector •** '
and training local managers.
Based on these conversations I included some questions in the questionnaire that could give some
insight in the importance these kind of "personal" factors of the decision-maker in the decision-making
process. I like to stress that in most cases the presence of personal factors does not mean that the j
decision to invest is not based on making profits. With exception of the last example, all the firms I i
spoke with intended to make a profit and the fact that they relied on these kinds of personal factors
did not mean that they did not sufficiently evaluate whether the expected NPV was positive as well. „ :
However, the personal motivations made them consider only one specific investment possibility, •
disregarding other possibly more profitable alternatives.
The survey was held among Dutch firms that were interested in investing in the CEE region. The
survey had a response rate of 23.4 percent. The analysis in Annex A indicated there was a
nonresponse bias in favor of larger, older firms and firms with an investment in the CEE region. In
order to take these nonresponse biases into account, the analysis of the data was done with and
without correction weights for nonresponse bias. In the regular analysis the data were taken with each
observation weighted as one. For the weighted analysis a probability is calculated for each
respondent that a firm with certain characteristics would answer the survey." The data were weighted
using the inverse probability of response, thus taking the nonresponse bias into account.* The results
of the weighted analysis do not significantly differ from the unweighted regressions; therefore only the
unweighted results are included in this analysis.
As in any survey, the data are subjective. Firms are asked to answer the questions to their best
knowledge and their answers are treated as reliable information. Still, interpretation of the question
can differ over respondents and recollection of certain events can be distorted given the time that
elapsed since the event occurred and the questionnaire was filled out. Therefore, in this chapter the
results of the survey are treated as "facts", but the results derived from the analysis should be
interpreted with care.
^ Characteristics used are sector, size and age of the firm
For example, the chance that a large industrial firm responds to the survey is 0 2. or 20 percent. In the unweighted analysis
the answers of this firm were included with a weight of one. In the weighted analysis, the answers were valued with a factor of
1/0.2, thus with a weight of five.
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Box 6.1: Questions from the survey ' ' " ' ' _^
21. Did you make any investment analysis to estimate the possibility of success of the investment?
1 [] Yes, only for the country of the T'investment „ . . . .,„.,.. • . ^...-, ,.. .,., ,...,, ^ ..^,,
2 [] Yes, for the country of our 1" investment and multiple
other countries
3 [] No, no calculation was made. The company chose for ' ' ••.'•' - - '•••'••' ' • ' - r-""
the country of our 1" investment because: ,,,-i;
22. What were the 4 most important actions during your decision-making process, in chronological order
(for instance first the choice of a country, afterwards the search for an appropriate local partner).





23. Which one of the following aspects was a specific reason for your company to make the investment
analysis for the country of your l" investment?
1 [] There was already a trade relation with one or more companies in that country
2 [] There was a good contact person to work with in that country
3 [] Other companies in that sector achieved good results in that country "'
4 [] The owner or employees of the Dutch firm are from that country .
5 [] Your partner or direct family members are from the country of your 1*' investment
6 [] Friends or acquaintances are from the country of your 1" investment
7 [] The owner or employees of the Dutch firm were willing to work in the country of your 1" investment
8 [] Your partner or direct family was willing to work in the country of your 1"
investment
9 [] Friends or acquaintances were willing to work in the country of your 1" investment
10 [] Language knowledge of the country of your 1" investment in the Dutch firm available
11 [] Positive personal experiences in the country of your 1" investment, for instance because of travel
experiences
12 [] Other, namely:Chapter 6 Integrating emotions and intuition in FDI decision-making :»«*•.•» iv i\\- ••w :<-V^«T ' •*--•»-:?
6.2.2 /nteresf/ng find/rigs during foe ana/ys/s offne date «*>«•*<-••>•»"»"™- s
Following the standard rational economic theory, as for instance the option theory is (chapter two),
economic actors maximize their utility or profit given stable tastes and preferences and full
information. Translated to the investment decision, firms invest in the country that provides them with
the highest expected profit. A general assumption is that firms base their investment decision on an
investment analysis, in which they consider and evaluate the available information of the investment
alternatives. The concept of an investment analysis is vague, since this analysis is different for all
respondents. Some firms collect all kinds of economic information, insert this information in
complicated, possibly computerized systems that analyze and compare several country alternatives.
Other firms, for instance, only consider three main aspects of each investment alternative and base
their choice on those aspects. Still, rational economic theory assumes that firms consider the
information available while making an investment decision. As previously mentioned, during the
preparation of the survey it became obvious that many firms were not only influenced by economic
motivations when making an investment decision, but also relied on "personal motivations". One firm
invested in Moldova without considering any other alternatives because the entrepreneur married a
Moldovan woman. The company was still not structurally profitable after several years in operation,
but on average broke even. This was sufficiently satisfying for the entrepreneur, since it gave him the
opportunity to live in Moldova. In this specific case, it was not important whether the firm would have
been more profitable in another country, since the entrepreneur did not choose its location for
economic reasons, but for personal reasons. Any other country was not interesting to him.
The survey included several questions that shed light on the "personal motivations" entrepreneurs
have when making an investment decision, as well as the frequency at which these factors influence
the decision. First, question 21 asked firms if they made an investment analysis. Firms were free to
define for themselves what they considered an analysis and were asked to mention if they made it for
one or several countries. 59 percent of the firms did not make any investment analysis. For
noninvestors this percentage was higher (75 percent) than for the investors (28 percent).* The large
percentage of noninvestors not making an analysis was partly the result of the 168 firms that indicated
they did not even consider an FDI in the CEE region, either because they were not interested in an
FDI or because they were not interested in investing in the CEE region (see also figure 4.1 in chapter
four). When adjusted to response probability using sample weights, the difference between investors
and noninvestors remained remarkable, thought the percentages of firms not making an investment
analysis was decreased percentage wise. The most mentioned reasons why firms did not make any
investment calculation were:
• They were not interested in an FDI in general.
• They were not interested in an investment in the CEE region specifically.
• They already had personal relations with individuals in the respective country.
• They received an invitation of a business partner in the host country, requesting the firm to
invest in their company or to extend existing business relations.
• Investing was a logical result after opening of the market and with growth of the market.
• The country was the only investment possibility due to availability of certain natural resources.
Investors are firms that at the time of the survey had an FDI in the CEE region. Noninvestors are those firms that were
interested in the CEE region, but decided not to invest.
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Source: Survey Dutch Direct Investment in CEEC and FSU, Maastricht University, 2000.
From this question it became evident that many firms do not use investment analysis as a tool for
decision-making. They have other motivations for investing and know without further research
whether they want to invest.
The second question, number 23 in box 6.1, was an open question. The participating companies
that made an investment analysis specified the four most important actions/steps during their
decision-making process. Given that the question was an open question, it led to a large variety of
answers (see table 6.1). The first column of the investors and noninvestors contains the percentages
per group. For example, nine percent of the investors mentioned that contacts in the region were an
important factor in their decision.
The second column of the investors and noninvestors compare the results per answer option. Each
firm had four answer possibilities, leading to 322 and 144 answer options respectively. Thus, e.g. ten
percent of the answers of the noninvestors indicated that choosing a country or location for the FDI
was an important step in decision-making. The choice of country or location and doing a
market/company analysis are important factors in the decision-making for both investors and
noninvestors. Previous business relations and contacts in the country were also often mentioned as
separate reasons to consider in the investment process. Investors often mentioned personal
motivations. 12,5 percent of all investors indicated that one important factor in their decision-making
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was of a clearly personal nature. Surprisingly, of the firms that finally did not invest, personal
motivations were not given by any of the respondents. Personal contacts and personal experience
with a country were mentioned by a significant number of the investors and noninvestors. indicating
these aspects are important in the decision-making process. The results highlight that companies that
do make an investment analysis also incorporate personal variables in the decision-making process.
The firms that invested more often mentioned personal motivations. This could mean that personal
motivations are of importance in FDI decisions. In other words, once there is a personal motivation,
the chance the investment is made is higher. I test that hypothesis later in this paragraph.'
The third closed question from the questionnaire among Dutch businesses was included to test
whether some specific personal factors play a role in the decision-making analysis. All firms that
seriously considered an investment in the CEE region, irrespective of whether they finally invested,
were asked if several personal variables influenced their FDI decision. If these factors were marked
as important, personal motivations influence decision-making. If they were marked significantly more
by those firms that did invest in the CEE region than by noninvestors, it is an indication that personal
motivations positively influence foreign direct investment decisions in the region.
The following personal variables were included in the questionnaire:
• Available contact person in the country: Having a contact person can be considered as a form
of persona/ re/af/ons. If a firm or businessman has contact with one or several persons in the
country, it can use the knowledge of this person. As such, the risk of investing will be perceived
as lower.
• Owner or employee of the Dutch firm, partner, family, friends or relatives has the nationality of
the host economy: When the nationality of someone within the firm is from the host country,
there is always a persona/ /nw/vemenf of that individual with that specific country. Most
probably the individuals will feel more secure investing in their native country. In addition the
individual might still have a certain network of contacts, being relatives and friends in the
country, again decreasing the risk of investing.
• Owner or employee, partner, family, friends or relatives are willing to work in the host country: If
an individual is persona/// /nferested in spending time in the host economy, the outcome of the
investment decision personally affects the individual and this influences the final decision.
There will be some degree of self-efficacy as well. If a person is considering working in the
country himself, he or she is very likely convinced of the success of the investment.
• Language knowledge available: If a person speaks the language, he or she will be able to
communicate better and use the language knowledge to deal with administration and build a
network quicker. Language knowledge can also influence the self-efficacy of a person
positively.
• Positive personal experiences: Due to whatever positive persona/ experience, the individual will
be more personally involved in the country, have positive images when thinking about the
country and possibly also feel more confident in engaging in an FDI.
The weighted results did not differ a lot from the unweighted percentages.
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Table 6.2: Personal Factors: investors and noninvestors
Percentage of investors for which
this variable had impact on the
investment decision
Percentage of noninvestors for which
this variable had impact on the
investment decision
Available contact person in the country
Owner, employee, partner, family, or
friend of the Dutch firm have the
nationality of the host economy
Owner, employee, partner, family, or
friend of the Dutch firm are willing to













Source: Survey Dutch Direct Investment in CEEC and FSU, Maastricht University, 2000
Note: Of the 90 firms included. 56 firms were investors in the CEE region and 34 were noninvestors
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Table 6.2 shows the numbers and percentages of firms that responded to each of the above-
mentioned variables. The variable "contacts in the CEE region" is of crucial importance in the
decision-making process. Almost 70 percent of all firms answered that having contacts in a country
was a specific reason for their company to consider an FDI in that country.
Positive experiences, language knowledge and family or friends from the region play important
roles in the decision-making process as well. Firms that invested in the region indicate more often that
personal variables influenced their decision. However, for none of the variables was the difference
between investors and noninvestors significant.'
So far, all three tests indicate that personal factors are important in the decision-making process.
First, personal motivations could be a reason for firms not to make any investment calculations.
Second, if firms make an investment calculation they often include personal variables in their
calculation. Thus, it is interesting to test whether personal variables influence the final investment
decision. Can one say that firms with a personal motivation are also more likely to set up an FDI in a
transition country?
In order to test that I created three different personal coefficients dummy variables. The variable "no
ana/ys/s"/s a dummy variable that is zero in case companies made an investment analysis and one if
they made no analysis but made a decision based on other factors. The second dummy variable
"persona/7" takes the value one for firms that have a contact person in the host country or were
invited by business relations to invest in the host country. Those factors can be seen as indicators of
presence of a social network. However, having a network is not the only benefit; having a network
automatically involves personal involvement, such as trust in the people in the network and trust in the
information provided by the network, resulting in a more confident feeling about the investment. The
third variable, "pefsona/2", measures personal involvement in the narrowest definition. The dummy
variable takes the value one only if strict personal motivations are displayed either in the reasons for
not making an investment calculation', in the open questions'" (table 6.1) or in the closed question"
(table 6.2).
' For each of the variables a Pearson chi2 test was done to see whether the data for investors and noninvestors were
independent. In none of the cases was the difference in outcomes between investors and noninvestors significant.
' The dummy variable was set at one if the reasons for not making an investment calculation was a personal one.
'° The dummy variable was set at one if in the open question the firms answer fell in the category personal motivations (see
table 6.1).
" The dummy variable is set at one if the answer options the owner, friends or family are from the host country", "the owner.
friends or family are willing to work in the host country", 'someone from the firm speaks the language of the host country' or
"there were positive experiences in the country' were marked as motivations for the investment (table 6 2, box 6 1 question 23).
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Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses' Significant at 10%, " significant at 5%, "* significant at 1%
Source: Survey Dutch Direct Investment in CEEC and FSU. Maastricht University. 2000
The sector Industry is taken as the baseline sector.
Firms with less than 100 employees are small (model 5); firms with more than 101 employees are large (model 6).
The control variables included were a sector variable", age of the Dutch firm at the time if the FDI
decision" and size of the Dutch firm measured in number of employees at the time of the FDI
decision". The results of the logit analysis displayed in table 6.3."
Six different versions of the regression are included. The first model only includes control
variables. Models two, three and four include the dummy variables for personal influence. Models
five and six are equal to model four in terms of variables included, but the sample is divided in two
strata; small and large firms. The main conclusion is that personal influence has a positive significant
impact on the decision-making, meaning that firms that indicate personal factors play a role in the FDI
Six dummy variables were defined using one-digit SBI code, with Agriculture, including Agriculture (A). Fishery (B) and
Natural resources. Industry (D), Consfrucf/on (F), Transport (I), Trade (K) and Other including E (Electricity, Gas and Water), H
(Hotel, Restaurants), J (Financial institutions), L (Govemment/NGO). M (Education), N (Health), O (Environment), P (Private
households) and Q (Extraterritorial bodies). A table with more detailed SBI codes is included in Annex B.
^ All firms older than 100 years were included as being 100 years old.
As primary source the answers from the questionnaire were taken. I included the number of employees of 1989, 1994 or
1999, depending on which year closest preceded the year of the investment decision. Whenever data for that specific year
were missing, I used the number of employees from the later years as a proxy.
Firms can only be included in one dummy-groups. Thus, if for instance the dummy persona/ mof/vafröns equals one, the
variabels no ana/ys/s and soc/a/ nefworit and experience are zero. There is no difference between the unweighted and
weighted analysis in sign or significance of the variables The interpretation of the coefficients remained the same
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a higher chance of investing. In the basic model (model one) the only significant control factors were
the sectors /og/stfc and ofher and the age of the firm. Firms in the sectors logistic and other have a
higher odd to invest in the CEE region than firms in the sector industry. Age influences the investment
decision negatively; older firms are less likely to invest in an FDI in a transition country than younger
firms. Model two tests whether making a decision without investment analysis increases the chance a
firm invests in the CEE region. This is indeed true, since the coefficient of the variable no ana/ys/s is
positive and significant at a five percent level. Firms that did not make an investment decision based
on an analysis but on other motivations are more likely to invest in an FDI in the CEE region. The
coefficients of the persona/t variables, added in the model three, increases the explanatory power of
the model. The coefficient is positive and significant at a five percent level. Thus, having a social
network or a contact person significantly increases the chance the firm invests. This can be due to the
positive economic values attached to having a network, but the results can also be interpreted as the
positive effect of a having a network on the personal attitude of the decision-maker towards investing.
Model four, that includes the strictest dummy for personal motivations, increases the explanatory
power of the model even more. This dummy variable is positive and significant and the fit of the model
is higher than the fit of model one, two and three. This indicates that firms with a direct personal link to
a country are more likely to invest. Dividing the sample in two strata, small and large firms, shows that
the influence of the personal dummy variables is higher for small firms than for large firms, indicating
that personal involvement in the host country has more impact in small firms than in large firms.
Concluding, the analysis indicates that personal motivations indeed have a positive influence on the
investment decision. If personal motivations are present firms are more likely to invest in the CEE
region.
6.3 Bounded Rationality
Within the economic literature there are several models or theories that can add to explaining the
large impact of the personal variables in FDI decision-making. One example is the theory of bounded
rationality. Given rational choice, firms may not be utility (profit) maximizing and full information is
absent. Decision-making under uncertainty is difficult, since predicting the future is not easy and
humans face cognitive limitations. These critiques to neoclassical theory are largely accepted and the
theory is adjusted based on empirical evidence (Simon (1997))." The term bounded rationality is used
to "describe the complete range of limitations in human knowledge and human computation that
prevent economic actors in the real world from behaving in ways that approximate the predictions of
classical and neoclassical theory; including the absence of complete and consistent utility functions
for ordering all possible choices, inability to generate more than a small fraction of the possible
relevant alternatives, including the inability to assign consistent and realistic probabilities to uncertain
future events" (Simon (1955)). The solution that bounded rationality refers to is that firms do not
attempt to search for all investment possibilities but choose solution satisfying to all parties (Simon
(1997)).
Cognitive limitations can be a way to explain the large influence of personal motivations in
investment decisions. Given that decision-makers face cognitive limitations, they have to rely on other
sources of information, or decision factors, when making an investment decision. For FDI decisions it
" Simon (1997). Models of Bounded Rationality.
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means that human cognition is insufficient to make complicated expected utility calculations, as often
used in investment decision models. It is simply not possible to consider all FDI possibilities available
- which means considering all countries in the world as possible host countries. Thus, before even
considering an analysis several choices have to be made in order to limit the possible investment
alternatives, so as to keep the choice options within the boundaries of human cognition. This notion is
in line with the fact that 75 percent of the noninvestors did not make an analysis related to FDI in a
transition country. They excluded this region beforehand in order to limit the number of alternatives.
Explanations for the large influence of personal motivations, as mentioned in table 6.2, can be given
by nefworff frieories and experience or/ea/7?/ng frieories."
A/efwortc fneory is based on the idea that there is an economic value attached to the social network
you have. There is "a network if individuals are variably connected to one another as a function of
prior contact, exchange and attendant emotions" (Burt (2000)). The structure of relations among
people and organizations in a market, being strong or weak relationships, can affect or even replace
information. Replacement occurs when the information provision is so limited and unclear that people
rely completely on their networks when making decisions. In the survey, about 70 percent of the firms
had a contact person in the region and 10-20 percent of the firms indicated that the owner or other
related persons were of the host country nationality. One of the positive effects of having the
nationality of a country or having contact persons in a country is that there is a network in place in the
host country when starting the FDI. Having a network of contact persons, relatives and friends or
business relations in a country provides a firm with direct sources of information. These individuals
have expertise related to the host country and can advice the firm at relatively low cost. They
decrease the uncertainty attached to the investment decision and their presence leads to a higher
chance that a firm invests.
Experience ancf /eam/ng fheories provide another explanation of the significant presence of
personal motivations in section 6.2. Cognitive learning theories and social learning theories describe
the possible effects of experience (Martin (2001)). The basis of cognitive learning is that individuals
develop cognitive frameworks that allow them to interact more effectively in a certain environment.
Experience assists the individual in decision-making, determining behavioral options and choosing a
certain behavior. After evaluating the outcome, individuals can learn from their previous experience
again and use this new knowledge in the next decision they have to make. The evaluation, or
feedback from previous choices is essential in cognitive learning. Social and experiential learning
relates to the idea that within each environment people learn and experience different things and thus
automatically learn different things that are attached to that specific social setting. For example
children in the Netherlands learn Dutch cultural habits from their parents, but those are not useful
when used in, for instance, a country in the Middle East. The process of socialization can be seen as
a period of experience and placed in a different social setting people experience new things and learn
from these experiences. This idea is incorporated in the Kolb learning cycle (Martin (2001))."
Having experience with the host country directly or indirectly enables a firm to evaluate the
experiences and use this knowledge to make the current choices. For example, a person with the
The intention in this section is not to fully elaborate on these theories, but only to indicate that there are several economic
theories that can explain the presence of the personal motivations, among which the two mentioned here.
The Kolb learning cycle connects the following aspects:
Experience->Reflection-»Generalization-»Experimentation-»Experience etc.
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nationality of the host country or with friends, family or relatives in or from the host country has more
direct or indirect experience with the host country. He or she has experienced certain national or
cultural habits directly or learned about the cultures indirectly from others and is able to adjust to
those customs easier than someone who is completely unfamiliar with the national habits. Equally,
previous business experience in a country, or having a FDI in another country in the region provides a
firm with feedback on doing business that is useful for the current investment. Examples are
information on the procedural regulations, which enables a firm to deal with the appropriate
institutions and apply for the necessary documents quicker. In addition, the firm already has some
experience in the different social environment. Having this social experience not only implies that
there exists a social network a firm can rely on, but also the knowledge of the business culture is
greater. Lastly, language knowledge is mentioned as important factor in decision-making by about 20
percent of the firms (table 6.2). Speaking the language of the host country directly decreases the
costs of obtaining information, thereby decreasing uncertainty of doing business in a foreign country.
Local regulations, institutional processes and so on can be undertaken in the host country language,
leading to less costly information acquisition and less distortion of information content.
All information sources and experience the firm has regarding the host country, in the form of
networks, experience and knowledge eases the investment decision. Where human cognition fails to
understand and analyze all investment possibilities, these factors help the firm to make informed
decisions by relying on the network of people that can assist during the investment period and trusting
the knowledge obtained during previous experiences. The fact that the personal motivations are so
often mentioned by the firms is an indication that personal motivations can be considered a way to
deal with limited human cognition and assist the firm in selecting a satisficing solution using networks
and experience.
6.4 The role of emotions and intuition . - . ;
So far the economic explanations, rational and including the concept of bounded rationality, focus on
the FDI decision-making process. The decision and the decision rules are a central feature in these
theories. However, psychological literature suggests there are also psychological factors influencing
the decision-maker, as such influencing the choice to invest. The personal motivations mentioned in
section 6.2 that influence the investment decision are directly linked to the decision-maker instead of
the decision process or decision rules. Despite the fact that a good deal of the variance is still left
unexplained by the FDI-theories, such psychological aspects remain largely absent from the decision
models. In this section, two aspects of psychological decision-making influencing the decision-maker,
emotions and intuition, are introduced as possible sources of explanation for FDI decisions.
The fact that emotions and intuition have been largely absent in economic decision theory does not
mean that emotions and intuition are ignored entirely in modem developments in economic analysis.
Emotions are gaining importance and the discussion on inclusion of the concepts in economic theory
is becoming more regular (Allen et al. (1992)). How individuals behave, feel and make a judgment is
considered more and more a crucial determinant of choices (Kaufman (1999)). Evidently, in the
psychological literature theories on emotions are more popular (see e.g. Lewis and Haviland (1993),
Oatley and Jenkins (1998), Wollheim (1999)). The impact of intuition is less often discussed than
emotions, but is also gaining importance (Hogarth (2001)). In section 6.4.1 and 6.4.2 the concepts of
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emotion and intuition are defined and their influence on decision-makers is summarized based on the
current literature. Being an economist, I abstain from psychological discussions surrounding the two
concepts and settle for definitions that are commonly used and suitable for this chapter, without
entering the discussion of what to include or exclude for both terms. In section 6.4.3 the influence of
emotion and intuition is linked to decision-making by means of a utility model.
6.4. •/ Emof/on and economics
Within the literature there is no consensus on the definition of emotion; each researcher generally
defines a working definition of emotions. For this chapter a commonly used definition is adopted that
is suitable for the economic application and refrains from using psychological specifications."
Emotions are both psychological and physiological subjective experiences and include facial action,
central or peripheral nervous system activation, cognitive changes and behavioral action tendencies
(Frijda (1986))." Emotions are multifaceted processes that unfold over time. They are manifest in
multiple channels and the channels themselves are loosely coupled and interact in a complex way
(Venables (1986), Larsen and Fredrickson (1999)). Emotions cannot be directed or prevented. People
undergo emotions, without means of resisting them. People can avoid situations in which they know
they will face emotions (for example a person that is alcohol addicted can avoid going to bars), or they
can equip themselves with strategies to deal with the emotion (for instance angry people often use the
"golden rule" to count to ten before responding, instead of responding immediately), but they cannot
avoid emotions themselves.
There are two kinds of emotions, visceral and anticipated emotions. Visceral emotions are
immediate emotions that occur at the time of the decision, like anger or happiness. Anticipated
emotions occur after the decision is made, like for instance regret. Visceral emotions are thus more
important when making an investment decision.
In economics, the attempts to incorporate emotions in regular theory are limited, although more
apparent during the last decade. (Frank (1988), Elster (1998), Hanoch (2002)) Economists more often
use anticipated emotions, even though visceral emotions are basic to daily life and decision-making.
Emotions are often linked to consumer theories and test for instance to what extent consumers regret
their purchase. Visceral emotions play an essential role in human behavior, but face two main
complications. First, they often make people behave in ways that are not necessarily beneficial for
them. Second, people underestimate the effect of visceral factors on their own current and future
behavior (Loewenstein (2000))." J ,..
My starting point is that each individual has physiological and psychological reactions (body and mind). In this chapter the
focus is on the psychological influences. The psychological part can roughly be divided in two categories of processes: thinking
capacity and feeling capacity. Emotions and intuition largely affect the feelings of an individual As mentioned, emotions can
lead to physiological reactions as well, but those reactions do not influence investment decisions, whereas I argue that the
emotions leading to those reactions do (based on Keizer (1987)).
Emotions always have an intentional object, being a person or a state of affairs (envious of someone, sad because of
something) Emotional states are characterized by hormonal changes and change in the autonomic nervous system and have
characteristic observable expressions (for instance a smile). Emotions can be located on a pleasure-pain scale, including a
neutral point of emotional indifference (valence) and often lead to action tendencies (for instance anger and hurting someone,
tove and touching, shame and hiding) (Frijda (1986)).
Loewenstein (2000) mentions the example of road rage. When asked in advance, people recognize that it is not in their self-
interest to assault another dnver that they find irritating, but in real life emotions often lead to such assaults Kaufman (1999)
gives another example in his illustration of a homosexual man being infected with the HIV virus due to having engaged in
unsafe sex. The man admitted it was not in his self-interest to practice unsafe sex, but driven by the emotion of happiness and
love this knowledge became less important. Especially in this last example the short-term emotions driving a decision lead to
very important consequences.
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Specific applications of emotions in economics are found in game theory (Bosman and van Winden
(2002), Dufwenberg (2002), Selten (1998)) and consumer behavior (Allen et al. (1992), van Dolen et
al. (2001), Aaker and Willems (1998)). In other fields, research is done to see to what extent emotions
are linked to decisions. Examples are the studies that link happiness and the position in the labor
market (Clark and Oswald (1994), Blanchflower and Oswald (1992)(1998), Oswald (1997)) and the
analyses that explore the relation between emotions, culture and economic performance (Casson
(1993), Altman (2001), Gutter et al. (1999)) and social cognition (Stajkovic et al (1998)). The
conclusion of almost all of these publications is that emotions are an important significant factor in
decision-making.
Inclusion of emotions in economic models or frameworks is rare. Based on the literature I reviewed,
the only models integrating emotions and economics use utility theory, measuring emotions as costs
and benefits (Loewenstein (2000), Elster (1998), Frank (1988)). Loewenstein highlights the fact that
people highly value their current emotions and underestimate future emotions when maximizing utility
today. He uses utility functions, including consumption and emotional states, to show the difference
between what people should be maximizing versus what they are maximizing due to emotions.
Translated to a firm's investment decisions, his argument is that at the moment of their investment
decision entrepreneurs behave largely under the influence of their emotion on that specific day and
underestimate the impact of the future. With respect to decisions under uncertainty, Loewenstein
argues that peoples cognitive evaluation of risks often diverge from the emotional reaction to those
risks. In other words, a positive country risk rating in an economic analysis does not imply the
entrepreneur also personally considers the country equally risky." Elster (1998) states emotions can
be seen as psychic costs or benefits that enter a utility function. Here valence becomes important.
Valence implies that emotions can be measured on a scale from low to high. Elster uses an example
of Becker's analysis to illustrate the economic integration of emotions. Meeting a beggar induces guilt
of being wealthy, which can be considered an (indirect) cost. In addition, you may give money to the
beggar to get rid of the bad feeling, which is a direct cost. Thus, emotion itself can be cost (or benefit),
or the emotion can lead to a cost (or benefit). The larger the emotion is, the higher the costs or
benefits will be in economic terms. Frank (1988) also translates emotions in cost and benefit
terminology. Examples are the costs and benefits of marriage, or the costs and benefits of cheating in
cooperative ventures. In his appendix he derives a formal version of the commitment model, including
payoff functions of honest and dishonest persons engaging in joint ventures, also taking costs of
scrutiny into account.
None of these economic applications combines both economic motivations for decisions with
emotions. They only describe the influence of emotions and indicate how to include them in
economics terms, thereby losing any interaction effects between economics and emotions. Kaufman
(1999) and Hanoch (2002) integrate emotions and economics; their research is built upon section 4.3.
6.4.2 /nfu/f/on and econom/cs
Intuition is defined as thoughts that are reached with little apparent effort and typically without
It is commonly known that, even though rationally risks remain constant, it feels as if risks become higher when they come
closer. For example, a war is more threatening if it is between your neighboring countries instead of at the other side of the
world Equally, a country can have consistent medium risk ratings, but may feel more risky if you have to live there with your
family. Or. a bungee jump today is considered scarier than a bungee jump next year, even though the risks remain equal.
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conscious awareness. They involve little or no conscious deliberation. Intuition can be backward
based (based on interpreting past experiences) or forward based (predictions based on beliefs of
what may happen). Intuition is often immediate, includes a feeling of certainty and may be based on
inadequate information (Hogarth (2001)).
All people have intuition and all people process information differently. Often the choices we make
are based on intuition and occur automatically. There are two systems of acquiring intuition, tacit and
deliberate. Intuition is formed tacitly, without effort" and deliberately by learning. People learn from
experience, both their own experience and experience of others (what other people tell them) and
form intuition based on this experience. For example, a hairdresser intuitively cuts someone's hair
straight, but does not know how to shut down a computer, whereas a researcher daily working with
computers intuitively shuts down his computer at the end of the day. Intuition does not have to be
correct; intuition can lead to automatic action that is suboptimal. For instance prejudices can be the
motivation for intuitive decisions that lead people to make suboptimal decisions. People are unable to
suppress intuition as automatic thoughts, but it is possible to use deliberate learning in order to avoid
acting upon tacit prejudices."
Intuition is continually used to make decisions. Primitive choices made subconsciously are in
general good choices." For sophisticated choices, intuition may not be the best guideline. For
sophisticated choices intuition might be better used as a weak signal and models or rules established
based on human rational could be more successful choice guidelines (Hogarth (2001)).
Intuition is seldom integrated in investment decision-making literature. One research in consumer
literature argues that intuition can be used to compensate for missing product information when
making a decision (Broniarczyk and Alba (1994)). A second application including intuition relates to
company performance. The argument is that companies can perform better if they use the intuition of
experienced managers. Integrating analysis and intuition of managers leads to a better balance
between rational activities and use of experience in the form of intuition (Harvey and Novicevic (2002),
McGinnis(1984)).
6.4.3 Ro/e of emotons and /nfu/'ton ;n dec/s/on-mafc/ng
Even though it is generally accepted that emotions and intuition influence decision-making processes
of individuals, their inclusion in economic theory, without losing the values of emotions and intuition, is
not simple. Standard economic theory on FDI decision processes under uncertainty requires rational
agents reviewing options and their probabilities. They should estimate the Net Present Value as the
main indicator for future success and finally base (non-) investment decisions on the ranking of the
options according to that indicator and the related probabilities. The functionality of the theoretical
framework depends crucially on two basic assumptions related to the decision-making and decision-
maker, namely "given tastes and preferences" and "perfect information". The outcomes of the
economic decision-making model are of course a simplification of reality, but lead to interesting
^ Exponentially, for example avoiding bumping into someone while walking on the street by stepping aside.
Assume an employer with the prejudice that men work harder than women has a vacancy. There are two applicants, a male
and a female. On paper the female applicant is the better one. If he intuitively follows this prejudice when hiring employees and
he has to choose between a man and women, he hires the male worker even if that man is less qualified than the female
applicant.
Such as not crossing the street if a car passes, without deliberately thinking about the costs and benefits of not crossing now,
but later.
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conclusions. However, those conclusions are only realized when the simplifying assumptions are
considered to hold. The incorporation of intuition and emotions into this particular part of theory on the
one hand indicates that these assumptions do not always hold, but on the other hand can be
interpreted as safeguards of the theory, as is argued below.
Stability in tastes and preferences is an important prerequisite for rational choice models to work.
What is important is that decision-makers know their tastes and preferences and once identified,
adhere to the same preference ordering. The concept of a utility curve is based on this stability.
Known and stable utility curves are a necessity for being able to estimate the outcome of decisions.
The model becomes completely volatile and unpredictable if investors for example at one moment
prefer higher revenues above higher total profit in one particular country, but prefer the opposite the
next moment or in another country. This is a strong assumption. It not only requires that all the
decision-makers know their preferences (it is a cognitive framework) but also that they do not change
them. Emotions and intuition do not come into play. The assumption of perfect information is equally
strong, complex and encompassing. It requires that all the information on all relevant characteristics of
the goods is available to all market parties (all consumers and all producers) and it also requires that
perfect information holds even for future markets. The assumption of perfect information seems to be
very restrictive and it is hard to understand how any market can ever comply with these conditions.
The introduction of emotions and intuition will not help us a lot in this context; they complicate the
analysis further by introducing noncognitive elements into the decision-making process and further
blur the assumption of perfect information.
The concept of bounded rationality already recognizes these points of critique and argues that due
to cognitive limitations people settle for a suboptimal satisficing solution. Kaufman (1999) builds on
this concept and introduces emotions as an additional source of bounded rationality, besides
cognition. He argues that, even though the emotional process is largely explainable in rational terms,
the behavior caused by emotional states can be irrational. Insufficient or excessive emotions cause
suboptimal decisions or performance. With too little emotional intensity people suffer from insufficient
physical and mental arousal to perform optimally, while too much emotion causes a person to be so
aroused that thinking and physical self control become disorganized and this deteriorates
performance as well. Kaufman uses the Yerkes-Dodson law to explain the impact of emotional
bounded rationality. This is visualized in figure 6.1. On the horizontal axis, the level of emotional
arousal is placed on a scale from low to high, with as optimal emotional level A2. The vertical axis
measures performance (or utility). The bell-shaped curve is the Yerkes-Dodson curve, showing the
effect of emotions on performance. If there would be a pure rational world, the optimal performance is
at the level of P^x- However, due to cognitive limitations there is bounded rationality leading to a
satisficing sub-optimal performance of P2. Kaufman argues that this level of performance is only
achieved if emotional arousal is optimal, at level A2. If emotions are too weak (for instance at A1), or
too strong (A3), they further deteriorate performance to a level of P1. The decrease of performance
from the optimal level Pmax to P2 is caused by cognitive bounded rationality and the decrease from P2
to P1 by emotional bounded rationality.
Applying Kaufman's theory to decision-making, the absence of emotions leads to worse choices
than in the presence of a limited degree of emotions, as long as they do not become excessive.
However, in Kaufman's approach, emotions can never improve decision-making.
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They not only lead to weaker performance compared to neoclassical economic solutions, but also
to deterioration compared to the bounded rationality solution. Or, as Kaufman states, they add a
source of bounded rationality, extending the effect of bounded rationality due to cognitive limitations
with additional emotional distortions.
Following Hanoch's line of reasoning (2002), I would like to turn the argument around and argue
that allowing emotions and intuition to play a role in the decision-making process rescues the rational
choice model in a certain way. The basic argument is that, even without emotions and intuition, one
cannot believe in the assumptions of stable preferences and perfect information. Decision-makers
need a device to deal with instability in preferences and imperfect information. This device is the
recognition that emotions and intuition exist and are allowed to enter the decision-making process
(the cognitive acceptance of emotions and intuition). Hanoch (2002) elaborates the stable taste
argument in detail. His main point is that emotions (and I add intuition) can function as a tool to
prioritize tastes and preferences. Time, or attention, is a scarce resource and people simply cannot
analyze all preference decisions. Given that in reality preferences are not stable, but fluctuate per
situation and over time, adjustments in priorities are constantly made. This can be done in a slow,
analytical manner, but also quickly, based on emotions and intuition. Hanoch argues that these quick
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decisions are not necessarily the best solutions, even though sometimes they are, but they are
satisficing solutions. An example he mentions is an individual walking through the woods with the aim
of picking blueberries. At some point the individual encounters a snake and jumps back. At that point
the priorities shifted; instead of picking blueberries, survival became priority number one. The
individual did not analytically calculate the costs if jumping back, the probabilities of being bitten and
the revenues of having blueberries, but intuitively decided to jump back - the optimal solution.
«•. A second argument Hanoch makes is that individuals are not "cold calculating machines" and
feelings or intuition directly affect and change priorities. Last, he argues that people do not have the
cognitive ability to calculate future probabilities (calculating what will happen), but instead they
imagine what may happen. In this imagination, emotions and intuition can play large roles.
With respect to the lack of perfect information, Hanoch argues that intuition can serve as a tool for
making decisions. I will extend this argument for FDI decisions. Foreign Direct Investment decisions
are based on a process that can be subdivided into different phases. For convenience purposes I
distinguish five phases: ...- \
1. Start searching for investment opportunities. v ^ !
2. Select information to consider. >„
3. Interpret the information collected. •.
4. Stop searching.
5. Evaluate the options and decide.
In each of the phases perfect information is a near impossibility: it requires that all investment
opportunities are considered before making a decision, only at any given moment but also at any
given moment in the future. It also requires that all the relevant information is available and collected,
interpreted and evaluated by an investor. This requirement is unrealistic. No investor is able to review
all investment opportunities, including future ones, before making a decision. Nor is an investor able
to grasp the complexity of all the information that becomes available and evaluate it in an internally
consistent way. All investors need a device to limit the options and to allow them to make a decision
based on less than perfect information. This device can be the use of emotions and intuition. They
become a functional tool in actually making decisions by helping the investor limit the review and
decision process. Emotions and intuition may trigger a search in some circumstances and withhold
investors from searching in others, limiting the alternatives that an investor considers. Emotions may
help the investor to interpret the (imperfect) information and, finally, emotions may assist the investor
in deciding when to stop searching or evaluating. Interpreted in this particular way, it is not surprising
that emotions and intuition have been observed to play a crucial role in investment decisions. They do
not replace calculations or rational considerations; they make them possible by limiting the costs.
Emotions, like goals, norms, values and instincts, include factors that cannot be captured by
economic arguments. These factors are different for each individual. Intuition is also formed
individually and based on experience. The degree people rely on their intuition varies. As a result,
emotion and intuition influence decision-makers differently, thus different individuals respond to a
specific economic problem in a particular way.
In the fifth section of this paper I therefore try to model a decision-making framework that includes
both business-economic decision-making rules and the impact of emotions and intuition on decision-
making.
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6.5 A decision-making model including emotions •- ••-"*
Emotions and intuition can be included in an economic choice model in different ways. The two
extreme variations are either not to include emotions and intuition at all in the decision-making and
only use economic arguments (slow, analytical decisions), or to base a decision only on emotions or
intuition and exclude any economic arguments (quick, intuitive or emotional decision). Combinations
in decision-making, which use both aspects, are most likely. The decision-maker then takes
economic, emotional and intuitional aspects of a decision into account and together they determine
the outcome of the decision. A less direct way for emotions and intuition to be involved in decision-
making is by influencing all other variables determining the final decision. Limiting the number of
variables and estimating a value of economic indicators used in a calculation is not a uniformly
decided process for all decision-makers. Different variables will be selected by different individuals
and interpreted differently. Emotions and intuition can be used as a tool to deal with imperfect
information in order to limit the information and also influence interpretation of the variables, for
instance through imagination. An example is valuation of an indicator that is nominally equal for all
decision-makers, like the GDP of a country. The valuation and interpretation varies per decision-
maker and depends very much on the emotion and intuition of the decision-maker. What one person
considers a sufficiently high GDP can be an insufficiently low GDP for another decision-maker.
It is impossible to say if emotional or intuitive decisions lead to more successful decisions than a
decision following only economic arguments. Research on intuition shows that in general intuitive
decisions are less consistent and overall less successful than decisions based on predetermined
rules (Hogarth (2001)). Still, the main question is if the two can even be considered separately.
Emotions or intuition influence decision-making and empirical research almost always points out that
emotions and intuition are influential and significant. It is thus hard to explain that emotional or
intuitive behavior has been excluded from direct decision-making models so far and empirically the
impact of emotional factors on direct investment decisions has not been tested. The results described
in section 6.2 are consistent with the idea that emotions and intuition influence FDI decisions. The
results are no hard evidence of a direct influence, but they do validate the assumption that inclusion of
an emotional or intuitional component in the decision-making model would be realistic.
In this section a decision-making model is described that includes both economic and emotional
influences. Intuition is mainly influential at the time of the actual decision and less included as utility
increasing or decreasing factor. It does however influence a lot whether a decision will be quick
intuitive or slow analytic and functions as a selection mechanism for information. The principle of a
utility maximization model is followed, in which individuals are considered rational in the economic
sense, meaning they are utility maximizing. I realize the inconsistency in using a rational neoclassical
model, which is based on the assumption that I earlier called unrealistic. However, in section 6.4.3 I
argued exactly that emotions and intuition are the tools to make models work, given the fact that the
assumptions are not realistic. . ,. . . .
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Figure 6.2: Utility function Net Present Value
U(NPV) „ ,-,„,„^
Emotions and intuition inherently influence the valuation of NPV, given the fact that they are used
to select investment alternatives and information sources and help value indicators and make future
prognoses or imaginations. The utility based on the expected net present value is shown in figure 6.2.
The utility is positive (negative respectively) when the E(7VPV) is positive (negative). The marginal
utility curve of E(NPV) is always positive, increasing when the EfA/PVJ is negative, highest when
£(NPV) = 0 and afterwards declining towards zero.
The factors determining the utility of the decision-maker are less clear.™ Imagine an entrepreneur
that considers investing in Poland. The "business part" of the decision (the profit expectations) is
already incorporated in the utility of the firm. The "personal preferences" of the businessman are
included in the utility of the decision-maker. Here emotions are very important. If the entrepreneur
wants to go to Poland, enjoys living abroad and believes he will be successful, he will have a high
positive utility. This utility is higher than his personal utility of not investing. If, on the other hand, the
* In the case of more decision-makers, the sum of their personal utility can be included here.
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businessman has a family that does not want to join him to Poland, he may have very sad feelings
when he considers investing and his personal utility of not investing is higher. While intuitively clear,
the most important problem is how to measure these personal preferences." How do you specify
emotions and their intensity (see for instance Larsen and Fredrickson (1999), Van Dolen et al. (2001),
Blarney (1998), Bosman and van Winden (2002))? In general, each study selects a number of
emotions, which are specifically related to their research. Emotional variables that could be included
in the investment decision-making function are variables related to Emof/ona/ /nte///'gence (instinct,
intuition), Emofona/ /nvo/vemenf (interest, love, hate), Se/f-Efficacy (confidence and trust), /nd/V/dua/
Experience and /nd/wdua/ Re/af/ons (trust, comfort, familiarity, safety). However, how to measure
those factors and how to transform them to interpretable variables is a difficult issue.
In order to make the utility of the decision-maker comparable to the utility of the expected NPV the
inputs in the utility function of the decision-maker, here called emotions fe), need to be translated into
money value. By dividing the utility of the emotions over the marginal utility of money (M)", an
Emotional Coefficient (EC) displays the additional revenue in money terms a decision-maker gets due
to emotions (see equation two).
(2) EC = U(e)/U'(M) • - '
The utility of emotions ffEC) is depicted in figure 6.3a,b and c. Figure 6.3a describes the size of
emotions when taking the size of a firm into account. The larger a firm is, the smaller is the influence
of emotions is on the decision-making. A small firm has only one decision-maker that is personally
affected by the decision. The emotions of the decision-maker weight more heavily during the decision-
making process than if a decision is taken by a large multinational corporation, following a standard
investment process (see figure 6.3a). This is also confirmed by the results of model five and six in
table 6.3. The same downward slope exists for the utility of money. Smaller firms have less money
available, they have a larger utility of money than larger firms. Thus, the marginal utility of money
declines as firms increase in size, but remains positive (see figure 6.3b).
The argument of emotional influence can also be applied to for instance people from the former Dutch colonies or immigrants
in the Netherlands. While living in the Netherlands now. they will have a clear emotional link with their home country and thus
investments in their home country are (emotionally) more interesting to them than investments in any other country.
The model follows the discrimination theory of Becker, 1971
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Combining emotions and the marginal utility of money in the utility function of emotions, U(EQ),
these two effects level out for small and large firms. Small firms have a higher level of e, but also a
higher level of U'(MJ and large firms have lower influence by emotions, but also a lower marginal utility
of money. Therefore the utility function of emotions increases with positive emotions, but with
diminishing returns.-"' Including these specifications in equation one gives
(3) U(FDI) = U(E(NPV) + U(EC).
The additive utility function (equation one) adds the utility functions of the EfA/PV) (figure 6.2) and
the emotional coefficient (figure 6.3c). A firm only invests if either both utilities are positive, or if one of
the two factors dominates positively.
The theory coincides with the literature described in section 6.4.3. If an investment decision is made
following the rational, slow approach, the decision is based only on the utility obtained from the
economic calculations. In this model that means that U(E(7VPV,),) is the sole factor in decision-making
and UfECJ is not considered. If, on the other hand, the quick, emotional approach is taken, 1/fEQ) is
the sole factor of decision-making and economic calculations are not valued. The same is true if
intuition is the main choice determinant; in that case the intuitive judgment overrules or heavily
influences the interpretation of both utility functions. More likely is the scenario that economic
calculations and emotional influence jointly determine decision-making. If UfEfA/Pvy.) and U(£Q) are
either both positive or both negative, the decision to invest is not difficult. If l/fECA/Pl/) and 1/fEQ) are
of contradictory signs, the decision will be more uncertain.*
Interactions between the two utility factors are also possible. If the utility from emotions L/(£C,) is
strongly positive, these strong positive emotions can positively influence the business-economic
perspective of the market as well. Equally, a high expected NPV can give the decision-maker happy
or exciting feelings. To include interaction effects in the model, an interaction effect containing
U(E(A/PV;*EC; can be added to the model.
Applying this model to explain the survey results adds to the understanding of certain FDI
decisions. In section 6.2.1 four examples were mentioned of investments that were hard to explain
using rational economic theory. I argued that all four examples were to some extent driven by
emotions and intuition. The first two examples, an entrepreneur that invested in Budapest after
spending his study time there and a Dutch entrepreneur with Bulgarian nationality who invested in
Bulgaria, clearly exhibit a degree of the personal involvement with the country of their choice. Their
utility of the decision-maker was most likely higher for the country they invested in than for any other
transition country. As long as their E(NPV) exceeded zero, they did not even consider another
investment alternative, because of their personal preferences. Similarly, the third entrepreneur was
invited by a Moldovan contact person to engage in a joint venture with his firm in Moldova. This
contact person provided the Dutch entrepreneur a stable investment environment, an already present
The difference between for instance slightly negative, neutral (0) and slightly positive emotions on utility is larger than the
difference between positive and very positive emotions Therefore the marginal utility is positive but small at very negative and
very positive levels of EC.
An example of an investment decision is a manager of a small company that considers investing in Hungary, including the
fact that the manager has to move to Hungary. If he expects Hungary to be a profitable market (U(NPV>0) and also
experiences positive emotions with respect to Hungary. (U(EC)>0). he will definitely invest in the country However, if the
business-economic calculations are positive (U(NPV)>0) but the manager is totally against living in Hungary (U(EC)-» -x). he
will decide not to invest
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network and directly available knowledge of the country. Again, if the Dutch entrepreneur felt positive
about this investment and if the E(NPV) of the investment exceeded zero, there was no reason for the
Dutch firm to consider alternative investments in the region. Even though alternatives could be more
profitable, relying on the contact person and valuing the benefits this person bring in terms of more
security lead to high personal preference of the entrepreneur, high enough on which to base the
investment decision. The last example mentioned was the altruistic Dutch firm investing in Romania.
The firm invested in the Romanian counterpart up to the point the Romanian firm was profitable. Once
that happened, the Dutch firm sold its shares to the Romanian partner and started a new enterprise in
Romania. Reasons to engage in such kind of investments are purely development-oriented, in order
to assist a country in development. Profit was no motivation, but the personal utility of the decision-
maker was higher than the negative utility derived from only loss making or at best break-even
investments. These examples show that relying on emotions and intuition can make analysis
obsolete. Indeed, 59 percent of the firms in the survey did not make an analysis and made a quick
emotional decision to invest. In addition, the personal motivations increase the chance that a firm
invests, since these personal motivations add to a positive utility of the decision-maker. ,., . ; >
6.6 Difficulties of modeling emotions and intuition and including emotions and
intuition in empirical research • - .i .::. .<;:••• ' ••>.:.;!;•,.•• .•••.• ••••••.••. :.*-
6.6.7. OeA/n/ng emotons and /'nfu/f/ön
In psychology literature there are several basic handbooks covering all aspects of emotions. Emotions
alone already have more than 90 different definitions (Larsen (1999)). There is no full agreement
among researchers on how to define emotions or intuition. As a result, in empirical research emotions
are often introduced with a research specific working definition. According to Larsen and Fredrickson
(1999) this approach is recommended since it limits possible misinterpretation of the results and
makes choosing between the different kinds of emotions and emotion measures easier. , .. .-<.•
With respect to intuition also different definitions are used, but there are less different kinds of
intuition than there are kinds of emotion, making the problem less complicated (the most common
deviations are tacit or deliberate intuition and backward or forward based intuition, Hogarth (2001)).
Defining a working definition specific for each research, after which the measures of emotion are
selected, prevents the risk of getting stuck in the discussion on the appropriateness of the definition.
However, it makes comparison among research harder since different starting points are used. The
creation of a commonly used framework including different kinds of emotions and intuition, measures
of emotions and intuition and the advantages and disadvantages of specific measurements of
emotions would be a useful tool for empirical research.
Including emotions and intuition in FDI decision-making model also raises the question how tastes
and preferences deviate from emotions and intuition. Do emotions and intuition only influence the
tastes and preferences or do they influence decision-making given the tastes and preferences. If a
person is happier in a certain scenario, is that an emotion, or does he or she adjust his preferences
towards that scenario? Are emotions short run and tastes and preferences long run? Further research
is needed. . .
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6.6.2 Measuring emofons and /nfi/if/on
Emotions can be measured; they have a valence scale. Someone can be not angry, a little angry or
very angry. However, there are several measurement issues that need to be taken into account,
specifically with respect to reliability, timing, context and validity. Measuring emotions is mainly
subjective, only an individual himself can be fully aware of his or her own emotions. A little angry for
individual one can be very angry for individual two. There is no reliability check of the "true emotions"
of an individual. In addition, emotions take time. Sometimes emotions occur at once; sometimes they
are part of a gradual process. The scale of emotions depends on timing. It is for instance likely that an
individual is very angry at time of an accident, but as time passes the anger decreases. In addition,
people underestimate the effect of visceral factors on their own current and future behavior and when
asked before a certain event, emotions are underestimated or even misdirected, as are their effects.
(Loewenstein (2000)).
Emotions also vary distinctively depending on the context. Imagine two firms considering investing
in Slovenia, one of the most stable transition countries. Firm one only considered investing in more
stable EU countries, whereas firm two until now focused on an FDI in the less stable countries of
Africa. Given this context, firm one finds Slovenia a risky country, whereas firm two finds it a very
stable FDI alternative, even though in fact the risk rate of Slovenia is equal for both firms.
The last difficulty with measuring emotions is validity. Given that emotion is such a broad term,
which includes many aspects, it is hard to give evidence on the role of emotions. Emotions can be
linked to many other variables and interactions, making it hard to prove the impact of emotions. For a
detailed overview of these measurement issues, see Larsen and Fredrickson (1999). ' ""^ •'" ~
Measuring emotions can be done through self-reports (subjective, each individual determines the
kind and size of emotion using single or multiple-item measures), by observers or through measuring
the more physiological signs such as for instance facial expressions, brain actions, or vocal
measures. With respect to FDI decisions, emotions are less clearly visible since they are based on
longer-term feelings. As a result, those emotions are probably best captured by subjective self-
reports, by means of surveys or interviews, which raise the problems of reliability and context.
Intuition is, like emotion, present in every individual. Some intuition is innate, some is learned.
Some people rely more on their intuition than others, but all individuals have intuition. Intuition cannot
be scaled from little intuitive to very intuitive. It is possible, though, to make a distinction between
choices based on analysis and choices based on intuition. Using self-report methods, it is possible to
indicate to what extent people rely on their intuition. Of course, similar measurement problems occur
as described for emotions. „ - „ ••,,...-. -.. -_
6.6.3 Mode//ng emof/ons and /nfu/f/on ^•'* ^>"-««^*ft •:-•* A -^-« >--• ••- - • - ••••••
Even though a substantial amount of research exists on emotions and intuition, their inclusion in FDI
decision-making models is rare. In individual decision-making inclusion is more common, but since a
firm's decision is less personal and (often) includes several decision-makers it is not possible to
simply adopt one of those approaches without changes. The main motivation to opt for the subjective
utility model was the simplicity of the model. An additive utility function allows highlighting the fact that
emotions and intuition can be included in decision-making formulas and influence the decision at
several levels. Most dominant is of course the separate utility function for the decision-maker,Chapter 6 Integrating emotions and intuition in FDI decision-making t...,:- ' • -• • :• -.*•••. •• , ••»•-•a
including the personal utility the decision-maker gets from the choice. As the explanation already
mentions, this factor is translated into money terms, taking into account the size of the firm. It can also
incorporate the sum of utility of several decision-makers. There is also an indirect influence of
emotions and intuition, such as the interpretation of the variables included in NPV calculation. Equally,
the variables included in the firm's utility function also influence the decision-makers utility.
Including emotions and intuition do not necessarily lead to suboptimal decisions. First, because of
the utility gained by decision-maker, the total utility of an investment possibility can exceed the
alternative option with a higher NPV but lower utility of the decision-maker. Personal preferences can
weigh heavier than profit motivations. Second, emotion and intuition can be a good tool in decision-
making. Analytical decisions take time and given the cognitive limitation of humans, emotions and
intuition can be the factors making it possible for individuals to make a decision, whereas they
otherwise waited to invest.
Having said that, the model is just a first attempt. It can be easily criticized, but as Loewenstein
(2001) mentions "no one theory is correct. Decision-makers utilize multiple modes of decision-making,
such as decisions based on reasons, affect, cost-benefit calculations and so on". However, there is no
guideline on how to model these different decision modes. Therefore I give three suggestions of
different approaches of the model, or how to incorporate emotions and intuition differently.
First, within the choice of a subjective utility model, different alternatives to include emotions and
intuition are possible. In section 6.5 I chose for a utility function for both the decision and the decision-
maker. A second format is to include emotions and intuition as costs or benefits in the decision utility
function. Besides expected revenues and expected costs of the FDI, the costs and benefits of
emotions are also discounted in the final decision." Another possibility is to include emotions and
intuition as multiplicative factor. If the emotional or intuitional choice is to invest, the decision variables
are interpreted more positively by the decision-maker than if the emotional or intuitional choice would
be not to invest. A last example of including emotions and intuition in the utility function is through
proxy variables. Variables like salary, housing conditions or the quality of education system can be
included as happiness indicators. If in country one those conditions are much better than in country
two, the investor probably is happier in country one than in country two and the value of this
happiness can be incorporated into the decision model. *-
An alternative model for the subjective utility model used in section 6.5 is the prospect theory. First
formulated by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), it is an alternative method of explaining individual
choices under risk. It explains effects found by individuals in decision-making in three specific areas
that the utility theory does not incorporate, called the certainty effect, isolation effect and reflection
effect. The certainty effect means that people are risk averse. They undervalue probable outcomes in
comparison to certain outcomes. With respect to FDI decisions, this risk aversion can be an
explanation as to why firms invest more often in low risk countries, even if the expected NPV of a
high-risk country is higher." The isolation effect stands for the idea that, if given two alternatives,
people consider only different aspects of the alternatives in their decision and ignore the components
that are common to both alternatives. The reflection effect stipulates that choices between negative
" Examples could be the costs of plane tickets paid for your children because of guilt from taking them away from their current
living environment, like school, clubs and friends.
" For example a certain NPV of an FDI in Hungary of 100 would be preferred to an FDI in Russia with 50% probability of an
NPV of 300 and 50% NPV of 0
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proposals are equal to similar choice of positive proposals. In order to incorporate those effects in the
model, prospect theory models decisions based on values given by individuals to gains or losses
compared to a reference point." In addition, prospect theory uses decision weights in comparison to
probabilities in order to take risk aversion into account (Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Edwards
(1996)"). Given that individuals make FDI decisions, it seems reasonable that prospect theory not
only better explains individual decision-making, but also firm decision-making. However, this new
insight does not change the content of the message in this chapter, which explains that emotions and
intuition could add to understanding FDI decisions and should be explicitly included in a decision-
making theory. Even if the shift from utility to prospect theory were made, the question remains as to
how to include emotions and intuition in this theory. ..-,•-;••• — :•
6.7 Conclusion
Emotions and intuition are still largely absent in economic theory, though the inclusion of emotions
and intuition in, for example, game theory or consumer behavior theory is becoming more current.
However, in decision-making theories emotions have not yet been included. This is surprising, given
the fact that studies on emotions indicate that they do influence decisions and that in addition they
can be considered a tool to ease difficult decision-making problems.
Several results of the survey to Dutch investment decisions indicate that personal preferences can
be very influential and important in FDI decisions.
In section 6.3 the results of the personal influence in decision-making are explained using the
concept of bounded rationality. Given that humans face cognitive limitations and that affects their
behavior, they may rely on other decision tools, such as experience or social networks. In section 6.4
an alternative explanation is offered, arguing that emotions and intuition influence investment
decisions. They not only directly influence the decision-making process by dealing with uncertainty
and incomplete information, but they also have a large impact on the decision-maker. The problem of
including emotions and intuition in economic theory lies in the fact that they are an element that
contradicts neoclassical rational behavior. In section 6.4.3 I argue that instead of causing a problem
for the neoclassical assumptions, they can also be considered a solution, given the strict assumptions
of stable tastes and preferences and perfect information are unlikely to hold anyway. Emotions and
intuition can be a tool to deal with unstable tastes and preferences by means of quick prioritizing, as
well as a tool to limit information search.
In section 6.5 a microeconomic model, based on utility maximization, is developed that includes the
utility of a firm as well as the utility of a decision-maker. As such it includes both economic decision-
making variables and an emotional coefficient.
This research was just a first attempt to include emotions in decision-making theory. The theoretical
part only included a first step to incorporate emotions in FDI decisions, keeping the model rather
limited. The empirical results should also be treated with care, given the fact that the measurement of
emotions is a complicated issue and the results can be interpreted and explained in various ways.
Losing ten euros is considered much worse if your wealth is only ten euros than if your wealth is 10 000 euros Therefore,
prospect theory takes the change in wealth into account (ten euros), as well as the reference point (ten or 10.000 euros),
whereas utility theory only considers total wealth.
Edwards (1996) gives an excellent literature review of the prospect theory, including explanation of the theory and an
overview of empirical work supporting and rejecting prospect theory.
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However, the results allow us to say that emotions and intuition are of importance in decision-making.
Future research is needed in both the theoretical embedment in economic theory and empirical
tests to the influence of emotions. Such research may shed more light on the added value of the
inclusion of emotions and intuition in economic decision-making models, which again may lead to





After the start of transition in 1989, the countries in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia
liberalized their markets for goods, services and investments. Foreign trade and foreign investments
were now freely allowed, thus imports, exports and foreign direct investment flows (FDI) have
increased steadily since then. It is generally accepted that the impact of FDI is positive for the
receiving country, since it not only provides capital but also knowledge in the form of human capital
and technology, and employment possibilities. Therefore, almost all transition countries not only
quickly changed their legal frameworks in order to allow FDI but also often established institutions with
the purpose of facilitating FDI.
FDI is spread unevenly over the transition countries. More developed transition countries, such as
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, have received a large share of the total flows to the region,
whereas the FDI invested in the Central Asian countries can be considered minimal.
Most Dutch firms with an FDI in a transition country also invested in the Central European
countries, that are economically and politically most developed and geographically and culturally
closest to the Netherlands. It is interesting to study this development, since it is questionable if the
best investment possibilities are indeed in those Central European countries instead of in other
geographically more distant and economically less developed transition countries. Those countries
have a more risky investment climate, but the advantages such as the presence of natural resources
or the absence of competition could outweigh the disadvantage of a higher investment risk.
This dissertation focused on all aspects of an FDI decision to an uncertain region such as Central
and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The purpose was to obtain a better idea of the complete
investment decision process of Dutch firms investing abroad. The research questions were i) Which
firm characteristics increase the chance a firm invests, ii) What does the investment decision process
of firms look like and is it different for investors and noninvestors?, iii) Which country determinants
attract Dutch investments to transition countries? and iv) How does personal influence relate to direct
investment decisions?
Those questions were answered using firm level data obtained by a survey among Dutch
enterprises and Dutch macroeconomic FDI data. Section 7.2 contains a summary of the chapters. In
section 7.3 some practical advice based on the results of this study is discussed. This advice is not
only directed to the Dutch enterprises making an investment decision, but also to Dutch and foreign
institutions advising those firms as well as to foreign countries trying to attract FDI.
7.2 Summary - ; •,.-.•?^-•,.•--.-
The dissertation can be divided in three parts. Part one, chapter two, three and four, provide a
microlevel analysis. Chapter two gives an overview of the real option theory used in this dissertation.
Chapters three and four tests whether the predictions from the option theory described in chapter two
are realistic for Dutch firms. Chapter three focuses on the firm characteristics explaining and
influencing FDI flows. Chapter four elaborates on the investment decision process of firms and links
the investment decision process to the actual investment decision. In part two (chapter five) the
influence of macrolevel country determinants on FDI is studied. In part three (chapter six) the role of
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emotions and intuition in an FDI decision is placed central. "" " """* *" --'——- *
In part one, chapter two gives an description of the real option model and relates the model to FDI
decisions. The real option model is very suitable to model FDI decisions to transition countries, since
it explicitly includes timing of an investment and uncertainty. Firms select one or several countries in
which they consider investing. Based on an investment analysis, taking factors like timing and
uncertainty into account, they make an investment decision. The real option model predicts that firms
postpone an investment more often if uncertainty increases. Extensions of the model, derived in
section 2.4 and 2.5, add that postponement is more likely if a firm considers several countries to
invest in and if those countries differ in country risk.
The real option model, as most economic decision theories, assumes that profit is the main
motivation for a firm to invest in a foreign country. While it is clear that commercial firms are pursuing
profit, the decision to invest in a transition country is not necessarily based on profit expectations only.
Many other economic and noneconomic factors can influence the decision to invest. The option model
predicts that firms invest if the expected profit is positive. However, the model does not specify how
this expected profit is derived. Firms can use economic indicators to estimate the expected profit, but
equally firms may not have the time, information and money available to spend on the decision-
making analysis, skip the whole economic approach and base their decision on emotions or intuition.
In order to become aware of the process of investment decisions of firms, whether they make an
analysis and if so, which factors they include, a survey was held among Dutch enterprises that were
interested in the transition region. In annex A the methodology of this survey is described.
In chapter three and four determinants of FDI are studied. Based on the assumptions and
expectations of the real option model hypotheses are formulated and tested using the survey data.
Chapter three focuses on firm characteristics. The firms included in the sample are all firms that at
some point between 1989 and 2000 were interested in investing in a transition country. Of the firms
that considered international activities, the ones that decided to become active in a transition country
are significantly larger than the firms that decided not to invest and they more often had previous
business relations with one or several firms in the transition region. The logit regressions, testing
which characteristics influence the chance a firm will invest in the transition region, all indicate the firm
characteristics may not be the main explanatory variables for investment decisions. In fact, only larger
firms are more likely to invest. The age, sector, number of owners and percentage of Dutch ownership
do not influence the investment choice. Transition time influences the investment decision: the more
time that has elapsed after transition started, the more likely firms are to invest. Experience effects are
of great importance in explaining investment behavior as well; having experience increases the
chance firms will invest (again) in the region. These results are in line with the option model
expectations.
Chapter four describes the internal decision-making process of a firm. The main question is how or
on what basis firms make an investment decision. Several hypotheses were derived from the
assumptions the option model builds on as well as the predictions of the theoretical extensions of the
model in chapter two. These hypotheses were tested in section 4.3. One of the interesting findings
was that many firms decided not to invest without entering the decision process, without applying any
decision rule or without making an investment analysis. With respect to the firms that made an
investment analysis, the data show three interesting findings. First, the internal investment analysis
154Chapter 7 Conclusion >r*t.-v..r..v..
was equally extensive for firms that decided to invest and firms that decided not to invest. This finding
contradicts the idea that firms that decide not to invest are less well informed than firms that decide to
invest. Second, firms with an FDI in a transition country prepare following direct investments equally
well or even more thoroughly than their first investment in the region. The presence of experience with
an FDI in the region does not lead to a less extensive analysis before the decision. Third, the
extensiveness of the investment analysis influences the success evaluation of the firm positively,
though the differences are small. Concluding, there is a large variation in the way firms prepare an
investment decision. In section 4.5 a framework is developed to explain this finding by comparing the
costs of collecting information with the benefits of the information in terms of decreased uncertainty
surrounding the investment decision. Firms collect information as long as the benefits of this
information exceed the costs of collecting the information. In addition, firms have a perceived risk of
the direct investment and subjective (firm specific) risk threshold values. Firms invest if the perceived
risk of the FDI is lower than a minimum risk threshold of investing and do not invest if the risk exceeds
the maximum threshold of risk above which investment is no longer worthwhile. Between those two
risk thresholds the firm postpones the investment decision and continues to collect information. By
applying this framework, many of the findings contradicting the expectations based on the option
model can be explained. First, firms do not need an investment analysis if their initial risk perception is
above the maximum threshold or below the minimum threshold. If that happens they immediately
decide to invest or not. Second, a long investment analysis period is no indication that firms invest
eventually, since additional information can increase as well as decrease the perceived risk of the
countries. Last, the fact that firms invest less and later in high-risk countries than in low-risk countries
can be explained by an initial high-risk perception of investing in those countries. More information is
needed in order to reduce the uncertainty of investing in high-risk countries before investments reach
an acceptable risk level for the firms, below the minimum risk threshold.
Part two of the dissertation contains a macrolevel study. Chapter five focuses on aggregate Dutch
FDI flows, specifically explaining FDI outflows to the transition countries. The gravity model is taken
as the basic tool for the analysis. The basic gravity model performs well as a long run equilibrium
model, but fails to incorporate volatility of FDI flows. In an attempt to explain FDI volatility, 60
additional indicators have been added to the basic gravity equation. In addition the study allows for
nonlinearity by creating dummy variables for countries receiving far more (less) FDI than could be
expected based on the basic gravity model and using those dummy variables to add interaction
effects. Results show that certain explanatory variables have a nonlinear relationship with FDI flows.
In general the expectations are that transition countries, after having been closed to FDI for a long
period, should be catching up and receive relatively large FDI inflows. There is no evidence to support
such a catch-up effect. The more one controls for the heterogeneity of the transition countries in the
data set (through the inclusion of the basic gravity variables, additional variables and interaction
effects), the larger the evidence that there is no such a thing as an overall upward gravity pull for
these countries. There is also no reason to assume that the flows of Dutch FDI to the EU accession
countries will increase in 2004 once the first eight countries join the EU. Currently, those countries
have already reached their long run equilibrium levels. The other countries of Central and Eastern
Europe and Central Asia still receive FDI inflows below their long run equilibrium level, but those
countries are not affected by EU accession. There is some evidence of a complementary relation
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Part three, chapter six, develops the idea that personal motivations are important in an FDI
decision. Several results of the survey on Dutch investment decisions indicate that personal
preferences can be very influential and important in FDI decisions. In chapter six personal motivations
are highlighted and some possible explanations for those influences are given. Personal motivations
are not often included in economic decision-making theories. In section 6.3 the presence of the
personal influences in decision-making are explained using the concept of bounded rationality. Given
the fact that humans face cognitive limitations and this affects their behavior, they rely on other
decision tools, such as experience or social networks. In section 6.4 an alternative explanation is
offered, posing that emotions and intuition influence investment decisions. Instead of causing a
problem for the rationality assumptions generally included in economic theory, emotions and intuition
can be considered a solution to decision-making problems given the fact that the strict assumptions of
stable tastes and preferences and perfect information are unlikely to hold anyway. Emotions and
intuition can be a tool to deal with unstable tastes and preferences and imperfect information by
means of quickly prioritizing investment options, as well as by limiting information search. In section
6.5 a microeconomic model, based on utility maximization, is developed that includes the utility of a
firm as well as the utility of a decision maker and as such both economic decision-making variables
and the influence of emotions and intuition. Though basic, the model may be the first step to including
emotions and intuition in economic decision-making models. As mentioned in section 6.6, there are
numerous problems with including the concepts, ranging from definition problems, measurement
problems and modeling issues, but given the concepts may be crucial for decision-making it is
important to start the discussion, if only by including them in a basic model.
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Based on this research, several conclusions can be drawn with respect to policy, not only for Dutch
firms and institutions but also for government and institutions located in the host countries. There are
three points of advice that are specifically apparent from this study. These three points of advice are
discussed in more detail, divided into advice for the host country government, the investment-
promoting institutions and Dutch companies. The fact that three points of advice are selected does
not mean these are the only points of advice that can be drawn from this research. At the end of this
section several additional issues will be discussed briefly as well.
The ffrsr recommendation relates to the political and economic stability of the host country. In
chapter five it becomes apparent that a lower country risk and political risk and a more developed
business climate positively influence FDI inflows. In addition, the analysis in chapter four shows that
firms often consider the economic and political developments of the host country in their investment
decision processes. The firms in the survey mention many macroeconomic and political indicators as
decision factors in the investment analysis. Both results indicate that FDI follows economic growth
and development and does not initiate growth'. Country stability and performance are basic
conditions for attracting FDI. For governments this result can be interpreted as an indication to initially
focus their policy on 1) the introduction and implementation of democratic principles to create political
' The fact that FDI follows growth does not imply that once foreign direct investments reach a country, they do not stimulate
growth as well. However, that relationship is not studied in this dissertation.
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stability, 2) the encouragement of economic development and economic growth and 3) the
establishment of a good and stable legal and institutional basis. If such basic infrastructure is not
present and minimal conditions with respect to political stability and economic development are not
fulfilled by the host county, putting effort in attracting FDI will most likely be unsuccessful and
establishing FDI-promoting institutions in the host country may not yet be a fruitful investment. The
long run preconditions must be in place before short run FDI incentives will become useful. For FDI-
promoting institutions in the Netherlands these basic conditions can be taken as a guideline to select
the host countries on which the institutions focus. If basic conditions are missing, the interest of Dutch
firms in those countries is low and focusing on those countries is costly. In addition, the
macroeconomic and legal situation of the host country that do meet those basic conditions should be
communicated clearly to interested firms. Summaries of legal regulations and lists of institutions
present in the host country can be used, along with regular macroeconomic updates. This is in line
with advice with respect to firms considering an investment in a transition country. Firms should
realize that within the region, the distinctions between the countries are enormous; there are high risk
countries, which do not fulfill the basic economic and legal conditions; there are medium risk countries
that fulfill the basic conditions but are economically still risky and there are low risk countries, both
economically and legally well developed. Before selecting a host country, firms should decide what
risk level is acceptable in order to be able to evaluate whether their selected country fulfills their
target.
77)e second recommendaton based on this research is not to underestimate the importance of
establishing a link between the firm interested in an FDI and the host country. In chapter three it was
shown that having business relations with the region increases the chance a firm invests. The
analysis in chapter four confirms this, since many firms with a contact person in the region considered
an investment there and this contact person plays an important role in the decision-making procedure.
In chapter six this fact is studied in more detail. Many of the firms indicated that personal motivations
influenced their decision. The presence of a field of interest by someone in the firm, direct links
between the firm and a contact person or institution in the host country, or personal motivations of the
entrepreneur increase the chance a firm invests abroad. Thus, once an initial interest in the host
country is present, firms become more aware of the possibilities for their firm to invest in that specific
country. The role of personal motivations has been underestimated in FDI studies, but the survey
results described in chapters three, four and six highlight that they are important factors in decision-
making. In order to explore this field better, host country governments and FDI-supporting institutions
could focus on the more personally oriented promotion. Governments can increase the awareness for
their countries to a broader public by promoting for instance tourism or well-known country specific
export products. But also less direct country promotion, through study exchange programs or city
friendship links can lead to the creation of personal interests. Institutions can also opt for a personal
approach instead of large-scale provision of basic information to many readers. The last may be
cheaper, but fails to interest the reader personally. Smaller scale investments in for instance FDI
networks, business study tours or trade fairs will reach fewer firms but may be more efficient in really
convincing the firm an FDI is a good investment. Also more personally oriented activities, such as
contacting host country nationals living abroad, or establishing links between local and foreign
enterprises or regions can be useful to initiate a first interest in the host country. For Dutch companies
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there is also a piece of advice related to the personal relationships. In chapter six I argue that the
utility of the decision maker should be taken into consideration when making an investment decision.
If a person is interested in working in a certain country, this increases his or her enthusiasm and self-
efficacy. Having a social network or contact person in a region probably positively influences the idea
the individual has about a country. This personal interest and willingness to work in a country should
be taken into account when making an investment decision. .«w «,»43.^:31 «ss#>qjA'»Kj.^ •
The fft/rd recommendation relates to the uncertainty firms face when making an investment
decision. Once a firm is interested in investing in a foreign country, it faces a lot of uncertainty related
to the FDI. This uncertainty is very firm specific, varies between host countries and is affected by the
timing of the investment. Given the fact that a firm can never obtain full information, uncertainty will
always be present and means of decreasing uncertainty are therefore very important. Firms
mentioned that lack of time and money, not necessarily the lack of profitable investment alternatives,
are the main motivations for firms not to invest (chapter four). An investment analysis and investment
preparations take a lot of time, most often from the higher management of a company. Therefore it
would be an advantage if there were low-cost alternatives for the company to assist them with the
investment analysis and preparation. The government of both host and home countries can assist
firms by establishing (partly) public, nonprofit investment promotion institutions. Those institutions
should have two forms of services, mass and individual. Mass information should be available at low
cost, with the aim to introduce the host country to a firm, provide basic information about the country
and reduce the firm's most elementary form of uncertainty. This can be done perhaps through the
provision of easy comprehensible and accessible information materials related to the necessary
procedural regulations of establishing an FDI, basic macroeconomic data or lists of institutions
available to assist a firm during the investment procedure. In addition to providing large-scale general
information, institutions should also provide tailor-made customer oriented services - at low cost - to
seriously interested firms. The use of commercial consultancy services assisting in the investment
decision process is very costly and specially small and medium sized firms are unable to afford such
services. If those services were available at low cost, the firm would be able to decrease the
uncertainty related to the FDI without having to spend a lot of time and money. This advantage
increases the chance that a firm invests. Examples of individual services could be an individually
organized study trip to a specific region or the provision of information related to a specific sector on
request. In addition to providing those services the promotion of the availability of these institutions
and services should be good. For example, many institutions in the host country are offering certain
services, but firms are unaware of their existence. They generally operate at lower cost than Dutch
institutions and are better informed on the situation in their region - but they should communicate their
existence and the services they offer better to interested firms. Also Dutch nonprofit organizations can
communicate the kind of services they offer better and could consider closer links with host country
institutions. Companies themselves should realize that good preparation pays off. In chapter four I
concluded that companies that had a more extensive investment analysis considered their FDI to be
more successful now. They do not invest more often than firms with a limited preparation, but once
they invest they benefit from their thorough investment analysis. Thus, it is beneficial for firms to use
the institutions available at their full scope. This means not only institutions in the Netherlands, but
also the ones in the host countries and not only the mass provision of information such as seminars
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and leaflets, but specifically also the more tailor-made services and sources of financial support.
Besides those three points of advice, more common results are found and confirmed by this study
as well. Examples are the result in chapter five that trade and FDI are complementary and the result
in chapter three that the presence of experience with trade within a firm increases the chance that the
firm will start an FDI. In policy terms both findings imply that by promoting free trade, FDI also
increases. Another example is the overall finding that long run stability and economic development is
more important than short run advantages, such as low labor costs or cheap resources (chapter four).
In policy terms, this means that incidental financial FDI incentives are less influential than incentives
provided in the form of longer run agreements. As a last example, factors like the religion, the
continent of the host country or geographical distance between home and host country are important
determinants of FDI (chapter six). Countries of the same religion, located close to the home country in
the same continent receive more FDI. FDI policies can thus be best targeted to the countries in the
region, which are culturally and geographically closest to the host country.
"Humans answer me mosf /mporfanf guesf/ons w/m fhe/r who/e //fe. /f ctoesn'f matter whar /hey
say /n behveen, wh/ch words and argumenfs mey use fo defend memse/ves. /n fhe end, when
everyming /s over, mey answer me guestons maf fhe wor/d so pers/stentfy Keeps asWng mem
w/fh me fecfs ofme/r //fe".
(Sändor Mara; (2002J, Embers;
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7 have to admtf.my heart was pound/ng and / was nervous. A tang had a premon/f/on fhaf /n f <
Rou/eftenburg somefh/ng wouW happen to me - my sfay here wou/d be a (urn/ng po/nf /n my //fe. <»>
/f cou/d nof be any d/fferenf and fhaf ;s fhe way /f wou/d go.
/f /s of course r/d/cu/ous fhaf / expert so much of fh/s game for myse/f, buf even more r/d/cu/ous
seems fhe genera/ op/n/on /haf /'s sfup/d and foo//sh to have h/gh expecfatons of (he game. Why -
shou/d fh/s game be worse (nan ofher ways of ma/c/ng money? Trade for /nsfance?" ;.- x.•„ •
F.M. DostoyewsW (7597J, The P/ayerJ . , ,.^ v ,..v--, s
A1 Introduction : :. ÜV, •,.,•»•,«-.
The following annex describes the methodology of the questionnaire research, held in the spring of
2000. The questionnaire is designed to find out what factors influence the decision of Dutch firms to
invest in a country in Central Europe, Eastern Europe or Central Asia, and what factors are crucial to
selecting the country in which to invest. It was sent to 1550 Dutch firms that showed interest in
investing in the CEE region during the years 1989-1999. Section A2 describes the set-up of the
questionnaire. Section A3 gives an overview of the survey methodology. Section A4 provides some
insight in the response rates and in section A5 the validity of the response will be tested using two
nonresponse tests. Section A6 concludes.
A2 The questionnaire
The goal of the survey was to extract information needed to estimate an investment decision-making
model directly from the firms that actually went through a decision-making process. As mode of the
survey a mail questionnaire was chosen, since that left respondents the freedom to answer the
survey questions at their convenience and look up information when needed. In addition the mail
survey is the most cost-efficient survey method, making it possible to approach the complete survey
population selected. Survey literature shows that response rates are comparable to other survey
modes, supporting the choice of a mail survey.'
•42.7 The popu/af/on
The respondents of the survey had to be firms that were interested in investing in the CEE region in
the past. In order to locate those firms a list of companies, provided by the Dutch Chambers of
Commerce, was used. The list consisted of approximately 3000 addresses of Dutch firms that asked
for documentation on the CEE region or participated in a seminar on investment opportunities in one
of the target countries.* The firms do not necessarily have a direct investment in, or trade relation with
the CEE region, but applying for information or participation in a seminar is considered an indication
' Cooper and Schindler (2000). Dillman (197B). The total design method of Dillman was taken as a guideline to set up this
survey.
* The seminars were organized by the NCH (Nederiandse Centrum van Handelsbevordering, Dutch Centre of Trade Promotion)
or FENEDEX (Federatie van Nederiandse export promotie, Federation of Dutch Export Promotion).
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of serious interest. -----_.,------
The data available at the start of the survey were the firm name, address in the Netherlands,
telephone number, fax number and contact person. To be included in the survey, the following
conditions needed to be fulfilled:
I.The firm should be Dutch, registered under the Dutch law and fall under (at least a partial)
Dutch ownership. 100 percent Foreign owned firms were excluded. < örtsmwvi, •:, , •
2. The firm should be commercial. Government organizations and voluntary and institutions were
excluded.
3. During the last 10 years the firm should have had a business interest in the CEE ä^ir *••.•,•?„
region. ' •••''.(=':-:••« ,••: s;,«»V> ~^:W*i ^niAftfMQ ~Vf« ie^K: ,-.S.*1 tt^« f>i": i-sf'.-V- t-v-"", -^vjv**
4. Each company could be included only once in the survey sample.
Since I opted for the mail survey approach, the entire population of 1550 firms could be included in
the survey mailing.
A2.2 The questions
Two questionnaires were created: one for those companies with a direct investment in Central
Europe, Eastern Europe or Central Asia, and one for those companies that did not have a direct
investment in this region.
The following information was requested:
1. Characteristics of the Dutch firms
2. Information on the firm's Foreign direct investments
3. Investment calculations for the investment decision in the CEE region
4. Endogenous variables of the investment decision process n-.s^i *>,>r • -»;• -r ,
5. Exogenous variables of the investment decision process " •'•-•"•
6. The order of the investment decision-making process • * "' *""•'••
7. Investment decision-making for follow-up FDI ' '• ' "' '
8. Reasons for disinvestments in the CEE region ' ' " ' ' -' -
9. Motives for not investing in the CEE region '" ^- ••»•'•• •
The two questionnaires are included in annex B. ' " •< " •--.-•, ..-> •-•..•-.
A3 The survey procedures
Realistic response rates of mail questionnaires to private businesses lie between 20 and 30 percent.
Given the fact that firms are not eager to participate in surveys in general, and the Netherlands
traditionally has low response rates to mail surveys, a response rate of 20 percent was targeted.'
The survey preparation started in the summer of 1999. The draft questionnaire was constructed
based on the results of a small study from 1998 among Dutch firms with a direct investment in
Hungary*'. Additional information used for the construction of the questionnaire was obtained by
conversations with institutions in the Netherlands and Poland^, Dutch companies^ and several
' See for example Knechel (1999) or Geuzinge, van Rooyen and Bakker (2000).
' The questionnaire focused specifically on the factors that influenced the firms' investment decision to go to Hungary The
sample consisted of 101 firms with a direct investment in Hungary, of which 50 respondents returned the survey after a very
intensive follow-up procedure with both follow-up mail questionnaires and telephone calls.
* Dutch Chamber of Commerce, Central and Eastern Europe Desk. Amsterdam; NCH (Netherlands Center for Trade •'-'•
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subsidiaries of Dutch companies in Moldova and Hungary'. Afterwards experienced survey designers
at the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), Maastricht University, the Open University and the
Free University commented on draft versions of the questionnaire and the set-up of the survey.
Respondents were informed that information on the research and the researcher was available on an
Internet site. This Internet site contained a description of the research, a CV of the researcher,
frequently asked questions, a confidentiality statement and a list of institutions that support the
intention of the research.
In November 1999 a pre-test was undertaken, which included 48 randomly selected firms. No major
problems were encountered during this testing. The response rate of the pre-test was 17 percent (see
annex A1 table one). After the pre-test the questionnaires and mailing procedure were adjusted. The
final mailing included an advance letter from the researcher, two questionnaires, a return envelope
and a recommendation letter from the NCH (Dutch Centre of Trade Promotion). Two weeks after the
initial mailing a follow up fax was sent to all companies that had not returned the questionnaire. A
month later a complete new package, including both questionnaires was sent by mail to all companies
that had not yet responded, followed by a reminder fax. The entire procedure was started in early
February 2000, and in June 2000 the mailing procedure was considered finished.
During the mail survey procedure some errors in the database were detected, being that some firms
included in the list were nonprofit, bankrupt or foreign-owned. Also several addresses in the original
list were not up-to-date anymore, since many firms had changed location in the Netherlands.
Therefore all addresses of the nonresponding firms were checked again using the Dutch telephone
book, a firm registration database and an Internet search.' Those firms of which the address were
unknown in either one of those sources were marked as "firms that could not be located". All of these
findings were marked in the database, and taken into account in the response rate calculation.
A4 The response of the survey
The response rate of the mail survey was 17.85 percent. Table two in the annex A1 gives an overview
of the response of the mail survey response.
In July and August 2000 a telephone follow-up was undertaken in order to collect data for additional
companies. Survey theory offers evidence that surveys with several modes of questioning offer larger
response rates and lower nonresponse errors because by offering two different survey modes, the
respondents could participate using the mode of surveying they prefer.^ The advantages of a
telephone approach are the personal contact with the respondents, the possibility to directly convince
the firm to participate in the survey and the possibility to approach many firms without having to spend
time on traveling and the relatively low costs. In addition, selecting a sample from the nonrespondents
of the mail survey and obtaining information of those firms will provide a clearer picture on the
composition of the nonrespondents of the mail survey and therefore also the composition of the
population. This method will be described in more detail in section A5.
Promotion. The Hague; Dutch Chamber of Commerce for Poland, The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Directorate Central
Europe. The Hague; Trade and Communication Centre Poznan - Noord Brabant. Poznan. Poland
^ Nine companies were asked to comment on the questionnaires dunng a meeting or telephone call Seven of those firms
responded to this request
' One Dutch firm in Moldova and four Dutch firms in Hungary were visited in order to see to what extent the questions covered
their actual procedure of investments decision or if some important aspects were lacking.
' The PTT "CD-foon was used as telephone database, and "Reach" was used as Ihe company database.
* See for instance Schindler and Cooper (2000) or Tomaskovic-Devey, Leiter and Denekamp (1994)
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Figure A1: Visualization of the mail survey response and telephone sample
response -Äi^vteuj.;-.- '• *-.• •.£•«•-«•**
MAIL SURVEY - 1550 FIRMS
Ü* JI
Respondents Investors 5% (71 firms)
Respondents: Noninvestors 11% (173 firms)
Ineligibles. 12%
(183 firms, including bankrupt firms, foreign firms and firms with no location available)
Nonresponse without notification 68%
(1056 firms)
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The main disadvantages of the telephone follow up were the fact that it is a time consuming survey
mode for the interviewer and that the questionnaire was designed as a mail survey, so several
questions were complicated to ask and answer by telephone.'" This could cause bias in the results of
the telephone survey and make the phone response harder to compare with the mail results.
120 firms were selected at random from the mail survey nonresponse to compose the telephone-
sample of firms." Of those 120 firms five already had responded to the mail survey procedures,
indicating they were not willing to participate in a survey. The remaining 115 firms were approached
by telephone. Figure A1 represents the mail survey and telephone sample responses.
Table three in annex A1 describes the composition and response rates of the telephone follow up.
The telephone response rate, 66.7 percent, was much higher than the response rate of the mail
survey. During the telephone interview the respondents were asked what their motivations were for
participating in the telephone survey and not the mail survey. The most frequently mentioned
motivations were: ,> ^rnt\< s.i, ;,.-•/, ,-vj-w;..,; ,• • ..-.;
a) The mail questionnaire never reached the desk of the respondent.
b) The timing was better. The telephone survey was held in the summer period, when most firms
were having a "low-profile or less busy period".
c) During the telephone survey the respondent was personally contacted, making it much harder
to refuse participation.
d) All respondents could be explained why their response was important, even if they did not
have an investment in CEE countries.
The total response rate of the questionnaire, including the mail and telephone survey, was 23.42
percent (see table A1).
Given the fact that two different modes of questioning were used in the survey, a check to see if the
data could be jointly used in further analysis was done. Tabulations were made using investment
status (investor CEEC, noninvestor CEEC, refusals, bankrupt, ineligibles, firms that could not be
located, and nonresponse) and general firm characteristics (sector, location, age, number of
employees). With respect to investment status, relatively more noninvestors participated in the
telephone survey than in the mail survey, and this difference was statistically significant. The bankrupt
firms, ineligible firms and firms that could not be located were about equal in the telephone and the
mail surveys.
Even more important was the question whether the respondents of the mail survey were different in
their basic characteristics from the respondents that participated by telephone. Therefore the
characteristics sector, location, age and size of the respondents were used to test whether the
respondents of both survey modes could be considered comparable, and if they could be jointly used
in the further analysis of the data. The result of the tests showed that the majority of variables were
not significantly different, irrespective to the response mode chosen by the respondents. The only
exception is the variable age. The firms that responded in the mail survey were significantly younger
than the firms that participated in the telephone survey.
"" Several questions were stated as tables, and hard to communicate over the telephone since the visual effects were missing
" The number of 120 firms was decided upon based on a time constraint Conducting the telephone interviews took no more
than two months' time for the researcher. This estimation turned out to be realistic.
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Table A1: Response of the overall (among 1550 firms)
Number of firms Percentage of firms
Respondents:
Firms with an investment in CEEC
Firms without an investment in CEEC
Nonresponse:
Firm indicated it does not want to participate
Non response
Excluded from response calculation:
Firms does not exists anymore
Firm is foreign or not for profit




















Note: response rate = investors + noninvestors response / total sample size - firms excluded due to bankruptcy, ineligibility or
firms without location
However, given the fact that age was the only control variable indicating that the firms responding to
the mail and telephone may have different characteristics, mail and telephone responses can be
added to one dataset without losing credibility. During the further analysis of the data, safety-tests
were undertaken per item to check whether the telephone or mail mode of questioning significantly
influenced the answer behavior.
A5 Nonresponse bias
In this last section of the annex I check whether there is a nonresponse bias in this survey. Motivation
to do so is the possible need for correction of the data during further analysis. The nonresponse bias
will be looked at in two different ways. The first test used the random telephone sample taken of the
mail survey nonresponse to create a picture of what the entire population would look like with respect
to investment status (investing in the CEE region or not). The second test used general firm
characteristics of the whole survey population to check whether the respondents were significantly
different from the nonrespondents.
In the first test I used the random telephone sample to estimate what the population of firms looked
like with respect to investment status. The respondents and ineligible firms of the mail survey together
were 27.5 percent of the total population. The random telephone sample, taken from the
nonrespondents of the mail survey, therefore provided a picture of the composition of the additional
72.5 percent of the population. In order to give an as accurate as possible estimation of the
composition of this 72.5 percent of the population, the 37 nonrespondents of the telephone sample
were asked to answer seven core questions, including their investment status." An estimated
composition of the population is included in table one of annex A2. From this table can be seen that
noninvestors were underrepresented among the respondents of the survey, whereas the number of
investors that responded was proportionally correct. The number of firms that could not be located
may have been overestimated in the response of the survey."
In the second test I used firm data available for the whole population and compared whether the
respondents and the population could be considered equal with respect to those characteristics. At
'* The additional information asked for was the sector of activity, year of set-up, number of locations, revenue in 1999, number
of employees in 1999 and ownership division of the company.
" This overestimate may be due to the fact that with the telephone survey direct contact was made with the new owners
/residents of the location the firm was registered. They could refer to the new location the firm moved to. It is harder to find new
addresses in external sources, as is the case with the mail approach.
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the start of the survey the addresses of all firms were available, leaving the option to test whether the
respondents were geographically clustered to one region, or evenly spread over the country.''' The
locations in the Netherlands also gave the option to split up the firms according to size of their
resident city, in order to test whether respondents were more likely to be located in a city or village
than nonrespondents." In addition, external databases gave access to information on sector (SBI
code)'*, size (number of employees) and age (year of set-up in the Netherlands) for approximately
90-95 percent of the entire population (the actual percentage depending on the vanable considered).
These data can help answer the questions whether the specific characteristics of the firm increased
the likelihood of answering the questionnaire. The three categorical variables, sector, geograpny and
urban or rwa/ tocaf/on of the firm, were included in a Pearson chi^ test, checking the hypothesis that
the control variables and response behavior of the firms were independent. I expected these variables
not to have any influence on response behavior. This is the case for the geographic position in the
Netherlands, and for the size of the city in which the firm is located. However, the sector in which the
firm is active affects response behavior. The main differences between the respondents and the
population were an overrepresentation of industrial firms among the respondents and an
underrepresentation of agriculture and construction sector firms. The influence on response behavior
of the two remaining variables, age of the firm and s/ze of the firm (number of employees in 1999)
was larger. I expected both larger and older firms to respond more often to the questionnaires." This
was checked using a two-sample t-test.'" The results show that there is a significant difference in
response behavior between older and younger firm. Those firms that did answer the questionnaire
are older than those that did not answer the questionnaire. Equally, the size of the firms influenced
response behavior positively, being that the survey respondents were larger than the nonresponding
firms."
In order to verify these results, a probit analysis was undertaken using all control variables both
separately and jointly. With respect to sector of activity almost all sectors were less likely to
participate in the survey than firms from the sector Industry (which was the largest sector, and taken
as baseline). Only firms included in the sectors Ofher*° were more likely to answer the survey than
the firms from the sector /ndusfry. The sector of activity did significantly influence response behavior
at a five percent level. Location in a specific region in the Netherlands did not influence response
behavior significantly, neither when individually tested nor when jointly included in the probit analysis.
" The firms are split into four regions (North. East South. West) using their zip codes as geographic indicator.
" The location of the firms was divided into three main categories, being villages with less than 10 000 inhabitants, villages or
cities with between 10 000 and 50 000 inhabitants and cities with more than 50 000 inhabitants
" Concerning sector activity, all firms are allocated using the standard coding appropriate in the Netherlands (SBI codes)
Using these codes the firms were placed into 13 main categories
" In Tomaskovic-Devey. Leiter and Thompson (1994) three factors are mentioned which influence response behavior, namely
authority to respond (is the recipient allowed to respond), organizational capacity to respond (is il organizationally possible for
the respondent to acquire all information to answer the survey) and motive to respond (are there enough individual and
organizational reasons to respond) I would like to add a fourth factor, being time to respond, indicating that small firms often do
not have as much human resources and time available to participate as larger firms Larger firms tend to be more complex, and
are expected to respond less to survey requests, based on the first two arguments However, they do have more time and
resources available (fourth argument), which would indicate they might respond more often than smaller firms Based on
experience in previous survey among Dutch firms in Hungary and the pretest I expect large firms to respond more often.
" Age and s/ze were both tested with equal and unequal variance assumptions Using Bartlet s test, age is included with equal
variance assumptions, and s/ze with unequal variance assumptions though the results were not affected by this choice The
tests were also done with age and size categorized over ranges The findings were comparable to the findings using the
numencal vanables
" Remark that the variables age and size were also significantly positively correlated
* The sector Orner includes Hotel and Restaurants sector. Government services. Education, health. Environment. Culture.
Recreation. Pnvate households and Extratemtonal organizations
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The same is true for the size of the city or village in which the firm is located, this does not affect
response behavior either.
With respect to the age and s/ze of the firm, the results of the probit analysis confirmed the previous
tests. Here I find that the older the firm is, the larger the probability is that this firm will participate in
the survey. The likelihood of participating in the survey will also increase the larger the firm is. The
results of the combined probit analysis are included in table two (annex A2).
Concluding from these nonresponse bias tests there are two important factors that need to be
taken into account during further analysis of the data. Firstly, there is an under representation of
noninvestors in the response of the survey. Secondly, larger and older firms are more likely to
respond to the survey than smaller and younger firms, so they are over represented in the response
of the survey. - -.- <• -••-•- -
A6 Conclusions —' • ^ .
During the development of the survey, to focus has been to create a questionnaire that will both give
sufficient information and will be clear and understandable for the respondents. Given that surveys
among firms in general do not result in high response rates, and the Netherlands is a country that is
known for low survey response, the response rate of 23.4 percent is satisfactory.
This response rate is achieved by using both a mail and telephone mode. Tests show there is no
major deviation between the respondents of each mode, so the data can be grouped for further
analysis.
The nonresponse bias test revealed that there is an under representation of firms without
investment in the CEE region among the respondents. With respect to firm characteristics there is an
overrepresentation of older and larger firms among the survey respondents. These two response
biases will be taken into account during the analysis of the data.
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Annex A1 Response rates * - :
Table A1.1: Response of the pretest of 48 firms
Respondents:
Firms with an investment in CEEC
Firms without an investment in CEEC
Nonresponse:
Firm indicated it does not want to participate
Nonresponse
Excluded from response calculation:
Firms does not exists anymore
Firm is foreign or not for profit

























Table A1.2: Response of the mail survey
Number of firms Percentage of firms
Respondents:
Finns with an investment in CEEC
Firnis without an investment in CEEC
Nonresponse:
Firm indicated it does not want to participate
Nonresponse
Excluded from response calculation:
Firnis does not exists anymore
Firm is foreign or not for profit




















Note: response rate = investors -
firms without location
noninvestors response / total sample size - firms excluded due to bankruptcy, ineligibility or
Table A1.3: Results of the telephone follow up among 120 firms
Number of firms Percentage of firms
Respondents:
Firnis with an investment in CEEC
Firms without an investment in CEEC
Nonresponse:
Firm indicated it does not want to participate
Nonresponse
Excluded from response calculation:
Firms does not exists anymore
Firm is foreign or not for profit



















Note: response rate = investors + noninvestors response / total sample size - firms excluded due to bankruptcy, ineligibility or
firms without location
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Annex A2 Nonresponse bias tests
























































' Percentage taken over the mail survey response excluding the nonresponse, together 27 5% of the total population
" Percentages are taken from the investment status of the randomly selected 120 firms of the telephone survey. They are
weighted for 72.5% of the population.
•" Percentage division of the response of the total survey (mail and telephone) excluding the nonresponse.
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Number of obs = 1260
LRchi2(13) = 256 44
Prob > chi2 = 0 0000
Log likelihood = -581 42005
PseudoR2 = 0.1807
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Annex B Questionnaire forms
(i::; ;!*-•<;.t ^ •
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DUTCH FIRMS WITH A DIRECT
INVESTMENT IN CENTRAL EUROPE, EASTERN EUROPE
OR CENTRAL ASIA
The questions in this questionnaire are about the decision of Dutch firms to
initiate a direct investment in one of the countries of Central Europe,
Eastern Europe or Central Asia (further referred to as the CEE region).
Foreign direct investments are newly started enterprises, takeovers of
already existing local firms or joint ventures with a local company.
The questionnaire consists of 6 parts; A to F and it takes approximately 30
minutes to fill out.
We thank you in advance for your co-operation
Prof. Dr. Chris de Neubourg
Drs. Mindel van de Laar
• • • J . . • Maastricht University
NOTE: These questionnaires are translated to English. The original Dutch
version, filled out by the firms, is available at your request.
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PART A: INVESTMENT PLANS IN THE CEE REGION
The first 3 questions of this questionnaire are about possible investment plans of your company




Does your company have a direct investment or did it have a direct investment in the
past in one of the countries in Central Europe. Eastern Europe or Central Asia?
fan/y / answer/wK.w'AfeJ
1 [] Yes, we currently have one or more direct investments. Continue with question 2
2 [] Yes, we had an investment that is currently closed. Continue with question 2
3 [] No, please fill out the blue questionnaire. This questionnaire can be thrown
away.
Which one of the following countries in the CEE region, in which your company has no
investment yet, would be the country of your first, second and third choice in which to
invest at this moment, and which country do you consider the least attractive for your
company to invest in at this moment? ;. j*-;



































Romania ' ••'" ••

















Number country of your ^'choice: '
Number country of your 2"** choice:
Number country of your 3"* choice: ••••• cs->^~jv •"•.fj? •?.•"
Number country of your last choice: ; _?..'.•• '•? •'•* »^v ••ifb'
In which one of the following countries do you expect your company to invest in within
the next two years?
This direct investment could in this case be your first investment in a specific country,
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PART B: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DUTCH FIRM
The following 6 questions are about the activities of your company In THE NETHERLANDS
In which sector is your company active?
Please enter the main code according to the Dutch standard company codes of the
Central Bureau of Statistics. A list of these codes is attached in Annex 1. If you do not
know the code, please describe the activity briefly.
SBIcode:
In which year did your company start its activities in the Netherlands?
How many different locations / offices does your company have in the Netherlands?
7. What was the total revenue, profit, and number of employees working in your company
in the Netherlands for last year (1999), 5 years ago (1994) and 10 years ago (1989)?
If you do not know those data exactly, please make estimation. If your company was not
operational in that year, please cross it out. • -










8. What is the ownership structure of your Dutch company?
(/>/«».«• «ww f/if 0H>ner>'Ai]p m pmv/i/ages, a</</('/i£ /Ö /00 %>
Owner 1. nationality: %
Owner 2, nationality: %
Owner 3, nationality: % +
100 %
9. Are the decisions to invest in a foreign country made completely or partly by the Dutch
company?
[] Yes, a completely Dutch decision. Please continue with part C
[] Yes, the decision is made by the Dutch company
in co-operation with the other owners. Please continue with part C
[] No. the decision is made by the foreign partners. This questionnaire is aimed at the
investment decisions of Dutch companies. Since your foreign partner makes the
foreign investment decisions of your company, the answers of your firm are not
comparable with those of the other respondents. Please continue with part F.
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PART C: INVESTMENTS IN THE CEE REGION
Part C focuses specifically on your DIRECT INVESTMENTS in Central Europe, Eastern
Europe and Central Asia. As direct investments we consider newly started companies, takeovers
of a local firm by the Dutch company and joint ventures with a local firm in which the Dutch
company is at least 10 percent owner.
10. In which countries in Central Europe, Eastern Europe and Central Asia (CEE region)
does your company have one or more direct investments, and in which years were these
started?
Please enter for each country the year of beginning for all your investment in that
country, with a maximum of 5 per country. Please also enter those investments made
before 1989.
(Wea.ve e/i/er /or ear A cuuniry '/if s/aiYi/ijj vear/iw a//rour mve.s7/n?n/1« <Aaf counfn'j
( oiinli \ Near Near Near Near \ car
opening P' opening 2'"' opening .V' opening 4"' open in





















































The following questions are about the FIRST DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE CEE REGION
since 1989. 1989 is taken as focus year since after the fall of the Berlin wall in November 1989
the first countries in Eastern Europe and states of the Former Soviet Union broke with
communism and started changing towards a market economy.
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11. What is the location of your first investment in the CEE region after 1989?




From now on in this questionnaire we will refer to this company as your 1" investment






In which sector is your l" investment active?
Please enter the main code according to the Dutch standard company codes of the
Central Bureau of Statistics. A list of these codes is attached in Annex 1. If you do not
know the code, please describe the activity briefly.
SBIcode:
What were the total revenue, profit, and number of employees working in your 1"
investment of last year (1999), 5 years ago (1994) and 10 years ago (1989) ?
If you do not know those data exactly, please make estimation. If your 1" investment was
not operational in that year, please cross it out.










What kind of investment is your l" investment?
fon/y / a/UHvr ymssiA/rJ
1 [] Take-over of an existing local company
2 [] Completely new company '
3 [] Joint venture with an existing local company
4 [] Joint venture with a completely new company
5 [] Purchase through the national privatization process
6 [] Other:
What is the ownership structure of your 1" investment?
#>/««* «t/fr f/r? OHTifrs/r/p/wctfnMg«, fogrtA«- <id7/rn£ /o /00 %>
Dutch owner: %
Local owner, from the country of the 1" investment: %
Owner 3, nationality: %
Owner 4, nationality: %
Owner 5, nationality: % +
100 %
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17. How did you finance your 1" investment?
1 [] Private capital of the owner
2 [] Own funds of the Dutch company
3 [] Borrowed funds in the Netherlands
4 [] Borrowed funds in the country of your P' investment
5 [] Own or borrowed funds provided by the other owners of the 1" investment
6 [] Borrowed funds provided by family members or friends
7 [] Other:
18. Did you receive a subsidy or other kind of support for your l" investment?
1 [] No
2 [] Yes, subsidy from:
3 [] Yes, insurance from:
4 [] Yes, such as:
19. What was the trade relation with the country of your l" investment before you made
your I" investment, and does this relation still exist for the I" investment or has it been
ended?
fmu///p/f ansHOTSpo.vsi7>/f,/?/eo.vt mar A/or (/re se/ecKa*/rajf rWan'ons )v/iwAfr //ii'.v acfii/Vv' *7iV/
Still No longer
... . _ ,, exists exists
1 [] No trade relation
2 [] Export to the country of your 1" investment ' [] []
3 [] Imports from the country of your 1" investment to
the Netherlands [] []
4 [] Other, such as [] []
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PART D: THE INVESTMENT DECISION
The following questions refer to the INVESTMENT DECISION PROCESS within your
company, specifically focusing on the decision to make your l" INVESTMENT IN THE CEE
REGION (as answered in question 11)
20. Which countries did your company consider as alternatives for the country where the 1"
investment in the region is made?














































Did you make any calculations to estimate the probability of success of the investment?
fo/i/y / ansH'CT-poss/AfeJ
1 [] Yes, only for the country of the I * investment Continue with question 22
2 [] Yes. for the country of our 1" investment and multiple
other countries Continue with question 22
3 [] No, no calculation was made. The company chose
the country of our 1" investment because:
Continue with part E
What were the 4 most important actions during your decision making process, in
chronological order (for instance first the choice of country, afterwards the search for
an appropriate local partner).
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23. Which one of the following was a specific reason for your company to make the
investment analysis for the country of your 1" investment?
1 [] There was already a trade relation with one or more companies in that country
2 [] There was a good contact person to work with in that country
3 [] Other companies in that sector achieved good results in that country
4 [] The owner or employees of the Dutch firm are from that country
5 [] Your partner or direct family members are from the country of your 1" investment
6 [] Friends or acquaintances are from the country of your 1 * investment
7 [] The owner or employees of the Dutch firm were willing to work in the country of your 1
investment
8 [] Your partner or direct family was willing to work in the country of your 1*
investment
9 [] Friends or acquaintances were willing to work in the country of your 1" investment
10 [] Language knowledge of the country of your 1" investment in the Dutch firm available
11 [] Positive personal experiences in the country of your 1" investment, for instance travel
experiences
12 [] Other:
The following 3 questions are about the factors that your company considered when deciding
whether to invest in the country of your l" investment.
24. Which of the following factors did your company use when determining the
EXPECTED REVENUE of your l" investment? If a factor was important for your
company to estimate the expected revenue, please mark if the factor influenced the
estimation positively or negatively. Factors that were not important for your company
may be skipped.

















Factors considered to estimate the revenue of an investment in the
country or your I" investment
Number of inhabitants in the country of the 1" investment
Income per capita in the country of the 1" investment
Income growth in the country of the 1" investmenl
Revenue of your company in the Netherlands
Revenue of your company in other foreign countries
Revenue of olher companies in the country of the 1" investment
Revenue of the firm in the country of your 1" investment that you consider
being your partner or want to take over
Expected market share in the country of your 1 *' investment
Price of the sales product in the Netherlands
Price of the export product to the country of your 1" investment
Price of the products of your competition in the country of your 1"
investment
Price of your product in other countries in the CEE region
Revenue obtained on existing export to the country of your 1" investment
Costs of the existing export to the country of your 1" investment
Profit obtained from the exports to the country of your 1" investment
Competition present absent in the country of your l" investment
(please cross out whatever is not appropriate)




The factor was seen as:
very
negative
negative neutral positive very
positive
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25. Which one of the following ORIENTATION ACTIVITIES did your company undertake







Seminars/study days / lectures > . , ?
Study trips / orientation trips / -; *•
Market research done by your own company '• <..>-'• • . ;
Market research and advice by an external consultant . ••' '>•••. • ••>
Advice by institutions in the Netherlands v.;-^ ••-•<-. v
(for instance chambers of commerce, ministries, embassies)
Advice from institutions in the country of your r'investment
(for instance foreign trade agencies, ministries, and privatization institutions)
Other:
Other
26. Which ones of the following costs did your company make in the first year after the
positive investment decision?
We re these costs higher, equal or lower than the in advance expected costs?
Please skip those costs that were not made by your company.
















Costs in the first year of the investment
Building costs and restructuring costs of the building
in the country of your 1" investment
lnfrastructural improvements in the country of your
1* investment
(for instance road improvement, streetlights)
Telephone connection in the country of your 1"
investment
Furniture location of the 1 * investment
Institutional costs
(for instance obtaining documents)




Rent or mortgage payments on the building in the
country of your 1" investment
Wages of the personnel
Training ' retraining costs of the personnel
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27. Which of the following factors did your company take into account when making a
RISK ANALYSIS for the country of your l" investment. Were the factors considered to
be risk increasing or risk decreasing?
Factors that were not considered in the risk analysis may be skipped.
For instance: Your company did consider the factor "internal conflicts" in your risk
analysis when deciding to invest in Russia, and the fact that Russia is involved in an
internal conflict in Chechnya is risk increasing for Russia.






























Factors considered for the risk analysis of the country
of \our 1" investment
Political / cultural factors
Political stability
Political opinion of the government
Internal conflicts
External conflicts
Cultural difference with the Netherlands




Distance to the Netherlands
Location with respect to other countries in the CEE region
Level of Gross National Income










Restructuring of government services
Presence of institutions to increase the foreign trade and
investment
Bilateral or multilateral tax agreements with the
Netherlands
Bilateral or multilateral trade agreements with the
Netherlands
Legal svstcm and implementation
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Questions 28 to 39 are about the investment decision procedure within your company
28. How often did your company, during the period in which your company considered to
invest, make an analysis using the chosen factors?
1 [] Once ~'*~ •:•'••"> (! *
2 [] Incidental
3 [] Monthly ?b*J3-Kj<* Bßrii '*a»iji->««• r',-iis-> i»-»if. *:<ti w¥T ££
4 [] Weekly '*••• ' x---<
5 [] Daily
6 [] Continuous process >...,»•-«<.<•*.*..•..••= »««»<*.:.... • --•• ;
7 [] Other:



















is not a goal
*.'< ' .'.
30. Are there, besides profitability, other goals that determine the success of your 1"
investment?
1 [] Being present in the market
2 [] Growing market share
3 [] Brand name recognition in the market
4 [] Learning process for investments in other countries in the CEE region
5 [] Other:
31. With what do you compare your 1" investment to determine its success?
1 [] No comparison
2 [] The profit percentage of the Dutch firm
3 [] Interest revenues in the Netherlands
4 [] Interest revenues in the country of your 1" investment
5 [] Revenue on stocks and shares
6 [] Revenue of obligations
7 [] The inflation percentage in the Netherlands
8 [] The inflation percentage in the country of your 1" investment
9 [] Other:
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32. How long after your positive investment decision did your l" investment become
operational?
1 [] < 1 month •'•-:• ••• : .. - • .......
2 [] 1-3 months < i-i*:, ••<.*v'>-<»{fc^.flV wiirt-• -C
3 [] 4-6 months . ,. , . ,.,*'„. •U«^i - ^BR ^ ,-*;.-
4 [] 7-12months ...... -••,.•••--.-., . \'-^ . »xSt- -.«\rt - .• ^ '.*\« -i>
5 [] Other, .'. ;.........!.............
33. Was this preparation time longer than expected? ?
1 [] Yes, continue with question 34 . .."'"•. . ^
2 [] No, continue with question 35
34. What were the most important reasons for delaying the implementation of your l"
investment?
-'V 1
1 [] Disappointing results of the Dutch company , x', .,,,,- ,{^ -,.f1
2 [] Disappointing expectations of the Dutch economy v'..-i«\^..--n'i i',
3 [] Disappointing expectations of the world economy
4 [] Unstable economic situation in the country of your 1" investment r
5 [] Unstable political situation in the country of your 1" investment
6 [] Company found a country that at that time was more appropriate for the investment
7 [] Negative company results of the firm to take over in the country of the 1"' investment
8 [] Financial reasons
9 [] Delay with the necessary documents
10 [] Difficulties with the partners/other owners of the T'investment
11 [] Other:
35. On the basis of which criteria will a decision to stop the l" investment be made?
1 [] Company should be profitable after a certain number of years
2 [] The invested costs should be paid back after a certain number of years
3 [] A maximum amount of money to be invested by the Dutch company is reached
4 [] Other:
36 Is your 1" investment still operational?
1 [] Yes
2 [] No, the 1" investment is not operational anymore since 19
Reason:
Please continue with question 40
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37. How risky do you currently consider your 1" investment, on a scale from 1 to 10?
(7= verc rüAy, /0 = «of röJty a/ a//>
How risky do you currently consider the country of your 1" investment, on a scale from
1 to 10?
f/= very TO*}", /0 = no/ rä*y ar a//J • ^ -••••••
if
39. What would at this moment be the 3 most important motivations that could lead to the




40. If you were to give your 1" investment an overall grade for success, between 1 and 10,
what would be vour choice? .., ... , -. , :
;.*•
:••.;".( •{
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PART E: FOLLOW UP INVESTMENTS IN THE CEE REGION
This part of the questionnaire is about the follow-up investments of your company in the CEE
region. The questions will focus specifically on your last investment in this region.
41 Does your company have more than 1 direct investment in a country in Central Europe,
Eastern Europe or Central Asia? Branches of your company in the same country are
also considered as separate investments.
1 [] Yes Continue with question 42
2 [] No Continue with part F




43. In which vear was this investment made?
^; * *
44. Was the analysis of your most recent investment more or less elaborate than the analysis
of your first investment?
1 [] No analysis done
2 [] Less elaborate and less precise analysis
3 [] Exactly the same analysis
4 [] More elaborate and more precise analysis
45. How long after your positive investment decision did your most recent investment
become operational?
1 [] < 1 month
2 [] 1-3 months
3 [] 4-6 months
4 [] 7-12 months
5 [] Other
46. Was this preparation time longer than expected?
1 [] Yes. continue with question 47
2 [] No. continue with question 48
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47. What were the most important reasons for delaying the implementation of your most
recent investment?
1 [] Disappointing results of the Dutch company
2 [] Disappointing expectations of the Dutch economy
3 [] Disappointing expectations of the world economy
4 [] Unstable economic situation in the country of your most recent investment
5 [] Unstable political situation in the country of your most recent investment
6 [] Company found a country that at that time was more appropriate for the investment
7 [] Negative company results of the firm to take over in the country of the most recent
investment ~1
8 [] Financial reasons :
9 [] Delay with the necessary documents _•
10 [] Difficulties with the partners/other owners of the most recent investment . ^
11 [] Other: "*
48. Is your most recent investment still operational?
1 [] Yes
2 [] No, the most recent investment is not operational anymore since 19
Reason:
Continue with question 51
49. How risky do you currently consider your most recent investment, on a scale from 1 to
10?
^/= very r«A>\ /0 = no/ risAy of
50. How risky do you currently consider the country of your most recent investment, on a
scale from 1 to 10?
51. If you were to give your most recent investment an overall grade for success, between 1
and 10, what would be your choice?
f/=no( a/ a// sucress/u
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PART F: GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONTACT PERSON
Part F consists of some questions on the characteristics of the person that filled out this
questionnaire. These questions are necessary to send you the results of the survey. Also some
additional space is included for your questions and comments.
52 Would you like to receive a summary of the survey results?
1 [] Yes
2 [] No
53. Name contact person (person that filled out the questionnaire) ' {'
54. Function contact person
55. Phone number contact person
56. Fax number contact person
57. E-mail address contact person
58. Are you prepared to participate in this research by means of a personal interview or
some additional questions?
If you have additional questions or comments, you may enter them below and we will contact you:
You can also contact Mindel van de Laar, at the below mentioned address.
Thank you for your co-operation
Drs. Mindel van de Laar ><»»«r^ ,. ... •••^•« ,„,«^ .ö!
Uiii Mih " 4 Universiteit Maastricht S4\»<HTÄ' • - .«• •, -, «-v...v.,
Postbus616
6200 MD MAASTRICHT '•'
tel: 043-3883653
fax: 043 - 3884864
e-mail: m.vandelaar@algec.unimaas.nl
Internet information page: http://www2.unimaas.nl/~fdewbae/
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Landbouw, jacht en Bosbouw
Landbouw, jacht en dienstverlening t.b.v. dc
landbouw en jacht
Bosbouw en dienstverlening t.b.v. de bosbouw
Visserij
Visserij, kweken van vis en schaaldieren en
dienslverlening t.b.v. de \ isserij
Winning van Delfstoflen
Turfwinning
Aardolie en aardgaswinning en dienstverlening l.b.v
aardolic en aardgaswinning
Zand - grinl en klciu inning
Industrie
Vervaardiging van voedingsmiddelen en dranken
Verwerking van tabak
Vervaardiging van textielwaren
Vervaardiging van kleding: bereiden en verven van
bont
Vervaardiging van leer en lederwaren (excl.
Kleding)
Houtindustrie en vervaardiging van artikelen van
hout, kurk riet en vlechtwerk (excl. Meubelen)
Vervaardiging van papier, kanon en kanonwaren
Uitgeverijen. drukkerijen en rcproductie van
opgenomen media
Aardolie en steenkoolverwerkende Industrie:
bewerking van splijt en kweekstoffen
Vervaardiging van chemische produeten
Vervaardiging van producten van rubber en
kunststof
Vervaarding van glas, aardewerk, kalk en
gipsproducten
Vervaardiging van metalen in primaire vorm
Vervaardiging van producten van metaal
Vervaardiging van machines en apparaten
Vervaardiging van kantoormachmes en computers
Vervaardiging van overige elektrische machines,
apparaten en benodigdheden
Vervaardiging van audio, video en telecommunicate
- apparatuur en benodigdheden
Vervaardiging van medische apparaten en
instrumenten, orthopedische anikelen e.d.
Vervaardiging van auto's, aanhangwagens en
opleggers
Vervaardiging van transponmiddelen
Vervaardiging van meubels. venaardiging van
overige goederen
Voorbereiding tot recycling
Productie en Distributie van Elektriciteit.
Aardgas en Water
Productie en distributie van elektriciteit. aardgas en
warm water







































Detailhandel en rcparalie t.b.v. particulicrcn (excl.
auto's en motorfietsen en motorbrandstotTcn)
Horeca
Horeca
Vervoer, opslag en communicatie
Vervoer over land
Vervoer over water
Vervoer door de lucht
Diensverlening t.b.v. het vervoer
Post en telecommunicatie
Financiülc instellingcn
Financielc instellingcn (excl. Verzekeringswezen en
pensioenfondsen)
Verzekeringswczen en pensioensfondsen (excl
Verplichtc sociale verzekeringen)
Activiteilen t.b.v. of verwant aan financiele
instellingen
Ycrhuur van en handcl in gocd, vcrhuur van
roerende goederen en zakelijke dienstverlening
Verhuur van en handel in onrucrend goed.
Verhuur van transportmiddclcn. machines en
werktuigen zonder bedienend personeel en van
overige roerende goederen
Computerservice en informatictcchnologie bureaus
Speur - en ontwikkchngswerk
Overige zakelijke dienslverlening
Openbaar bestuur, overheidsdiensten en
verplichte sociale verzekeringen





Gezondheids - en Wclzijnszorg
Milieudicnstverkning. cultuur, rccrcatie en
overige dienstverlening
Milieudienstverlening
Werkgevers-, werknemers - en berocpsorganisaties:
levensbeschouwelijke en politieke organisaties;
overige ideeic organisaties
Cultuur, sport en recrealie
Overige dienslverlening
Particulierc huishoudens met personeel in
loondienst
Particulierc huishoudens met personeel in loondienst
Extraterritoriale lichamen en organisaties
Extratemtonale lichamen en orgamsatics
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DUTCH FIRMS WITH NO DIRECT
INVESTMENT IN CENTRAL EUROPE, EASTERN EUROPE
OR CENTRAL ASIA
The questions in this questionnaire are about the choice of Dutch
companies to start a direct investment in one of the countries of Central
Europe, Eastern Europe or Central Asia (further referred to as the CEE
region). Foreign direct investments are newly started enterprises, takeovers
of already existing local firms or joint ventures with a local company.
The questionnaire consists of 5 parts, A to E, and takes approximately 15
minutes to fill out.
We thank you in advance for your co-operation
Prof. Dr. Chris de Neubourg
Drs. Mindel van de Laar
Maastricht University
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PART A: INVESTMENT PLANS IN THE CEE REGION
The first 3 questions of this questionnaire are about possible investment plans of your company
in Central Europe, Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
1. Does your company have a direct investment or did it have a direct investment in the
past in one of the countries in Central Europe, Eastern Europe or Central Asia?
fa/i/y / a/iSHW/JOss/We,)
:" " l [] Yes, we currently have one or more direct investments. Continue with question 2
2 [] Yes, we had an investment that is currently closed. Continue with question 2
3 [] No, please fill out the blue questionnaire. This questionnaire can be thrown away. <»
Which one of the following countries in the CEE region, in which your company has no
investment yet, would be the country of your first, second and third choice in which to
invest at this moment, and which country do you consider the least attractive for your
company to invest in at this moment?





















































Number country of your 1 st choice:
Number country of your 2nd choice:
Number country of your 3d choice:
Number country of your last choice:
In which one of the following countries do you expect your company will invest in within
the next two years?
This direct investment could in this case be your first investment in that specific country,
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PART B: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DUTCH FIRM
The following 6 questions are about the activities of your company in THE NETHERLANDS
4. In which sector is your company active?
Please enter the main code according to the Dutch standard company codes of the
Central Bureau of Statistics. A list of these codes is attached in annex 1. If you do not
know the code, please describe the activity briefly. •» * •-- ,:: :•;-;', i^ i'V-Als '*' .'•^«"-".o<-»
fo/t/y 7 answerposs/Afe) ••: < , :.- . ^ ! i;... *• s,..«,^
SBIcode: „v, • .. t. \ .v« ,\
In which year did your company start its activities in the Netherlands?
How many different locations / offices does your company have in the Netherlands?
7. What were the total revenue, profit, and the number of employees working in your
company in the Netherlands the last year (1999), 5 years ago (1994) and 10 years ago
(1989)?
; If you do not know those data exactly, please make estimation. If your company was not
operational in that year, please cross it out.










8. What is the ownership structure of your Dutch company? •••••.• ,.-.,;
(p/ease e/iter /Ae otv/fersAip in />erce«ra^s, aaW/'/i^ to 700 9^)
Owner 1, nationality: %
»ii'" Owner 2, nationality: %
Owner 3, nationality: % +
'- •"•• . 100 %
9. Are the decisions to invest in a foreign country made completely or partly by the Dutch
company?
[] Yes. completely Dutch decision Please continue with part C
[] Yes the decision is made by the Dutch company
in co-operation with the other owners Please continue with part C
[] No, the decision is made by the foreign partners. This questionnaire is aimed at the
investment decisions of Dutch companies. Since your foreign partner makes the
foreign investment decisions of your company, the answers of your firm are not
comparable with those of the other respondents. Please continue with part E
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PART C: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS
Part C focuses specifically on all your foreign direct investments worldwide
10. In how many countries worldwide does your company have a direct investment?
Continue with question 12
Continue with question 11
1 [] No foreign direct investments
2 [] Foreign direct investment in countries
11. In which countries worldwide does your company have one or more direct investments,
and in which year were these started?
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12. In which sector is the majority (more than half) of your foreign investments active?
Please enter the main code that, according to the standard company codes of the Dutch
Central Bureau of Statistics, is most applicable to your company. A list of those codes is
included in Annex 1 (page 12)
SBIcode: • ••• .^-,v-,-i.:iv^Vti^..>-^H*. •&;<*.•>
it 8«i<?•>•.> -^••••-••• ••;?.:' ' S ' • *••.;•!".••: •>' :..•••...•:•••.'. ••..: ••
13. Did your company ever consider investing in a country in the CEE region?
l [] Yes, -.-•• Continue with part D
* [] No, our company has never been interested in investing
in a country in the CEE region Continue with question
14
14. What are the reasons your company never has been interested in the countries of the




















No interest in investing in a foreign country
The CEE region is economically not developed enough *
The CEE region is politically too unstable
There is already too much competition in the CEE region
We supply the CEE region with exports from the Netherlands '
There is not enough demand for our product in the CEE region >
There is no finance available for such an investment
Our company has bad experiences with doing business with the CEE region
Other:
Continue with part E
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PART D: CALCULATIONS FOR THE I1WESTMENT DECISION
The following questions are about the calculations your company makes before it determines to
invest in a foreign country or not. The questions are specifically aimed at the country in the
CEE region that your company has most recently considered investing in.
15. Which country in the CEE region has your company most recently considered to invest
in? We will refer to this country as your CEE choice.
























Georgia . »•• ,







































16. In which year did you consider to make this investment?
17. What kind of investment did you consider to make in your CEE choice?
(o/i/y 0/i£ a/KHwposs/A/^
1 [] Take over of an existing company
2 [] Completely new company
3 [] Joint venture with an existing company
4 [] Joint venture with a completely new company
5 [] Purchase through the national privatization process
6 [j Other:
18. How did you intent to finance your investment in the CEE choice?
f/»/e«s£ cross a// source o//ifta/icej
1 [] Private capital of the owner
2 [] Own funds of the Dutch company
3 [] Borrowed funds from the Netherlands
4 [] Borrowed funds from the country of your CEE choice
5 [] Own or borrowed funds from the other participants in your investment in the CEE
choice
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What was the trade relation with your CEE choice at the time you considered an
investment, and does this relation still exist?
f/w «////»/«• «wsHWs/w.vs/We, /»/ease /narAybr /Ae 5«fec/e</ fracfe re/aft'o/is H>Ae/A£r /Ais




Export to the CEE choice [] []










When your company was interested in an investment in your CEE choice, did your
company make any calculations to estimate the possibility of success of the investment?
Continue with question 21
Continue with question 21
Continue with question 21
Continue with part E
[] Yes, only for your CEE choice '•"'
[] Yes. for multiple countries
[] Yes, for multiple countries, all in the CEE region
[] No, the company did not make an analysis
Which one of the following aspects was a specific reason for your company to make an
investment analysis for your CEE choice?
1 [] There was already a trade relation with one or more companies in that country
2 [] There was a good contact-person to work with in that country
3 [] Other companies in that sector achieved good results in that country , •• , < .,
4 [] The owner or employees of the Dutch firm are from that country
5 [] Your partner or direct family members are from the CEE choice
6 [] Friends or acquaintances are from the CEE choice
7 [] The owner or employees of the Dutch firm were willing to work in the CEE choice
8 [] Your partner or direct family was willing to work in the CEE choice
9 [] Friends or acquaintances were willing to work in the CEE choice
10 [] Language knowledge of the CEE choice was in the Dutch firm available
11 [] Positive personal experiences in the CEE choice, for instance because of travel
experiences
12 [] Other:
22. For which countries did your company make an investment analysis besides your CEE
choice? , : . .... ,..,
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23. What were the 4 most important actions during your decision making process in
chronological order (for instance first the choice of country', afterwards the search for
an appropriate local partner)





The following question is about the factors that your company considered when determining to
invest in your CEE choice or not.
24. Which one of the following factors did your company use when determining the
EXPECTED REVENU of an investment in your CEE choice? If a factor was important
for your company when estimating the expected revenue, please mark if the factor
influenced the attractiveness of the country positively or negatively. Factors that were
not important for your company can be skipped.


















Factors considered during the calculating of the expected revenue of
the country of your 1" investment
Number of inhabitants in your CEE choice
Income per capita in your CEE choice
Income growth in your CEE choice
Revenue of your company in the Netherlands
Revenue of your company in other foreign countries
Revenue of other companies in your CEE choice
Revenue of the firm that you consider being your partner or want to take
over in your CEE choice
Expected market share in your CEE choice
Price of the sales product in the Netherlands
Price of the export product in your CEE choice
Price of the products of your competition in your CEE choice
Price of your product in other countries in the CEE region
Revenue obtained on existing export to your CEE choice
Costs of the existing export to your CEE choice
Profit obtained from the exports to your CEE choice
Competition present / absent in your CEE choice
(please cross out whatever not appropriate)




The factor was seen as:
Very
negative
ncgulivL- ncutrul positive Very
positive
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25. Which one of the following ORIENTATION ACTIVITIES did your company undertake
during the investment decision process of a possible investment in your CEE choice?
Seminars /study days / lectures T-, ..*>>,.•. ,...- -.-.«.»•,,, *.,...,.^ ^ ?...,-,.-v
Study trips / orientation trips ' ,A.S"
Market research done by your own company
Market research and advice by an external consultant
Advice by institutions in the Netherlands :
(for instance chambers of commerce, ministries, embassies)
Advice from institutions located in your CEE choice
(for instance foreign trade agencies, ministries, and privatization institutions)
Other:
Other:
26. Which of the following costs did your company consider w hen determining the expected
costs of your investment in your CEE choice?
















Build and restructure the building in your CEE choice
Infrastructural improvements in your CEE choice
(for instance road improvement, streetlights)
Telephone connection in your CEE choice
Institutional costs
(for instance obtaining documents)
Informal payments in your CEE choice
Company specific machinery
Other machinery
Rent or mortgage payments on the building in your CEE choice
Wages of the personnel
Training / retraining of the personnel
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27. Which ones of the following factors did your company take into account when making a
RISK ANALYSIS for a possible investment your CEE choice, and were these factors
considered as risk increasing or risk decreasing?
Factors that were not considered in the risk analysis can be skipped.
For instance: You did consider the factor internal conflicts in your risk analysis when
deciding to invest in Russia or not, and the fact that Russia is involved in an internal
conflict in Chechnya is risk increasing for Russia.






























Factors considered for the risk analysis in your CEE
choice
Political / cultural factors
Political stability
Political opinion of the government
Internal conflicts
External conflicts
Cultural difference with the Netherlands




Distance to the Netherlands












Restructuring of government services
Presence of institutions to increase the foreign trade and
investment
Bilateral or multilateral tax agreements with the
Netherlands
Bilateral or multilateral trade agreements with the
Netherlands
Legal system and implementation









The questions 28 to 32 are about the investment decision procedure within your company
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28. How often did your company, during the period in which your company considered to
invest, make an analysis with the use of the chosen factors?
1 [] Once - 's-' ;=•<!-.sit iti ij.i ,*.. /i > -••. . i ...,• •;•.>. >
2 [] Incidental -••« -'" ••'•.J.m?.v.'-> ;5i=- •••.<.•:.-;'.',. ii .
3 [] Monthly • •••- "'• '•'' ••••'•-•».•.•;<'; . i, .;• •
4 [] Weekly •• •>' '••••< • •^-•«H*«i*.fc^ ^. -: i. • •.•-:T.-.' • •'^:..
••••"<' 5 [] Daily -v. .-•%••>< -.Ü«* ro\-;,I\_-?»•'.• V> . < .i -•••.-:•.••.-••
6 [] Continuous process "
7 [] Other:
29. Within which time period would you expect your investment in your CEE choice to
become profitable?
1 [] Profitability was not an aim •- ••- '- '• - -/
2 [] < 1 year - -
3 []2-3years ,-^^.^,.^.,-.,-,.„,„.,-,;.-:;,-.. / ' ..
4 [] 4-5 years "^ j' .. •• - . ..
5 [] 6-10 years ... „_...., ._.-.. . *.
6 [] > 10 years ...
30. Were there, besides profitability, other aims that would determine the success of your
investment in your CEE choice?
1 [] Being present in the market L •
2 [] Growing market share
3 [] Brand name recognition in the market
4 [] Learning process for investments in other countries in the CEE region
5 [] Other:
31. With what would you compare your investment in your CEE choice in order to
i; • • • determine its success?
1 [] No comparison
2 [] The profit percentage of the Dutch firm
3 [] Interest revenues in the Netherlands
4 [] Interest revenues in your CEE choice . ,_
5 [] Revenue on stocks and shares
6 [] Revenue of obligations : ".
7 [] The inflation percentage in the Netherlands
8 [] The inflation percentage in your CEE choice ' ^ :. ? •.:.
9 [] Other:
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PART E: GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONTACT PERSON
Part E consists of some questions on the characteristics of the person that filled out this
questionnaire. These questions are necessary to send you the results of the survey. Also some
additional space is included for your questions and comments.
52 Would you like to receive a summary of the survey results?
' [] Yes , . .. ,. ,,.
2 [] No ""•••' ^ ' ' •
53. Name contact person (person that filled out the questionnaire)
54. Function contact person
55. Phone number contact person
56. Fax number contact person
57. E-mail address contact person




If you have additional questions or comments, you can enter them below and we will contact you:
You can also contact Mindel van de Laar, at the below mentioned address.
Thank you for your co-operation




tel: 043 - 3883653
fax: 043-3884864
e-mail: m.vandelaar@algec.unimaas.nl
Internet information page: http://www2.unimaas.nl/~fdewbae/
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Landbouw, jacht en Bosbouv*
Landbouw. jachl en dienstvcrlcning t.b.v. dc landbouw en
lach I
Bosbouw en diensivcrlcning t.b.v. de bosbouw
Visserij
Vissenj, kweken van vis en schaaldicrcn en dienstverlening
i.b.v. de vissenj
Winning van Del fst offen
Turfwinning
Aardolie en aardgasw inning en dienstverlening t.b.v.
aardolie en aardgaswinning
/und grint en kleiwinning
Industrie
Vervaardiging \an voedingsmiddclen en dranken
Verwertung van tabak
Vervaardiging van textielwarcn
Vervaardiging van klcding: berciden en verven van bont
Vervaardiging van leer en lederwaren (excl. Kleding)
Houlindustric en vervaardiging van artikclcn van hout.
kurk net en vlcchtwcrk (excl. Mcubelen)
Vcrvaardiging van papier, karton en kartonwaren
Uilgevcrijen. drukkerijen en reproductic van opgenomen
media
Aardolie en steenkoolvermerkende Industrie: bewcrking
van spliji en kweekslofien
Vervaardiging van chemische prudueten
Vervaardiging van produclen van rubber en kunststof
Vervaarding van glas, aardewcrk, katk en gipsproduclen
Vervaardiging van mclalcn in pnmaire vorm
Vervaardiging van produclen van metaal
Vervaardiging van machines en apparaien
Vervaardiging van kantoonnachines en computers
Vervaardiging van overige elektrische machines, apparaten
en henodigdheden
Vervaardiging van audio, video en telecommunicatie -
apparaiuur en benodigdheden
\'ervaardiging van medische apparaten en instrumenlcn.
orthopedische anikelen e.d.
Vervaardiging van auto's, aanhangwagens en opleggcrs
Vervaardiging van transportmiddclen
Vervaardiging van mcubels. vervaardiging van overige
goedercn
Voorbereiding lol recycling
Productie en Distribute van Elektriciteit, Aardgus en
Water
Produeiie en distnbutic van elektneiteii. aardgas en wann
w ater







































Detailhandel en rcparatic i.b.v. particulieren (excl. auto's
en motorfietscn en motorbrandstotTen)
Horeca
Horeca
Venoer, opslag en communicatie
Vervoer over land
Vervocr over water
Vcrvoer door de lucht
Diensverlening t.b.v. het vervoer
Post en iclecommunicatie
Financiele insicllingen
Finaticiclc instellingcn (excl. Verzekeringswczcn en
pensioentond.sen)
Ver/ekenngswc/cn en pensioensfondsen (excl. Verplichtc
sociale verzekenngen)
Acli\iteiten t.b.v. of verwant aan financiele instcllingen
\ crhuur van en Handel in goed, verhuur van roerende
ßoederen en zakelijke dienstverlening
Verhuur van en liandel in onroerend goed.
Verhuur van trans port middelen. machines en werktuigen
zonder bedienend personeel en van ovengc roerende
goedercn
Computerservice en in format ielech no logic bureaus
Speur - en ontwikkclingswerk
Ovengc zakelijke diensiverlening
Openbaar bestuur, overheidsdiensten en vcrplichte
sociale ver/ekeringen





Cie/ondheids - en Wel/ijnszorg
Milicudienstverlening, cultuur, recreatie en overige
diensiverlening
Milieudicnstvcrlening
Werkgcvers-. werknemers - en beroepsorganisalies;
levensbeschouwelijkc en politiekc organisalies; overige
ideiMe organisaties.
Cultuur. sport en recreatie
Ovenge dtenstverlening
Particuliere huishoudens met personeel in loondienst
Particuliere huishoudens met personeel in loondiensl
txtratcrritoriale lie ha men en organisaties
Extraterritoriale lichamen en organisalies
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De val van de Berlijnse Muur, op 9 november 1989, was een van de meest onverwachte,
indrukwekkende en belangrijke gebeurtenissen van de vorige eeuw. De landen in Centraal- en Oost-
Europa keerden zieh af van de Sovjet-Unie en begonnen de hervormingen van een socialistische
planeconomie naar een demoeratische markteconomie. Niet lang daarna, in 1991, viel de Sovjet-Unie
in vijftien onafhankelijke staten uiteen. De veranderingen voor deze landen waren enorm. Op körte
termijn moesten de prijzen worden geliberaliseerd en de landen openden hun grenzen voor
buitenlandse handel en investeringen.
Het is algemeen aanvaard dat met name directe investeringen een positieve invloed hebben op de
economie van het ontvangende land. Dit brengt niet alleen kapitaal maar ook kennis in de vorm van
menselijk kapitaal en technologie en werkgelegenheid met zieh mee. Om die reden hebben bijna alle
transitielanden hun wetgeving snel aangepast om buitenlandse investeringen toe te staan en te
faciliteren.
Ook voor Nederland was dit van belang. Niet alleen verdween de vijandigheid tussen Oost en West
met het beeindigen van de koude oorlog, maar op het hetzelfde moment opende zieh een enorme
markt voor handel en investeringen. Buitenlandse handel en investeringen waren tijdens de
communistische periode zo minimaal mogelijk gehouden. Sinds 1989 zijn de handeis- en
investeringsstromen vanuit Nederland naar Centraal- en Oost-Europa en Cehtraal-Azie constant
gestegen.
De buitenlandse investeringen zijn ongelijk verdeeld over de transitielanden. De meer ontwikkelde
landen, zoals Polen, Tsjechie en Hongarije, ontvingen een groot deel van de totale
investeringsstromen, terwijl de directe investeringen in bijvoorbeeld de Centraalaziatische landen
minimaal zijn. Ook de Nederlandse bedrijven met een investering in een transitieland hebben veelal
ge'investeerd in de Centraaleuropese landen, die economische en politiek het meest stabiel zijn en
geografisch en eultureel het dichtst bij Nederland liggen. Het is interessant deze ontwikkeling te
bestuderen, omdat het de vraag is of de beste investeringsmogelijkheden wel in Centraal-Europa
liggen, in plaats van in de geografisch verder gelegen, economisch minder ontwikkelde landen. Deze
landen hebben een risicovoller investeringsklimaat, maar de voordelen zoals bijvoorbeeld de
aanwezigheid van natuurlijke grondstoffen of de afwezigheid van coneurrentie kunnen mogelijk
zwaarder wegen dan de nadelen van een hoger investeringsrisico.
Dit proefschrift rieht zieh op alle aspecten van een directe investeringsbeslissing naar een onzekere
regio als Centraal- en Oost-Europa en Centraal-Azie. Directe investeringen zijn investeringen waarbij
een Nederlandse bedrijf voor meer dan tien procent eigendom is van een bedrijf in het buitenland en
zieh actief bezighoudt met het management van dat bedrijf. Het doel van dit proefschrift is een
completer beeld te krijgen van de processen die ten grondslag liggen aan de beslissing van
Nederlandse bedrijven om te investeren. De onderzoeksvragen zijn i) Welke kenmerken van
Nederlandse bedrijven verhogen de kans dat een bedrijf in een transitieland investeert? ii) Hoe ziet
het investeringsbeslissingsproces van een bedrijf eruit en is dat anders voor investeerders dan voor
bedrijven die besluiten niet te investeren?iii) Welke landkenmerken van transitielanden trekken
Nederlandse investeringen aan? en iv) Hoe bei'nvloeden persoonlijke aspecten en motivaties een
investeringsbeslissing?
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Het proefschrift kan worden verdeeld in drie delen. Deel een, dat bestaat hoofdstuk twee, drie en
vier, bevat een microniveau analyse. In hoofdstuk twee wordt het optiemodel beschreven en verder
uitgewerkt. In hoofdstuk drie en vier worden de veronderstellingen en conclusies van het optiemodel
getest. Hoofdstuk drie rieht zieh op de bedrijfskenmerken die direete investeringsstromen verklaren en
beinvloeden. Hoofdstuk vier gaat over het investeringsbeslissingsproces van een bedrijf en relateert
dit proces aan de uitkomst van de uiteindelijke keuze. Deel twee bevat een macroniveau analyses
van Nederlandse direete investeringsstromen; hoofdstuk vijf beschrijft de invloed van
landenkenmerken op direete investeringsstromen. Deel drie, hoofdstuk zes, onderzoekt de rol van
emoties en intuTtie bij een investeringskeuze.
Deel een van deze Studie bevat een microniveau analyse. Hoofdstuk 2 geeft een overzicht van het
optiemodel. Het optiemodel is gekozen als model omdat het zeer geschikt is om investeringen naar
transitielanden te beschrijven. Bedrijven kiezen een of meerdere landen waarin ze mogelijk willen
investeren. Op basis van een investeringsanalyse, met inachtneming van factoren zoals timing en
onzekerheid, nemen bedrijven een uiteindelijk de beslissing om al dan niet te investeren en zo ja, in
welk land. Het optiemodel voorspelt dat bedrijven een investering vaker zullen uitstellen als
onzekerheid omtrent de investering groter is. Uitbereidingen van het model, in sectie 2.4 en 2.5,
voegen toe dat uitstel vaker voorkomt als bedrijven meerdere landen selecteren om mogelijk een
investering in te doen en als deze landen onderling veel in risico verschillen. Hoewel het optiemodel
duidelijk aangeeft wanneer bedrijven zullen investeren, namelijk als de verwachte netto toegevoegde
waarde positief is, geeft het niet aan hoe deze waarde berekend moet worden en welke factoren
meegenomen dienen te worden in een dergelijke berekening. Om meer te weten te komen over het
investeringsbeslissingsproces van bedrijven, of ze een analyse maken en zo ja, welke factoren ze
dan meenemen in die analyse, is een enquete onderzoek uitgevoerd. Deze enquete is gehouden
onder Nederlandse bedrijven die tussen 1989 en 2000 geinteresseerd waren in de transitielanden. In
annex A is de methodologie van de enquöte beschreven en in annex B zijn de enqueues toegevoegd.
In hoofdstuk drie en vier worden de veronderstellingen en conclusies van het optiemodel in
hoofdstuk twee getest. Hoofdstuk drie is gericht op bedrijfskenmerken. De bedrijven in het
enqueteonderzoek waren allemaal in meer of mindere mate geinteresseerd in investeringen in de
transitielanden tussen 1989 en 2000. Dit hoofdstuk behandelt de vraag of bedrijven die in
transitielanden investeren gemeenschappelijke bedrijfskenmerken bezitten. Analyse toont aan dat
bedrijfskenmerken niet de belangrijkste verklärende variabelen zijn voor een investeringsbeslissing.
Met name ervaring met handel in de regio en ervaring met investeringen in de regio verflogen de
kans dat een bedrijf nogmaals zal investeren. In hoofdstuk vier wordt gekeken naar hoe bedrijven een
buitenlandse investeringsbeslissing nemen. Veel bedrijven maken een keuze zonder enige
investeringsanalyse. Voor wat betreff de bedrijven die wel een analyse maken, zijn er drie
interessante bevindingen. Ten eerste was een dergelijke analyse even uitgebreid voor bedrijven die
investeerden en bedrijven die niet investeerden. Het idee dat bedrijven die niet investeren minder
goed ge'informeerd zijn is dus op grond van deze data incorrect. Ten tweede was, voor bedrijven met
meerdere direete investeringen in de regio, de analyse voor de latere investeringen even uitgebreid
als de analyse voor hun eerste investering. Ervaring leidt dus niet tot een minder uitgebreide
voorbereiding van investeringen. Maar, ten derde, een uitgebreide investeringsanalyse heeft wel een
positieve invloed op de succesevaluatie van bedrijven. Bedrijven die de investering met een
212Nederiandse samenvatting •
uitgebreidere analyse hebben voorbereid zijn achteraf positiever over het functioneren van hun
investering. In sectie 4.5 zijn deze bevindingen omgezet in een raamwerk, waarin investeringskeuzes
worden gemaakt op grond van een risico-inschatting van het land, de kosten van het verzamelen van
informatie en de opbrengsten van de informatie in de vorm van verminderde onzekerheid van de
investeringskeuze.
Deel twee van het proefschrift, hoofdstuk vijf, behandelt geaggregeerde Nederiandse
investeringsstromen. Door middel van het grawry mode/, aangevuld met 60 variabelen, worden de
investeringsstromen naar de transitielanden bestudeerd. Vaak wordt aangenomen dat de
transitielanden, nadat ze zoveel jaren gesloten zijn geweest voor buitenlandse investeringen, hun
achterstand nu versneld inhalen en relatief veel instroom van investeringen ontvangen. De resultaten
bieden geen bewijs voor deze veronderstelling. Hoe meer er gecontroleerd wordt voor ,,,.,
landenkenmerken en verschillen tussen de landen van de regio, hoe duidelijker wordt dat er geen
regiogericht inhaaleffect bestaat. Er is ook geen reden aan te nemen dat de landen die in 2004 zijn
toegetreden tot de Europese Unie hogere instromen van Nederiandse investeringen zullen
ontvangen, aangezien deze landen al op hun lange-termijnevenwichtsniveau zitten. De overige
transitielanden zitten momenteel nog onder hun lange-termijnevenwichtsniveau, maar aangezien zij
niet toetreden tot de EU wordt ook daar geen positieve schok verwacht.
In deel drie, hoofdstuk zes, wordt gekeken in hoeverre naast onzekerheid, kosten en opbrengsten
ook persoonlijke motivaties een rol spelen bij een directe investeringskeuze. Meerdere antwoorden in
de enquete duiden erop dat persoonlijke redenen belangrijk en invloedrijk zijn voor de uiteindelijke
keuze. In sectie 6.2 worden deze persoonlijke motivaties beschreven. Dergelijke motivaties worden
niet vaak in overweging genomen in economische beslissingstheorieen, hoewel uit de literatuur blijkt
dat ze wel degelijk van invloed zijn op investeringsbeslissingen. In sectie 6.4 wordt beargumenteerd
dat individuen, gezien de complexiteit van investeringskeuzes en afwezigheid van perfecte informatie,
hun emoties en intuftie kunnen gebruiken om keuzes te maken. In sectie 6.5 wordt deze argumentatie
omgezet in een micro-economisch nuts-maximalisatiemodel, waarbij zowel het nut van het bedrijf als
het nut van de beslisser van invloed zijn op de uiteindelijke keuze.
In hoofdstuk zeven wordt een samenvatting van het proefschrift gegeven, inclusief een sectie
waarin beleidsadviezen op grond van de analyses worden gegeven.
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